


SRI VENKATESWARA UNIVERSITY

ORIENTAL JOURNAL



Volume : XXXVIII

1995

Parts 1 & 2

ISSN 0081 - 3907

**SRI VENKATESWARA UNIVERSITY
ORIENTAL JOURNAL**

Volume XXXVIII: 1995



**ORIENTAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE
SRI VENKATESWARA UNIVERSITY
TIRUPATI - 517502**

Sri Venkateswara University Oriental Journal
Vol. 38, Pts. 1 & 2, 1994. Edited and published by
Dr. M. Srimannarayana Murti, Professor & Director, Oriental
Research Institute, Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati, 1997.

ISSN 0081 - 3907

*The responsibility for the facts stated, opinions
expressed or conclusions reached, is entirely that
of the authors of the articles, and the Oriental
Research Institute accepts no responsibility for them.*

Price Rs. 50=00

Copies can be had of:

The Librarian

Sri Venkateswara University Library

TIRUPATI-517 502

India

Laser typeset in the *S.V.U. Oriental Research Institute*

Printed at *L.V. Graphics*, Tirupati-517501

CONTENTS

Comparative Mythology <i>Samiran Chandra Chakrabarti</i>	1
Pada and what it signifies in Pāṇini <i>V. Swaminathan</i>	21
A Note on Professor R.D. Ranade's Contribution to the Study of History of Upaniṣadic Philosophy <i>G.C. Nayak</i>	45
Brahmins and Kshatriyas in the Vedic Age <i>M. Srimannarayana Murti</i>	55
A Study of Ornaments in the Vedic Literature <i>Narasingha Charan Panda</i>	75
Metaphors in the Ṛgveda - with special reference to Nadī Sūktas <i>S.K. Lal</i>	85
The Sadvidyā Section of the Chandogyaopaniṣad - A Study from the Advaita and the Dvaita Stand Points <i>S. Revathy</i>	105
Criticism of the Study of Vatsarāja - A Novel Approach <i>C.R. Subhadra</i>	115

TELUGU

నేరము, నేరస్థుడు, మానవమితి: పరిశీలన
V. Rami Reddy

125

REVIEWS

139

- S.S. Janak (ed.): *Śiva and Temple Ritual*
Horst Brinkhaus (ed): *M. Winternitz, Kleine Schriften*
C.G. Kashikar: *A Survey of the Śuklayajurveda Pariśiṣṭas*
Bommakanti Srinivasacharya: *Gopurasandēśaḥ* (Skt)
N.R. Waradpande: *New Light on the date of the Ṛgveda*
N.R. Waradpande: *The Ṛgvedic Soma*
John J. Stanley: *The Precession*
C.R. Sarma: *The Rāmāyaṇa in Telugu and Tamil -
A Comparative Study*
C. Rajendran: *A Transcultural Approach to Sanskrit Poetics*
K Vijayalakshmi & K.M. Shyam Sundar: *Mṛgāyurveda -
Indian Animal Science, Pt. I & II*
K.M. Shyam Sundar: *Treatment for Poisons in Traditional
Medicine*
Ramesh M. Nanal & A.V. Balasubramanian (ed): *Ṛtucaryā* (Hindi)
K.M. Shyam Sundar: *Ophthalmology in Traditional Medicine*
Ramesh M. Nanal & A.V. Balasubramanian (ed): *Ṛtucaryā -
Adaptation to the Seasons*
K.M. Shyam Sundar & A.V. Balasubramanian: *Prakruthi -
An Ayurvedic Guide to Health*
Aparna Chattopadhyay: *Studies in the Kathasaritsagara*
Aparna Chattopadhyay: *Studies in the Carakasamhita*

SAMIRAN CHANDRA CHAKRABARTI

COMPARATIVE MYTHOLOGY*

Much debate as regards the origin and nature of myths remains inconclusive, even great scholars are at logger heads with one another, the origin and nature of myths still remain to some extent obscure. I shall try here to present a brief conspectus following the findings of the experts. The word *mythology* means 'the systematic and historical study of myths'. The word is however also used to denote the body of myths belonging to a people. With the advent of modern science, mythology was usually regarded as a purely fictitious, superstitious product of primitive mind. This attitude towards myths is no more considered fully acceptable and scholars have devoted serious attention to the study of myths. Modern research has applied comparative methods to various branches of learning and thereby broadened the horizons of our knowledge, deepened our understanding of things and heightened the quality of research.

* Keynote address read at the Seminar on Comparative Mythology organized by the Department of Sanskrit, Bombay University, 1991.

Comparative history, comparative religion and particularly comparative philology set the trend of comparative mythology in the early 19th century.

When the myths of a particular people are studied in isolation, it would appear that they are bundles of absurdity, having no logic. Comparative Mythology, by accumulation of vast range of material from different parts of the world, has brought it to our notice that even myths of widely different regions and cultures divulge a great extent of similarity. It gives rise to the conviction that behind apparent absurdities, myths may contain something that merits serious study, for otherwise we cannot explain the recurrence of ideas. A comparative study helps in understanding myths even of a particular idea contain something that merits serious study, for otherwise we cannot explain the recurrence of ideas. A comparative study helps in understanding myths even of a particular region. Claude Lévi-Strauss has shown how in order to solve the problem, "we have, to make a jump from South America to North America, because it will be a North American myth which will give us the clue to the South American one."¹ It is the comparative method of study that has enabled us to attain certain degree of certainty in classifying the myths and in understanding their nature and function. In the "one world" of today, a broad based study of the subjects has to be undertaken on a comparative basis.

A comparative study of myths brings to our notice the points of similarity and points of dissimilarity as well. A systematic study must start with the points of resemblance. It is to be seen which outweighs the other. Ishtar, of Assyro-Babylonian myth, riding a lion, presents a figure very similar to our Durgā; but Durgā is

a mother goddess whereas Ishtar is a harlot of gods, who tried to seduce Gilgamesh. It is necessary to ensure that the conclusions drawn from the points of resemblance are not invalidated by those of difference. If the comparative study reveals that a myth was prevalent among different peoples of different regions, we have to examine the probability of borrowing. Borrowings would be probable if direct or indirect contact of these peoples in the ancient period could be established by historical evidence. Migration of some myths and notions very probably could, and did, take place with migration of races and contact of peoples in the ancient age.

But in the cases where any such contact or influence is precluded or at least cannot be established, how are we to explain the points of resemblance? Besides, comparison itself divulges also innumerable differences, which cannot be explained by mechanical borrowing. It is to be seen whether comparative mythology lends support to the theory of diffusion or to that of evolution. Gonda points out that "in engaging in comparative studies of myths, rites, divine figures we are likely to detect or at least mention points of resemblance sooner than discover and evaluate differences, even if the latter are of greater relevance than the former".²

The points of differences may be due to regional peculiarities, characteristic features of a culture, social, historical and geographical reasons. The points of resemblance may indicate a common heritage, where possible, or parallel development of myths in independent traditions. They can also indicate the universality of human thought and experience under similar conditions, for humanity is one. It is universal man that is expressing itself in myths in spite of diversity of details.

The following tasks confront comparative mythologist: to collect all comparable data from possible quarters of the world, to sort out the fundamental resemblances or differences, to ascertain which, resemblance or difference, is more significant, to ascertain the place and function of the component elements in the whole myth, to ascertain the possible additions and alterations occurring in course of time, to consider historical, geographical and cultural conditions of the region where a myth was prevalent, and to study a myth together with the corresponding ritual, if any.

Scholars have found it difficult to define myth. We may however remember the characteristics of myths. Myths are ancient, often symbolical, narratives, traditionally handed down, believed to be true and sacred, mostly relating to the primeval condition, creation and other phenomena through deeds of supernatural powers like gods. Among the four types of *arthavāda*, *nindā*, *praśamsā*, *parakṛti* and *purākalpa*, *purākalpa* may most probably be used as the Sanskrit synonym for myth. Of the five elements of the *Purāṇa*, *sarṇa* and *pratisarga* approximate to myth.

A myth is a traditional narrative. It must have once originated in an individual's thought. But it represents his contemporary spirit, collective ideas, aspirations and modes of thought. It remains no more merely individualistic. Variety of the themes of myths is considerably large, and classification of myths admits of overlap. A great number of myths explain the origin of the universe. Some myths again deal with the origin of gods, man, animals, etc. There are myths connected with alternation of summer and winter solstice, bright and dark fortnight and such other regular natural changes, while

some myths deal with natural phenomena of irregular occurrence. There are also myths relating to different kinds of transformations, existence after death, social institutions, heroic deeds, etc.

Not all stories of antiquity are myths in the true sense of the term. Myths may be distinguished from fables and fairy tales. A very clear line of demarcation can scarcely be drawn between myths and such non-myths. Both are traditionally handed down, both have supernatural elements, and their date and authorship remain unknown. But myth is believed to be true, sacred, mostly connected with happenings at the beginning and with human destiny, whereas these characteristics are lacking in the non-myths like fables and fairy tales. Unlike myth, they are not connected with ritual. Unlike fables, myths are not intended directly for didactic purpose. The distinction between myth and folk tales is however more difficult to ascertain. The difference lies most probably in the degree of seriousness and sacred character attached. Some scholars like Stith Thompson regard myth as a type of folk tales.

Myths present difficult questions about the meaning they had for peoples among whom they originated. The symbol is very intimately connected with myths, the latter often state symbolic action, objects and expressions. Mythological figures too have symbolic significance. Also in ritual which enacts myth, symbolic significance of the actions and objects plays an important role. Same symbols may have different meanings to different peoples and same ideas may be expressed through different symbols. When, in course of time, the original significance of a symbol passes into oblivion, myths become obscure even to the people among

whom they are prevalent. If the same symbol can mean different things to different believers, it is needless to mention how difficult a task it is for a modern scholar to understand a symbol and the original significance of a myth of antiquity, and that too belonging to a different culture.

The primitive people believed the myths to be true. Even now, at least in India and some other parts of the world, the myths exert considerable influence on peoples. Even now a great body of our people believes in the ancient myths, practises and rites connected with them. Mythology is therefore still a force shaping the way of our living and thinking. The picture may be otherwise in cases where new religions like Christianity replaced the indigenous ones; a comparative study will make the position clear.

Even for some people who no more believe the supernatural elements of the myths as true, myths have retained some attraction. Themes from classical mythology have greatly influenced various arts like painting, sculpture and literature. Many modern writers have composed works on the basis of old myths (e.g. T.S. Eliot, J. Joyce, W.B. Yeats, R.M. Rilke, Thomas Mann, F. Kafka, etc.).

How to explain this appeal of myth to the modern mind? Probably the myths carry a deep significance for man beyond the limitations of a particular age and locality. Probably man finds in myths eternal crisis arising out of human limitations, mortality and invincibility of fate on the one hand and cosmic balance on the other. Immortality is beyond human reach; Gilgamesh, the Assyro-Babylonian hero, set out in search of eternal

life, even got a plant for the purpose, but ultimately lost it. Orpheus had a single chance in his life to bring back Eurydice from the realm of death; but he too failed, for contravening a condition.

When the myths were composed, religion and philosophy, in the sense we know them now, were not known to the primitive man, not to speak of science in its modern sense. But what we find in some of them may be called, in Oldenberg's expression, *vorwissenschaftliche Wissenschaft* 'pre-scientific science' or 'the conjectural science' in Macdonell's expression. Man looked at the nature with awe, anxiety and curiosity, and tried to establish casual relation between the natural and the supernatural. How the concept of supernatural powers dawned upon the mind of primitive people, is difficult to ascertain. This may be explained by a religious instinctive or primeval religiosity. Though the Marxist scholars will object to the idea of primeval religiosity, the ultimate source of religion may most probably be found in the instinctive sense of supernatural forces. Myths divulge a belief that there is a system in the cosmos of which man is a part and with which man is co-operating.

Ideas of unknown are influenced by or based upon the known. If myths are based upon primitive people's experience, we face the question what kind of experience it was. Was it intuitive knowledge? Ancient Indian tradition claims that our Vedic seers had supernormal vision, through which they could perceive the supernatural, but their successors lost this ability. Yāska calls the seers *sākṣātkṛtadharman*, and their successors *asākṣātkṛtadharman*. It was believed that through such

powers the ancient seers could see the role of the supernatural powers behind the natural phenomena.

The (yogins) and mystics of India emphatically claim to have supernaturally perceived some mythical gods, and to have established direct contact with them. They believe and make us believe that gods and goddesses of mythology are real supernatural beings. Time and again, such yogins 'mystics' and saints have drawn our attention to the reality of mythical deities (an apparent contradiction?) - which cannot be simply brushed aside. The study of comparative mysticism may shed light on this aspect of mythology. Mysticism make us aware of correspondences between the microcosm and the macrocosm. The Vedic thought often tends to mysticism. The famous Puruṣa hymn speaks of the creation originating from the cosmic sacrifice of Puruṣa, who is said to be all that is and that will be.³ In India we often find mingling of myth and mysticism. The Upaniṣadic idea of the all-encompassing Supreme Being is a very good expression of the mystic belief, tolerant of mythology.

The relation between myth and ritual is very intimate. Myth informs us of the nature of the supernatural powers, and ritual tells us the way how they may be worshipped and propitiated. What is most controversial in this regard is whether myth precedes ritual or ritual precedes myth. A universally acceptable solution is yet to be found. It has however been noticed by scholars that all ritual is associated with myth, but not all myths, at least apparently, are connected with ritual.⁴

Some regard a myth as providing a foundation for the corresponding ritual, while others regard ritual as a kind of dramatized expression of myth. Ritual represents

the level of action and the myth, the conceptual level. 'Creation myths' are supposed to have healing capacity. Myths are supposed to arouse the sacred being to whom they relate. It is the same notion of the sacred that appears in myth and ritual likewise. By retelling or by enacting the myth the primordial divine action is repeated and also rejuvenated.⁵ The mythological gods get nourishment from the ritual offerings.

The Mīmāṃsakas lay stress on ritual, which, in their opinion, are conducive to desired results, and regard the mythical narratives as merely eulogistic statements made in support of the ritual. They regard them as a part of the Vedas and admit that they too are studied traditionally, but do not admit that they are *vivakṣitārtha* 'literally true', that is to say, the true significance of the myth lies not in the phenomena related, but in its function of supporting the ritual concerned. Their views cannot be considered anti-Vedic, for Vedic literature itself contains statements to the effect that the myths are not to be taken as true in their literal sense.⁶

Myths are interpreted in various ways in accordance with various methods of interpretation. The problem of interpreting the myths is inseparably connected with the origin, nature, function and classification of myths. These issues are interlinked and to a great extent interdependent. Various approaches to the study of myths have been made. Some of them are quite old and may be found in the Vedic exegetical texts like *Nirukta*.

Followers of the historical approach regard myth as a part of traditional history of primitive man. Yāska mentions views of the Aitihāsikas, the ancient Indian

followers of this method. According to them, Vṛtra was the son of Tvaṣṭṛ and Áśvins were originally two virtuous kings. Pischel and Geldner too regarded them as two heroes of antiquity. The Vedic tradition recognizes promotion of human beings to the divine status by virtue of meritorious deeds; *karmadevas* 'gods by the deeds' belong to this class of gods. The *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* says: *martyā ha vā agre devā āsuh*, 'Now, indeed, the gods were at first mortal' (11.1.2.12, trans. J. Eggeling), cf. *yajñena vai devāḥ suvargam lokam āyan*, 'By means of the sacrifice the gods went to the world of heaven' (TS.6.3.4.7, trans. A.B. Keith). Euhemerus (c. 4th century B.C.) was an advocate of this method of interpretation, which is also called Euhemeristic after his name. He sought to establish that myths were of historical origin, that gods were men of great heroic deeds. Robert Graves traces history of ancient Greece in Greek myths. We are told that Uta Napishtim, the hero of the Babylonian flood story, was deified afterwards by the great god Enlil. Charpentier offered euhemeristic explanation of Indra, Varuṇa and Áśvins. Though not all the myths have necessarily historical value, it is quite probable that some myths contain historical elements. Myths may be useful to some extent as a source of the history of ancient peoples, especially where real history does not exist. The history of India of the Vedic period, is, for example, based mostly on the *Vedas*, full of mythical narratives.

The meteorological approach tries to explain myth as ascription of personal existence to the heavenly bodies. As for example, the solar interpretation of the Vedic gods claims that all the Vedic gods are in fact different names and forms of the sun. *Bṛhaddevatā* (1.61-69) contains such explanation. This is also the view

of *Sarvānukramaṇī*: *ekaiva vā mahān ātmā devatā, taṃ sūryam ity ācaksate, sa hi sarvabhūtātmā*, 2.14-20. Late MM *Sītārāma Śāstrin*, in his *Vedārthavicāraḥ*, tried to establish this view with great effort.

The folklorist approach seeks the origin of myths in folklore. Scholars like Wilhelm Mannhardt and Stith Thompson explored folklore on a comparative basis. The difficulty in distinguishing myths from folk tales has already been mentioned. Some myths are regarded as a part of folklore, while some scholars find in folklore mythology in the making. Lévi-Strauss says: "There is no serious reason to isolate tales from myths; although a difference between the two is subjectively felt by a great many societies. On the contrary, it is observed that tales, which have the character of folktales in one society, are myths for another and vice versa".⁷

According to the naturalistic approach, myths originated as a result of personifying the natural forces (cf. *abhidhāne 'rthavādaḥ*, *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtra*, 1.2.38 in this connection).

The Nairuktas championed this method, and Yāska explains Vedic myths accordingly. The primitive peoples largely believed in the animated character of nature or particular parts thereof. The principal objects of nature like water, fire and earth were universally conceived as persons, possessing divine character. Whether the natural objects themselves were deified or whether divine presence was felt in natural objects,⁸ remains a matter of debate. Some of these gods were conceived anthropomorphic. The sex of these personified gods is determined sometimes by their activities, and sometimes even by the language of the people concerned,

e.g. in Egyptian mythology, the earth (Geb) is a god and the heaven or sky (Nut) is a goddess, because of grammatical gender of the words. The sky is universally regarded as a sacred entity. Max Müller formulated the etymological equation: *Dyaus-pitar* (Skt) = *Zeus Pater* (GK) = *Jupiter* (Lat) = *Tyr* (Old Norse); different names of the sky god. The sky god assumes the name of Tien in China. The sky goddess is Nut in Egypt, her counterpart is Amaterasu Omikami in Japan. In Egypt and Inca empire, the sun-god, instead of the sky-god, assumed pre-eminence.

Polytheism provides a very good ground for a rich mythology. The gods in Egyptian mythology have various forms, human as well as numerous animal forms (bull, ram, falcon, vulture, etc.) and also in hybrid forms with animal head. A god appears in an animal form, later has the animal head, and lastly assumes a human form. The ancient Egyptian mythology recognizes a vast multitude of gods and goddesses, representing various aspects of nature and life, and malevolent ghosts.

But not in every case is the natural basis of a myth obvious. Macdonell points out: "When the natural basis of the tale is forgotten, new touches totally unconnected with its original significance may be added or even transferred from other myths. When met with at a late stage of its development, a myth may be so far overgrown with secondary accretions unconnected with its original form, that its analysis may be extremely difficult or even impossible".⁹ A comparison of similar myths in other traditions may be of help in such cases. Controversy rages over the question, which particular god represents which specific aspect of nature.

Unanimity is yet to be achieved. Some scholars of Indo-European mythology tried to determine this on the basis of the etymologies of the god-names, but others did not accept etymology as a safe guide in mythology.

The romantic approach of the late 18th century regarded myths as a historical representation of something eternal. Myths as repositories of experience were valued more than artificial poetry or art, by the followers of the romantic approach, who believe that myths give expression to fundamental feelings and concern common to the whole mankind, irrespective of age.

Frazer laid stress on the combined study of myth and ritual, for myths were, in his opinion, meant for explaining ritual. He suggested 'fertility' as the chief explanation for both myth and ritual. He analyzed many myths and has shown that they originated from the puzzle of harvesting. The cyclic appearance and disappearance of crop appeared to the primitive people to be of supernatural reason; around which originated his idea of the birth-death-rebirth cycle. The analogy between the cyclic birth and rebirth of man and that of crop is explicit in the Upaniṣadic statement: *sasyam iva martyaḥ pacyate sasyam ivājāyate punaḥ* (KaṭhaU. 1.1.6) and the like. Persephone, while plucking flowers, was abducted by Pluto. After her disappearance there was no crop. Gods intervened and it was ultimately decided that Persephone would live six months in the world and six months in the nether region. Her fate became also the fate of crop.

The functionalists believe that myths as social phenomena are to be analyzed by defining the function they performed in a society. Marcel Mauss laid stress on

the 'total social phenomenon'. Social life is a system, all its aspects are organically connected. Myths are no exceptions and therefore myths are to be interpreted as 'integrated with other aspects of society and as supporting existing social relationships'.

S. Freud developed theories concerning the deeper layers of the mind, the unconscious, and suggested that "myth was the distorted wish-dreams of entire peoples". In the Oedipus myth he detects "the male child's repressed desire for his mother and a corresponding wish to supplant his father". C.G. Jung extended the psychological approach by propounding his theory of common human access to the collective unconscious, the inborn deeper layer on which personal unconscious rests. The basic pattern of certain inherited motifs (archetypes) persists and largely similar images are encountered in myths and dreams.

Allegorical explanations of myths are also offered, e.g. opposition between gods and demons may be viewed as allegorical expression of the opposition between good and evil.

Comparative mythology got impetus from comparative philology. Scholars, on the basis of a comparative study of different languages, postulated the existence of IE, a common ancestor of the IE family of languages. If this IE was spoken by IE people, it was probable that they had common culture, religion and mythology. First of all, the scholars devoted their attention to the language. Etymologies of the names of Vedic gods were then believed to provide clues to the identification of IE elements. A. Kuhn may be regarded as the first serious scholar of comparative mythology with special

stress on the Vedic. Max Müller followed the lead given by Kuhn. Kuhn pointed out traces of a common mythology prevalent among Indo-European peoples. The Vedic mythology was naturally the *Ausgangspunkt*, but it was viewed as an aspect of Indo-European mythology; and the scholars depended on the etymologies of the names of gods, because of the assumption that the science of religion should be similar to that of language. Naturalistic explanation of the myths was offered, for it was believed that Vedic poets sought to see the supernatural behind the natural. Linguistic and mythological equations were framed.

Max Müller established identity of Dyaus-pitar (Skt), Zeus Pater (GK), Jupiter (Lat.), Tyr (Old Norse) – different names of the sky god. According to Oldenberg, Indra was the storm god of IE period. A thunder god existed in the IE period, he was retained in various branches of the IE family – though not under a common name. “That the conception of higher gods whose nature was connected with light (*div* ‘to shine’) and heaven (*div*) had already been arrived at in the Indo-European period, is shown by the common name *deivos* (Skt. *deva-s*, Lith. *deva-s*, Lat. *deu-s*), ‘god’.¹⁰ Not much progress could however be made in regard to the IE mythology and its relation with Vedic mythology.¹¹

Broadly speaking, most of the scholars of Vedic mythology like Kuhn, Max Müller, Gubernatis, Bergaigne, Kaegi, Hillebrandt, Oldenberg, Winternitz, Griswold and Keith, advocated naturalistic interpretation of the Vedic mythology. But later on, scholars like Pischel, Geldner, Sten Konow and Charpentier rejected the exclusively naturalistic interpretation. According to Pischel and Geldner, *Aśvins* were two heroes of antiquity,

and according to Charpentier, Indra was the heroic chief, while Varuṇa was the king of a well-ordered city state.

The early etymological attempts met with disapproval on the ground that the Vedic mythology should be studied primarily from the Vedic sources, and not exclusively from a comparative viewpoint, because the Vedic mythology was mostly of indigenous origin, and that the tendency of framing etymological equations of comparative mythology was not satisfactory, because other etymologies too could be suggested. Many equations have since been rejected. Besides, closely connected with the Vedic mythology was the Vedic ritual which too showed little IE influence. Hillebrandt, Oldenberg and Renou pointed out that combined studies of myth and ritual must be undertaken because of interdependence of these two aspects. Oldenberg noticed that not only natural phenomena, but also some abstract concepts *śraddhā*, *manyu*, etc. were deified. Prevalence of primitive magic (*Zauberritual*) in Vedic ritual and mythology was noticed by Caland. Some of the scholars appreciated the anthropological theories as helpful for explaining the Vedic mythology.

Leopold von Schroeder revived the early attempt of formulating mythological equations on the basis of etymologies, but there was also the contention that comparative philology was so safe guide, because of the time gap between the IE period and the Vedic era, and therefore, the Indian tradition itself should be explored thoroughly for understanding the *Veda*. Some scholars think that through contact with Austro-Asiatic people, the Vedic mythology assimilated some non-IE elements.

It was pointed out that the Vedic religion was more closely related to the ancient Iranian religion than to the other IE ones in linguistic, mythological and ritualistic aspects. Brunnhofer connected some Vedic personal and place names with persons and places of ancient Iran. To him, a considerable part of the *R̥gveda* was of Iranian origin. Oldenberg noticed that the mythological unit consisting of Varuṇa, Mitra and Ādityas corresponded very well with the Avestan mythological unit consisting of Ahura Mazdāh, Mithra and Amesha Spentas. Mithra was the Sun-god (= Mitra), and Varuṇa, (= Ahura Mazdāh), by virtue of his association with Mitra, was the moon-god, and Ādityas (= Amesha Spentas) were then the planets.

Macdonell noticed that the affinity of the oldest form of the Avestan language with the dialect of the Vedas is very great, but it is not that great in mythology (p. 7). The Vedic and the ancient Iranian concept are tantalizingly similar on the one hand and dissimilar on the other. A few such points may be noted here: The Vedic Indra is very similar to Tishtrya in his function, but not in name; Atar = Agni, recipient of sacrifice and prayer in both; Haoma = Soma, the plant and god, similarities suggestive of shared beliefs among IE people; Mitra - Mithra, - the image is clearer in Iranian tradition; Varuṇa - unknown by name in Iranian texts, but conceptually very close to Ahura Mazdāh; personification of abstract conceptions in both (*śraddhā*, *Verethraghna*); *Khsathra Vairya* reminds one of *kṣatra* of Varuṇa; *ṛta-druh*: *asha-druj*- moral dualism/opposition not so sharply defined as in the Avesta; powers of the gods are increased by sacrifices offered to them in both; tripartite structure of society reflected in mythology; some gods have human forms, others not; the concept of three

regions: Ahura Mazdāh ruling above in the light, Angra Mainyu ruling below in darkness, Vāyu ruling the intermediate space, cf. threefold division of Vedic gods according to three regions; the struggle between Atar and Azhi Dahaka over Divine Glory partially reminds that between gods and demons over heaven.

Johanness Hertel thought that the central theme of the Vedic mythology was light and fire. In the *Veda*, fire was identified with understanding (wisdom) and power. In his view, these two ideas were Indo-Iranian, and probably even Indo-Germanic. L.D. Barnett found Hertel's fire mythology helpful to correlate the Vedic Agni-cult with the Avestan fire cult.

G. Dumézil made a sociological approach (functional relationship). A comparative study of Indo-Iranian, Celtic, Italian and Greek sources shows the IE conception of a social structure based on three functions of priests, warriors and producers, and this gave rise to their tripartite mythology, which presented gods as moral (Mitra-Varuṇa), military (Indra) and economic (Ásvins).

In the recent period, comparative mythology has taken a new turn following the structural approach, which is based on the analogy of structural linguistics. The essence of structural approach is, in the words of Lévi-Strauss, one of the chief exponents of structuralism, "The quest for the invariant, or for the invariant elements among superficial differences" (*Myth and meaning*, p. 8). Stress is laid on the study of relations among phenomena (not on the phenomena themselves) and the system into which the relations enter. Why so? A myth tells us of events of mythopoeic age, but "what gives

the myth an operational value is that the specific pattern described is timeless; it explains the present and the past as well as the future".¹²

As a result of his structural analysis of myth, Lévi-Strauss has dismissed the alleged qualitative differences between the primitive mind and modern scientific or logical thought, for he has found that "the kind of logic in mythical thought is as rigorous as that of modern science, and that the difference lies, not in the quality of the intellectual process, but in the nature of the things to which it is applied".¹³ This method eliminates the problems of identifying the original versions of a myth, for a myth is, in this approach, regarded as consisting of all its versions. The structuralist approach has found opposition from some scholars like M. Eliade, who believe that myth is to be understood as a religious phenomenon, irreducible to non-religious categories.

All these approaches have their own merits and can indeed explain some myths. But they have their limitations too, as pointed out by experts from time to time. It is extremely difficult to believe that dogmatic application of any one of them can satisfactorily explain all myths. It is therefore better to be cautious before making or following sweeping generalizations, and, wherever possible, to seek evidence from other sources for testing the validity of a conclusion arrived at.

REFERENCES

1. *Myth and Meaning*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978, p.26.
2. Presidential address, *Proceedings of All-India Oriental Conference*, XXIX, Poona, 1980, p. 7.

3. *puruṣa evedaṃ sarvaṃ yad bhūtaṃ yac ca bhavyam*, RV. X.90.2.
4. Yāska noticed a distinction between *sūktabhāj* and *havirbhāj* deities.
5. cf. (*yasya brahma vardhṇam yasya somaḥ*), RV. 2.12.14.
6. e.g. *nendro astīti nema u tva āha ka īṃ dadarśa kam abhi ṣṭa-vāma*, RV. 8.100.3; *naitad asti yad daivāsuraṃ... na tvaṃ yuyutse katamac canāhar na te 'mitro maghavan kaś ca nāsti māyet sã te yāni yuddhāny āhur nādyā śatruṃ na nu purā yuyutse*, ŚB. 11.1.6.9-10.
7. *Structural Anthropology*, 2, pp. 127-128. (Vol. 1 trans. English, Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf, 1963, rpt. Penguin Books Ltd., 1979; vol.2, trans. English, Monique Layton, 1976; rpt. 1978.)
8. cf. *abhimānivyapadeśa* of *Brahmasūtra*, 2.1.5.
9. *Vedic Mythology*, 1898, rpt. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981. p. 1.
10. Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, p. 8.
11. For a survey of the work done, see R.N. Dandekar, *Vedic Mythological Tracts*, Delhi, Ajanta Publications, 1979; and *Exercises in Indology*, Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1981.
12. Lévi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology*, p. 209.
13. *ibid.* p. 230.

V. SWAMINATHAN

PADA AND WHAT IT SIGNIFIES IN PĀṆINI

Pāṇini has defined the term *pada* which he has employed in several rules of his *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. He has also extended the scope of the term *pada* to certain instances that have not been covered by the definition. This paper examines the possibilities of a further extension of the *pada-saṃjñā* and also the need for withdrawing the *pada-saṃjñā* from certain other instances in order to free it from the fault of *atiprasaṅga*.

Pāṇini ordains *pada-saṃjñā* in the four sūtras beginning with 1.4.14. The first of the four sūtras¹ constitutes the definition of *pada* and the remaining three² sūtras either widen or restrict the scope of *pada-saṃjñā*. In other words, the three succeeding sūtras prevent the operation of those grammatical rules that are based on *pada-saṃjñā* with respect to certain instances which get *pada-saṃjñā* by 1.4.14, and permit them to operate with respect to certain other instances which are not covered by 1.4.14.

The second sūtra, 1.4.15 ordains *pada-samjñā* for words ending with the letter 'n' in the neighbourhood of the suffix *kya*. The purpose of this rule is to effect the elision of 'n' in words ending with 'n' according to 8.2.7.³ The verbal formation *rājīyati* is effected by adding the suffix *kyac* to *rājan* according to 3.1.8,⁴ which presupposes *rājan* to be an inflected form (*subanta* or *pada*).

Even after the elision of the case ending *rājan* continues to be *pada* by 1.1.62.⁵ As such even without 1.4.15,⁶ words ending with 'n' are *padas* before *kya* and hence the contingency of the rule becoming superfluous.

In the absence of 1.4.15 words like *vāc* and *sruc* when followed by the suffix *kyac* will become *padas* according to 1.4.14⁷ and 1.1.62,⁸ and accordingly 8.2.39⁹ will invariably operate, giving rise to the undesirable formations *vājyati* and *srujyati* instead of *vācyati* and *srucyati*. Hence the necessity to restrict the scope of *pada-samjñā* to words ending in 'n' only in the environment of *kyac* and thereby to prevent the rising of undesirable formations. It is only with this objective in mind that Pāṇini extends the scope of *pada-samjñā* to words which are already *padas* by framing a fresh rule. Extension of the scope of a rule under such circumstances is none other than repetition and repetition of a rule with a diminished coverage aims at restriction.¹⁰

Extension:

Sūtra 1.4.17¹¹ extends *pada-samjñā* to words that do not come within the purview of 1.4.14. Formations, with case-endings like *rājā*, *rājabhyām*, *rājabhis* and formations ending with the secondary suffixes (*taddhita*) like *rājatva* and *rājatā* are derived from the base (*prātipa-*

dika) *rājan* after the elision of the final 'n'. Dropping of 'n' in *rājan* is possible only when *rājan* is a *pada* as according to the rule that ordains the elision of 'n'¹² the base *rājan* must be a *pada*. Unless *padatva* is sanctioned to such bases the desired formation cannot be obtained and hence the indispensability of sūtra 1.4.17.

Sūtra 1.4.16¹³ extends the jurisdiction of *pada-samjñā* to stems like *bhavat*, *ūrṇā*, etc., when followed by the secondary suffixes *īya*, *yus*, etc. One may question the utility of the rule on the ground that *bhavat*, *ūrṇā* etc., in the immediate neighbourhood of *īya*, *yus*, etc., are *padas* by 1.4.17. But it must be remembered that in the vicinity of *īya* *yus*, etc., *bhavat*, *ūrṇā*, etc. will get *bha-samjñā* by 1.4.18¹⁴ which is an *apavāda* of *pada-samjñā*. Unless *bha-samjñā* is cancelled rules based on *pada-samjñā*¹⁵ will not operate giving rise to undesirable formations. It is only to avoid faulty formations that Pāṇini has designed 1.4.16. In the language of Pāṇinian grammar 1.4.16 is only a *pratiprasava* (re-ordination) of 1.4.14.

Irregular extension of *pada* and *bha*:

As the rules ordaining *pada-samjñā* and *bha-samjñā* are of the nature of *utsarga* (general) and *apavāda* (exceptional) they are mutually exclusive and one will be at a loss to account for certain Vedic formations like *ayas-maya* and *ṛkvatā*. *Ayas* in the vicinity of *mayat* is *pada* by 1.4.17¹⁶ and the resulting form will be *ayomaya*. Likewise *ṛe* in the neighbourhood of *vat* is *pada* by 1.4.17 and the resulting form will be *ṛgvan*. The form *ayasamaya* can be derived from *ayas* if *bha-samjñā* is extended to *ayas*. Likewise *ṛkvan* can be accounted for if *ṛc* is a *bha* in addition to its being a *pada*. *Pada-*

dika) *rājan* after the elision of the final 'n'. Dropping of 'n' in *rājan* is possible only when *rājan* is a *pada* as according to the rule that ordains the elision of 'n'¹² the base *rājan* must be a *pada*. Unless *padatva* is sanctioned to such bases the desired formation cannot be obtained and hence the indispensability of sūtra 1.4.17.

Sūtra 1.4.16¹³ extends the jurisdiction of *pada-saṃjñā* to stems like *bhavat*, *ūrṇā*, etc., when followed by the secondary suffixes *īya*, *yus*, etc. One may question the utility of the rule on the ground that *bhavat*, *ūrṇā* etc., in the immediate neighbourhood of *īya*, *yus*, etc., are *padas* by 1.4.17. But it must be remembered that in the vicinity of *īya* *yus*, etc., *bhavat*, *ūrṇā*, etc. will get *bha-saṃjñā* by 1.4.18¹⁴ which is an *apavāda* of *pada-saṃjñā*. Unless *bha-saṃjñā* is cancelled rules based on *pada-saṃjñā*¹⁵ will not operate giving rise to undesirable formations. It is only to avoid faulty formations that Pāṇini has designed 1.4.16. In the language of Pāṇinian grammar 1.4.16 is only a *pratiprasava* (re-ordination) of 1.4.14.

Irregular extension of *pada* and *bha*:

As the rules ordaining *pada-saṃjñā* and *bha-saṃjñā* are of the nature of *utsarga* (general) and *apavāda* (exceptional) they are mutually exclusive and one will be at a loss to account for certain Vedic formations like *ayas-maya* and *ṛkvatā*. *Ayas* in the vicinity of *mayat* is *pada* by 1.4.17¹⁶ and the resulting form will be *ayomaya*. Likewise *ṛ* in the neighbourhood of *vat* is *pada* by 1.4.17 and the resulting form will be *ṛgvan*. The form *ayasamaya* can be derived from *ayas* if *bha-saṃjñā* is extended to *ayas*. Likewise *ṛkvan* can be accounted for if *ṛc* is a *bha* in addition to its being a *pada*. *Pada-*

saṃjñā would account for the change of 'c' to 'k' and *bha-saṃjñā* would prevent the change of 'k' to 'g'. In the case of *ayasmaya*, *bha-saṃjñā* will supersede (*bādha*) *pada-saṃjñā*. But in the case of *ṛkvan* both the *utsarga* and the *apavāda* will operate simultaneously; and this is an instance of what is known as *saṃjñā-samāveśa*. With a view to account for such Vedic formations Pāṇini has made provision in 1.4.20.¹⁷

This much we are able to gather about *pada-saṃjñā* from the sūtras of Pāṇini. We shall examine a few more instances and explore the possibilities of enlarging, further, the scope of *pada-saṃjñā*.

Sūtra 3.2.1¹⁸ ordains the suffix *añ*, in the sense of the agent of the action, to the root in the immediate neighbourhood of the word expressing the object (*karma*) of the action. Accordingly the root *kṛ* receives the suffix *añ* in the vicinity of *kumbha* resulting in the compound formation *kumbhakāra*¹⁹ constituted of *kumbha* and *kāra*.

One may doubt in this connection whether the root *kṛ* will give rise to *kāra* when *kumbha* is qualified by an adjective like *mahān*.²⁰ If the aggregate *mahāntaṃ kumbham* is an *upapada* according to 3.1.92,²¹ the form *kāra* may be derived; the desired form *mahākumbhakāra* will not be got as *kumbha* is not an *uttarapada*, the condition for *mahat* to become *mahā*;²² but in its stead the wrong form *mahatkumbha* will emerge. Therefore rule 3.2.1 must be prevented from operating in the instance under consideration. How to prevent it ?

Rules relating to *pada* will operate only where there is *sāmarthya* (competency).²³ In *kumbham karoti* there being *sāmarthya* between *kumbham* and the suffix *añ*

(the necessary condition for the derivation of *kāra*) the upapada *kumbha* permits *aṇ* and the form *kumbhakāra* is effected accordingly by 3.2.1. Whereas in *mahāntaṃ kumbhaṃ karoti* there is no *sāmārthya* between *kumbha* and *aṇ*. The relation of a noun to its adjective is more proximate and intrinsic than its relation to any other part of speech since the adjective expresses the quality that is inherent in what is expressed by the noun. As such by virtue of its having a more intimate relation with *mahat*, *kumbha* is not competent to possess any independent relation with *aṇ*, i.e. it does not have *sāmārthya* with *aṇ*.²⁴ When there is no *sāmārthya* between *kumbha* and *aṇ*, *kumbha* cannot serve as a cause to effect *aṇ* in the vicinity of *kṛ* and bring about the form *kāra*. It follows that it is possible to prevent the formation *kāra* in *mahāntaṃ kumbhaṃ karoti* if 3.2.1 is taken as a *pada-vidhi* 'rule relating to *pada*'. But in fact it is only *pratyaya-vidhi* 'rule relating to suffix'. In other words *pratyaya* must be taken as a *pada* or *pada-saṃjñā* must be extended to *pratyaya* 'suffix'.²⁵

The *bahuvrīhi* or possessive compound-word always qualifies a word different from its constituent members and it signifies what is expressed by a different word (*anyapadārtha*),²⁶ i.e. the compound word *citragu* denotes the person, say *Devadatta*, the owner of various kinds of cows. Inasmuch as *citragu* denotes the person also it may be contended that there is no need to juxtapose words like *devadatta*, *maitra*, etc. (that signify the qualified) and even without them the sentence will be complete so far as its meaning is concerned. But we find, actually, the sentence is not complete in the absence of words expressing the qualified (*devadatta*, etc.). This difficulty may be solved as follows:

Because the sentence is not complete without words like *devadatta* and it invariably requires the presence of words like *devadatta* to yield a complete meaning, it follows that *devadatta*, etc. is not expressed by the compound *citragu*. What then is the *anyapadārtha* which the compound word would denote? It is the relation in which the things, expressed by the words that constitute the compound (*citrāḥ gāvaḥ*), stand with reference to *devadatta*, that is signified by the compound. In the *vigraha-vākya* ('sentence constituted of the resolved components of the compound'), *citrāḥ gāvaḥ asya* the relation of the cows to *devadatta*, etc. is expressed by the genitive case ending *sya* (suffixed to the pronoun *idam*). The *vigrahavākya* and the *samāsa* are identical in sense. It follows therefore that the meaning of the case-ending (*vibhakti*) is expressed by the *samāsa* and this is the *anyapadārtha*. It amounts to say that *anyapadārtha* in sūtra 2.2.24 is none other than the *vibhaktiyartha*, meaning of the case-ending. In other words *vibhakti* is *pada*; or *pada-samjñā* must be extended to *vibhakti-(pratyaya)* also. In sūtras 1.4.99 and 100 ²⁷ Pāṇini designates the verbal terminations (*pratyaya*) by the word *pada* (*parasmai-pada* and *ātmane-pada*). The formation of the terms *parasmai-pada* and *ātmane-pada* are taught by Pāṇini in 6.3.7 and 8.²⁸ The words *parasmai* and *ātmane* are prefixed to the word 'pada' just to indicate when a particular termination (*laḥ*) is to be added to a verbal root and in what sense. The prefixed words *parasmai* and *ātmane* do not add anything to or alter the meaning of the word *pada* so far as the eighteen terminations *laḥ* (compressed in the *pratyāhāra* 'tiñ') are concerned. The word *ātmane-pada* means, 'the *pada* to be added to the verbal root if the fruit of the action signified by the root goes to the agent.'²⁹ The formation

of the compounds *parasmai-pada* and *ātmane-pada* as taught by Pāṇini justify this stand point. The dative case endings in *parasmai* and *ātmane* are employed in the sense of *tādarthya*³⁰ and the meanings of *parasmai-pada* and *ātmane-pada* would accordingly be 'pada for the other' and 'pada for one's own self'. This is another instance where Pāṇini styles *partyaya* as *pada*.

Kātyāyana's statement *na vā tadhvamor ādeśavacanaṃ jñāpakam padādeśasya* under 3.4.2³¹ refers to *hi* and *sva* (terminations of imperative second person singular) as the *ādeśas* (replacements) of *pada*, i.e., the *sthānis* of *hi* and *sva*, viz. the eighteen terminations (*tiṅ*) are denoted by the word *pada*. The author of the *Mahābhāṣya* also reiterates the stand taken by Kātyāyana.³²

Withdrawal of *Pada-saṃjñā*:

The word *vetasvān* is derived by adding the suffix *ḍmatup* to the stem *vetasa* according to 4.2.87.³³ The stem loses its final vowel by 6.4.143³⁴ and the 'm' of the suffix is replaced by 'v' according to 8.2.9.³⁵ After the dropping of 'a' the stem *vetas* gets *pada-saṃjñā* according to 1.4.17³⁶ and consequently 's' becomes *padānta* (last letter of *pada*). At this stage 's' will be replaced by 'r' by 8.2.66³⁷ and the undesirable formation *vetarvān* will emerge. Sūtra 8.2.66 cannot be prevented from operating by making use of *sthānivadbhāva* because according to 1.1.58³⁸ *sthānivadbhāva* cannot be availed in the present instance as 8.2.66 is a rule relating to the last letter of a *pada* (*padānta-vidhi*). How to avert this difficult situation and accomplish the desired formation? The only way to get out of this difficulty is by invoking the assistance of *bha-saṃjñā*. In the present case under

consideration *bha-saṃjñā* may be obtained as follows: The rule ordaining *bha-saṃjñā* is an *apavāda* of the one ordaining *pada-saṃjñā*. Just as the rules relating to *jaśva*, *rutva*, etc. are dependent on *pada* (*padānta*) the rule ordaining *bha-saṃjñā* also may be taken as based on *pada* inasmuch as it is an *apavāda* of *pada-saṃjñā*, i.e. whenever there is *bha-saṃjñā*, *pada-saṃjñā* also is present as its base.³⁹ Accordingly *vetas* becomes a *bha*. When *bha-saṃjñā* is there *vetas* ceases to be a *pada*. When *bha-saṃjñā* is thus obtained 's' is not the *padānta* and the rule ordaining 'r' automatically abstains from operation. This is an instance where *pada-saṃjñā* has to be suppressed in order to make it free from the fault of overpervasiveness (*atiprasaṅga*).

Samāveśa:

The stem *rājan* receives the designation *prātipadika* according to 1.2.45.⁴⁰ Even when immediately followed by the terminations *au*, *as*, etc., the stem does not give up the designation *prātipadika* because it does not lose its meaning. Consequently it will have to drop the final 'n' according to 8.2.7⁴¹ and forms like *rājānau*, *rājānaḥ*, etc. cannot come into existence.

Sūtra 8.2.7 purports the dropping of 'n' at the end of *prātipadika*. The sūtra, as it is, operates where it should not. This is a simple fact and Pāṇini cannot remain unaware of it. Still he has not framed any rule to stop the dropping of 'n'. The absence of any special effort on the part of Pāṇini to prevent 8.2.7 from operating with respect to the instances pointed out above leads one to infer that Pāṇini does not consider, 'being the last letter of a stem' alone, as the condition for dropping the 'n',

but something else also, in addition. What could that additional condition be?

Pāṇini divides case-endings into two groups - *sarvanāmasthāna* and *asarvanāmasthāna*. The inflections 'au', 'as', etc., belong to the *sarvanāmasthāna* division. The final 'n' of the stem will have to be dropped only when case-endings belonging to *asarvanāmasthāna* class follow. *Pada-samjñā* operates only with respect to *asarvanāmasthāna* case-endings. If *pada-samjñā* also is laid down as a condition for the dropping of the final 'n' then *rājan* will not drop 'n' before 'au', 'as' etc., because the stem is not a *pada* in the neighbourhood of a *vibhakti* of the *sarvanāmasthāna* class. Therefore in order to prevent the dropping of 'n' of the stem in the environment of 'au', 'as', etc., *pada-samjñā* will have to play the role of a qualifier of *prātipadika-samjñā*, i.e. a *samāveśa* of the *prātipadika* and *pada samjñā*s is most essential in order to avoid the formation of faulty words. The word *pada* may be availed from 8.1.16⁴² by the process of *anuvṛtti*.

Rule 8.4.11⁴³ ordains cerebralisation of 'n' (dental) occurring at the end of stem (*prātipadika*), the augment *num* and the 'n' of an inflection (*vibhakti*) when the cause responsible for cerebralisation lies in the first member of the compound word. According to this rule the 'n' in *garga-bhaginī* (*gargāṇām bhaginī*) will be liable for cerebralisation as it happens to be the last letter of the stem, *bhagin*. Cerebralisation in the present instance is not desirable. How to prevent it?

The word *pūrvapada* taken over from 8.4.3,⁴⁴ by the process of *anuvṛtti*, becomes a part of this rule. As this rule presupposes compound formations the word

pūrva-pada would necessarily imply that what has been ordained in this *sūtra* is with reference to *uttara-pada* (final member) only. As such *uttara-pada* also becomes a member of the *sūtra* and it has to be construed as an attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) to the word *prātipadika*. When *uttara-pada* qualifies *prātipadika* in *gargabhaginī*, it is *bhaginī* that is both *prātipadika* and *uttara-pada* and not *bhaginī* alone. *Bhaginī* does not end with 'n' and therefore the cerebralisation rule becomes inoperative.

As in the case of 8.2.7,⁴⁵ here too *samāveśa* of *pada* and *prātipadika samjñās* has to be admitted. The rule that defines *prātipadika*, 1.2.45⁴⁶ excludes *subanta* (*pratyayānta*) by the word *apratyaya*. This suggests that there can be no *samāveśa* between *pada* and *prātipadika samjñās* as the former stands for a formation with inflection and the latter for a formation bereft of inflection. *Pada* and *prātipadika samjñās* are mutually exclusive. *Samāveśa* of mutually exclusive *samjñās* involves the defect of *vyāghāta* or mutual contradiction. The incisive intellect of Pāṇini could not have left this rather glaring contradiction unnoticed. Pāṇini's silence in this regard reveals the fact that there is no real or absolute contradiction in the *samāveśa* of *pada* and *prātipadika samjñās*. Pāṇini would not hesitate permitting the co-operation of mutually exclusive *samjñās* if their coexistence is indispensable for the derivation of correct formations.

By the rule 2.2.19,⁴⁷ Pāṇini ordains the formation of the compound known as *upapada-samāsa*. A compound is always effected between inflected nouns⁴⁸ which are capable of expressing a coherent meaning.⁴⁹ As a compound formation is invariably the outcome of the combination of two or more nouns (*subantas*) the question

of a noun being compounded with a finite verb (*tiṇanta*) does not arise. It appears therefore that the word *atiṇ* in the sūtra is superfluous. When it is possible to prevent the formation of a compound of an inflected noun with a finite verb even without the inclusion of the word *atiṇ* in the rule the presence of *atiṇ* indicates that the words *sup* and *supā*, members of the earlier sūtras,⁵⁰ are not to be constructed with 2.2.19. At the same time the rule states that the compound should not end with a finite verb (*tiṇ*). It now follows that the *upapada* is compounded with neither a *subanta* nor a *tiṇanta*. According to Pāṇini words are only twofold - *subanta* and *tiṇanta*. If *samāsa* with respect to both classes of words is prohibited what word is there that could be compounded with an *upapada*. What does Pāṇini mean by this sūtra which, to us, seems to express something impossible ?

As Pāṇini excludes words belonging to both the categories - *subanta* and *tiṇanta* - from the purview of compounds effected with an *upapada* it is to be understood that he favours the compounding of an *upapada* with a word that is capable of entering into a coherent syntactical relation with the *upapada*, i.e. a word that is *samartha*. It must be recalled that *samāsa* is effected by *padas* and *padavidhi* rests upon words that are *samartha*.⁵¹ But in the present case the *upapada* is compounded with a word that is not a *pada*, but *samartha*. This stand of Pāṇini is understood from 2.2.19 which violates the basic principle governing compound formation *sup supā*. Therefore without prejudice to the basic principle the *samartha* word may safely be considered as a *pada* for all practical purposes. In other words *pada-samjñā* needs extension to cover those words, devoid of case-endings, that are compounded with *upapada*.

Many rules in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* are dependant on *pada-samjñā*. *Pada* according to Pāṇini is a formation ending with an inflection, *sup* or *tiñ*, and it retains the appellation *pada* so long as the inflection is not dropped. When some rule necessitates the dropping of the inflection the formation will have to give up its claim for the title *pada* and consequently rules based on *pada-samjñā* will cease to operate.

But some formations can be accounted for only when the rules dependent on *pada* are allowed to operate even after the dropping of the inflection. Therefore it is imperative to make some special provision so that the rules could evenly operate even in the absence of the inflections. Pāṇini sanctions this special provision in the rule 1.1.62⁵² which means: 'rules dependant on the presence of inflections would operate even after their disappearance'. It amounts to say that *pada-samjñā* which obtains when the inflection is physically present continues to exist even after the elision of the inflection. By this rule 1.1.62 Pāṇini indirectly confers *pada-sajñā* on that which remains after the inflection is stripped of.

On dropping the genitive case-ending of *rājñah* (in *rājñah puruṣah*) and the imperfect third person singular termination 't' (*ti*) in *aduht*, *rājñah* will be reduced to *rājan* and *aduht* to *aduh*. In order to arrive at the desired forms *rājapuruṣah* and *adhok* the final 'n' in *rājan* will have to be dropped by 8.2.7⁵³ and 'h' in *adoh* will have to be replaced by 'gh' according to 8.2.32.⁵⁴ The rules that effect the elision of 'n' and the replacement of 'h' depend on *pada* and unless *pada-samjñā* is extended to the mere stem (*prātipadika*) *rājan* and the root *duh* it is impossible to obtain the desired formations.

The formation of this rule is a clear indication of the fact that Pāṇini does not expect that the rules of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* should be rigidly applied. Derivation of faultless formations is his main concern and he will not mind waiving or relaxing the rules in certain cases if by so doing correct forms could be delivered. Pointed attention is drawn to the fact that in this rule Pāṇini confers *padatva* on not only *prātipadika* but on *dhātu* also.

It may be relevant to point out in this connection that Pāṇini expressly states, in some cases that the *apavāda* need not supersede the *utsarga*; he permits the *utsarga* and the *apavāda* to operate either alternately⁵⁵ or simultaneously.⁵⁶ Pāṇini readily accords this concession in the matter of *utsarga* and *apavāda* as the side by side existence of formations like *vikṣepakaḥ*, *vikṣeptā*⁵⁷ and *vikṣipaḥ*⁵⁸ cannot be accounted for if the *apavāda* were to overthrow the *utsarga*.

Sometimes Pāṇini sees no opposition between *utsarga* and *apavāda* and implies their simultaneous operation in the same instance. When the aorist third person singular termination 't' (*ti*) follows, the root 'gaṇ' gets reduplication by 6.1.11 since it belongs to the tenth conjugation.⁵⁹ After reduplication either the 'ṇ' of the *abhyāsa* may be dropped by 7.4.60⁶⁰ or it may be replaced by 'ī' by 7.4.97⁶¹ in conjunction with 1.1.52.⁶² Since 7.4.97 is *niravakāśa* it is powerful and naturally supersedes 7.4.60 which is *sāvakāśa*. If 7.4.97 were to overthrow 7.4.60, by virtue of its being *niravakāśa*, the desired verbal formation *ajīgaṇat* will never come to be. In order to derive the verbal formation *ajīgaṇat* both the *utsarga* 7.4.60 and the *apavāda* 7.4.97 must be allowed to play their respective role. 7.4.60 operates at

first and effects the elision of 'ṇ' of the *abhyāsa* and thereafter 7.4.97 operates and replaces the 'a' in 'ga' by 'ī'. As in the previous instance here too Pāṇini sees no antagonism between the *utsarga* and the *apavāda*, and this fact he indicates by incorporating the word *akitaḥ* in the rule 7.4.83.⁶³ This liberal attitude shown by Pāṇini in regard to *utsarga* and *apavāda* is presented in the post-Pāṇinian grammatical literature by the two familiar *paribhāṣās*: *kvacid apavādaviṣaye 'py utsargo 'bhinivīṣate*,⁶⁴ and *abhyāsavikāreṣu bādhyabādhakabhāvo nāsti*.⁶⁵ It is highly significant to note what a fine turn of expression Patañjali has used to uncover Pāṇini's liberalism in this regard:

*na hīśvara ājñāpayati nāpi dharmasūtrakārāḥ
paṭhanti apavādair utsargā bādhyantām iti.*⁶⁶

The contents of the two rules defining the *pada* and the *prātipadika* may be analysed as follows:

pada
{

subanta

tiñanta

prātipadika
{

not a root
not a suffix or inflection
not a formation ending with an inflection
(*subanta* or *tiñanta*)

Summing up both we see that a *pada* is neither a stem (*prātipadika*), nor a root, nor a suffix or inflection. It also transpires that *pada* and *prātipadika* are mutually opposed and therefore they can hardly coexist.

But the foregoing study brings to the fore the necessity of extending *pada-saṃjñā* to the root, inflection and the stem, i.e. what is not a *pada* at all according to 1.4.14. In the absence of express sanction, one may ask, will it be possible to enlarge or narrow down the domain of *pada-saṃjñā*? We have already seen the Pāṇini has liberated *pada-saṃjñā* from the defects of *ativyāpti* and *avyāpti* by formulating the few sūtras that follow 1.4.14. These sūtras need not be taken as an exhaustive enumeration, pervading all the instances (*parigaṇana*) that require either extension or restriction. On the other hand they will have to be treated, on the strength of the evidences adduced, merely as instances illustrating (*pradarśanāmātra* or *upalakṣaṇa*) the need for extension or restriction. Treating of certain sūtras as rules, illustrative in character, is not uncommon in the Pāṇinian tradition.

Further it is well known that Pāṇini does not teach all linguistic phenomena by explicit rules. He indicates many rules by his own usage in the sūtras (*sautra-nirdeśa*) and presupposes many others which are either inferred or presumed (*jñāpaka*) from his rules. The author of the *Mahābhāṣya* beautifully describes the diverse ways by which Pāṇini makes us understand his views.⁶⁷

Under these circumstances the instances we have taken up for consideration may be treated as *jñāpakas* or indicators of the extension of *pada-saṃjñā*. Again by 3.1.94⁶⁸ and the two *paribhāṣās* indicated by 7.4.83⁶⁹ Pāṇini freely allows even *utsarga* and *apavāda* operate either alternately or simultaneously.

Furthermore, in 1.1.62, Pāṇini has sanctioned the extension of *pada-saṃjñā* in the most unambiguous terms.

A careful consideration of all this shows that Pāṇini favours the extension or withdrawal of the *pada-samjñā* in the instances discussed above and many more.

It may be of interest to note, in this connection, that Patañjali takes the root and even the inflection as *pada*: *athavā nir api padaṃ, viśir api padam, padavidhiś ca samarthānām*.⁷⁰ *athavā vibhaktyartha 'bhidhiyate. etac cātra yuktam – yadvibhaktyartha 'bhidhiyate, tatra hi sarvapaścāt padaṃ vartate*.⁷¹


In another context Patañjali defines *pada* as a group of letters⁷² and not as a *subanta* or *teñanta*. It is obvious that not only Pāṇini but Kātyāyana and Patañjali also, the other two sages belonging to the trinity of Vyākaraṇa (*trimuni*) are in favour of extending *padatva* to the constituent elements of *pada*, viz. root, suffix or inflection and stem (*prātipadika*), i.e. *pada* stands for *dhātu* and *pratyaya* in addition to *pratyayānta* (*subanta* and *tiñanta*).⁷³

Now there arises the necessity to define *pada* in such a way that it comprehends all the cases, viz. *dhātu*, *pratyaya*, *prātipadika* and *suptiñanta*. A special characteristic that is common to all will be a fitting definition. What could that common characteristic be? Capacity to convey some meaning (*arthavattva*) is the special characteristic that is invariably present in all the cases under consideration. Pāṇini admits that *pratyayas* do possess meanings and he ordains every *pratyaya* to convey a specific meaning.⁷⁴ In many of his rules he refers to the meanings of roots.⁷⁵ The expulsion of the root and the *pratyaya* from the domain of *prātipadika*⁷⁶ also points to the meaningful character of the root and the *pratyaya*.

The word *pada* would mean that which conveys some meaning, *arthavat*, and therefore it forms a proper definition or *saṃjñā* of all the cases. Accordingly *pada* has to be resolved as: *padyate arthaḥ anena iti padam*; any articulated sound or group of sounds that conveys a sense. The word *pada* is self-explanatory (*anvartha-saṃjñā*) and therefore it does not stand in need of a formal definition.


It is not a secret fact that Pāṇini does not consider it worthwhile to offer formal definitions of *saṃjñās* that are *anvartha* or self explanatory. For example he does not define *vibhakti*, *vākya*, *ādeśa*, etc.

It may be asked, if *pada* also is a meaningful element, *arthavat*, will not Pāṇini's definitions of *prātipadika* and *pada* suffer from inconsistency? In reply it may said - From what has been said it is evident that Pāṇini sometimes employs *pada* to cover all the cases like root, stem, etc. and sometimes to convey only *subanta* and *tiṅanta*, i.e. Pāṇini uses *pada* in a wider as well as a narrower sense. When viewed in this perspective the inconsistency turns out to be only apparent; it is not real. The relation of *pada* in its wider sense to its narrower sense may be presented thus:



Inconsistency is something that is unthinkable in the writings of great personalities like Pāṇini, endowed with an exceptionally sharp intellect. Tradition regards Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* as a monumental work free from

all possible faults. It is worthwhile in this regard to quote Patañjali's comments on 2.3.66: *śobhanā khalu pāṇineḥ sūtrasya kṛtiḥ*. As a *subanta* or a *tinanta*, i.e. in the narrower sense, *pada* may be opposed to *prātipadika*; but in the wider sense there is no opposition between *pada* and *prātipadika*. In the śāstraic terminology *pada*, in the wider sense, is *vyāpaka-saṃjñā* and *pada* (*suptināta*), *dhātu*, etc. are *vyāpya-saṃjñās*. Usage of the same word in a wide and a narrow sense is not uncommon in Pāṇini. For example by *tatpuruṣa* he sometimes means *karmadhāraya*, *dvigu* and *tatpuruṣa*, i.e. in a wider sense⁷⁷ and at other times only *tatpuruṣa* in a restricted sense⁷⁸ (i.e. the residue left behind after the elimination of *dvigu* and *karmadhāraya*).



In such cases the context is the deciding factor as to whether Pāṇini intends the wider or the narrower sense. When taken in the wider sense *pada-saṃjñā* (extended with reference to the stem) taught in the rule *svādiṣv asarvanāmasthāne* becomes meaningful and not *pāribhāṣika*.

A legitimate objection stems up at this stage thus. If *arthavattva* is the criterion of *pada-saṃjñā* the definitions of *pada* and *prātipadika* become identical and give rise to confusion. This would necessitate the revision of the definition of *prātipadika* or the framing of an altogether fresh definition in order to avoid confusion.

Really this difficulty would have been there if both the definitions of *pada* and *prātipadika* cover the same ground. A close study of the sūtra that defines *prātipadika* will obviate this difficulty. The definitions of *prātipadika* and *pada* are of different nature. The definition of *pada* as *arthavat*, is positive in character whereas that of the *prātipadika* is negative in character. Pāṇini states in very clear terms what a *pada* is. But he does not assert what a *prātipadika* is. On the other hand his definition amounts to say what it is not. He says that it is not a root, not a suffix or inflection and not a word ending with an inflection. In defining *prātipadika* he resorts to what is known as the process of elimination (*atadvyāvṛtti*).⁷⁹

Pāṇini defines *dhātu*,⁸⁰ *pratyaya*⁸¹ and *pratyayānta*⁸² (*pada*) in unequivocal terms. From the stock of meaningful sounds Pāṇini arrives at *prātipadika* by eliminating *dhātu*, *pratyaya* and *prātipadika*.⁸³ This may be represented conveniently by means of a mathematical equation:

$$\text{arthavat (pada) - [dhātu + pratyaya + pratyayānta (suptinanta)] = prātipadika}$$

Prātipadika therefore stands for the residue left after filtering down *dhātu*, *pratyaya* and *pratyayānta* from meaningful articulate sounds and therefore there is no necessity either to modify the existing definition or to offer a totally fresh one (*yathānyāsam evāstu*).

Pada will have to be understood in its wider sense, i.e. comprehending *dhātu*, *pratyaya*, etc., if by so doing we are able to achieve the desired formations. The principle at work in the extension of *pada-samjñā* is

iṣṭasiddhyarthatva as in the case of splitting up of sūtras (*yogavibhāga*).⁸⁴ In the familiar saying that prohibits the use of a meaningful sound other than a *pada* (*apadaṃ na prayuñjīta*), *pada* is employed in the restricted sense. Further it is concerned only with the usage and remains natural in regard to what a *pada* is.

REFERENCES

1. सुप्तिङन्तं पदम्।
2. नः क्ये; सिति च; स्वादिष्वसर्वनामस्थाने।
3. नलोपः प्रातिपदिकान्तस्य।
4. सुप् आत्मनः क्यच्।
5. प्रत्ययलोपे प्रत्ययलक्षणम्।
6. नः क्ये।
7. सुप्तिङन्तं पदम्।
8. प्रत्ययलोपे प्रत्ययलक्षणम्।
9. झलां जशोऽन्ते।
10. नियमार्था पुनः श्रुतिः and सिद्धे सत्यारम्भो नियमार्थः।
11. स्वादिष्वसर्वनामस्थाने।
12. नलोपः प्रातिपदिकान्तस्य।
13. सिनि च।
14. यवि भम्।
15. *Jaṣṭva* is dependant on *padasamjñā* and therefore the form *bhavadiya* will not take shape.
16. स्वादिष्वसर्वनामस्थाने।
17. अयस्मयादीनि छन्दसि; MB's comment on this is: उभयसंज्ञान्यपि छन्दसि भवन्ति।
18. कर्मण्यण्।
19. कुम्भं करोति इति कुम्भकारः।
20. महान्तं कुम्भं करोति।
21. तत्रोपपदं सप्तमीस्थम्।
22. आन्महतः समानाधिकरणजातीययोः, 4.3.46.
23. समर्थः पदविधिः, 2.1.1.
24. सापेक्षमसमर्थं भवति।
25. MB 3.1.92: यावता चेदानीं पदगन्धोऽस्ति पदविधिरेवायं भवति। पदविधिश्च समर्थानां भवति। तत्रासमर्थान् भविष्यति।

Udyota of Nāgeśa: भाष्ये गन्धशब्दः संबन्धवाची। स च महासंज्ञाबलात् प्रत्ययविधौ पदत्वेन निमित्तत्वात् स्पष्ट एव।

26. अनेकमन्यपदार्थः, 2.2.24.

27. लः परस्मैपदम्; तङानावात्मनेपदम्।

28. वैयाकरणारब्धायां चतुर्थ्याः, परस्य च।

29. कर्त्रीभिप्राये क्रियाफले।

30. तादर्थ्यं चतुर्थी, काशिकावृत्तिः।

31. क्रियासमभिहारे लोट, लोटो हिस्वौ वा च तद्ध्वमोः।

32. पदादेशौ हिस्वौ।

33. कुमुदनडवेतसेभ्यो इमतुप।

34. टेः।

35. मादुपधायाश्च मतोर्वोऽयवादिभ्यः।

36. स्वादिष्वसर्वनामस्थाने।

37. ससजुषो रुः।

38. न पदान्तद्विर्वचनवरेयलोपस्वरसवर्णानुस्वारदीर्घजश्चर्विधिषु।

39. MB.1.1.51: यथैवान्यान्यपि पदकार्याणि उपप्लवन्ति रुत्वं जश्त्वं च। एवमिदमपि पदकार्यमुपप्लव्यते। किम्? पदसंज्ञा नाम।

Nyāsa: यथैवान्यानि पदकार्याणि पदचरमावयवकार्याणि रुत्वजस्त्वादीनि तत्प्रापक-पदसंज्ञारूपं चात्र सूत्रे उपप्लवन्ते पदान्तविधिशब्देन गृह्यन्ते। पदचरमावयवप्रापकाद्यपि तत्त्वेन गृह्यते। एवमिदमपि भसंज्ञारूपमपि पदकार्यं परंपरया पदचरमावयवप्रापकं प्रतिबन्धकं वा पदचरमावयवत्वेन गृह्यते इत्यर्थः। अयं भावः — यथा पदान्तपदे उपस्थितत्वात् पदत्वद्वारिका परंपरा गृह्यते तथा पदत्वबाधकतया भत्वस्यापि प्रत्यासन्नत्वेन तदद्वारापि पदचरमावयवविषयस्थानिवत्त्वप्रतिषेध इति।

40. अर्थवदधातुरप्रत्ययः प्रातिपदिकम्।

41. नलोपः प्रातिपदिकान्तस्य।

42. पदस्य।

43. प्रातिपदिकान्तनुम्विभक्तिषु च।

44. पूर्वपदात्संज्ञायामगः।

45. न लोपः प्रातिपदिकान्तस्य।

46. अर्थवदधातुरप्रत्ययः प्रातिपदिकम्।

47. उपपदमतिङ्, 2.2.19.

48. सह सुपा, 2.1.4.

49. समर्थः पदविधिः, 2.1.1.

50. सुबामन्त्रिणे, 2.1.2.

51. समर्थः पदविधिः, 2.1.1.

52. प्रत्ययलोपे प्रत्ययलक्षणम्।

53. नलोपः प्रातिपदिकान्तस्य।

54. दादेषातिर्धः।

55. वासरूपोऽस्त्रियाम्, 3.1.94.

56. Previously we witnessed the simultaneous operation of *bha* and *pada samjñās* in 1.4.20.

57. ण्वुल्तृचौ, 3.1.133.

58. इगुपधज्ञाप्रीकिरः कः, 3.1.135.

59. चङि।

60. हलादिः शेषः।

61. ई च गणः।

62. अलोऽन्त्यस्य।

63. दीर्घोऽङ्कितः।

64. *Paribhāṣenduśekhara*, 59.

65. *ibid.* 67.

66. MB.1.1.47.

67. इह इङ्गितेन चेष्टितेन निमिषितेन महता वा सूत्रनिबन्धेन आचार्याणामभिप्रायो गम्यते। एतदेव ज्ञापयति – परस्य भविष्यति न पूर्वस्येति, यदयं न संप्रसारणे संप्रसारणमिति प्रनिषेधं शास्ति। *Mahābhāṣya*, 6.1.37, न संप्रसारणे संप्रसारणम्। He says the same thing once again on 8.2.3: न मु ने।

68. वासरूपोऽस्त्रियाम्।

69. दीर्घोऽङ्कितः।

70. MB on शदेः शितः, 1.3.60

71. अनेकमन्यपदार्थे, 2.2.24. What Patañjali observes is this. In चित्राः गावः अस्य the inflection *sya* comes last and this is a *pada*.

72. वर्णसमुदायः पदम्, MB.1.1.21.

73. a) The Navya-Naiyāyikas define *pada* as शक्तं पदम् and they refer to the stem, inflection, etc. as *pada*. For e.g. षट्पद and अम्पद। In deed they have correctly understood the spirit of Pāṇini's sūtras.

b) Notable writers in Advaita Vedānta also understand *pada* in its wider sense. While commenting Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* अध्यस्य मिथुनीकृत्य *Prakāśātman* the author of the *Vivaraṇa* observes: ननु क्त्वाप्रत्ययप्रयोगात् अर्थतः क्रियाभेदः पूर्वापरीभावश्चाङ्गीकर्तव्यः। नहि पदमात्रवैयर्थ्यात् वाक्यार्थो नैसर्गिकत्वविशिष्टो विशेष्यपदार्थः अध्यसः उपक्रमोपसंहारयोः भेतुं युक्तः। Here by the word *pada* in पदमात्रवैयर्थ्यात् the author refers to the suffix *-ktvā* (i.e. *lyap*), *Brahmasūtra-Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya* (with nine commentaries). ed. by Mm. Anantakrishna Sastri, Part 1, p.86. Calcutta Sanskrit Series 1, Calcutta, 1933.

74. कर्मणि द्वितीया, 2.3.2; तस्यापत्यम्, 4.1.92; करणाधिकरणयोश्च (त्युट्), 3.3.117.

75. शिल्ब आलिङ्गने, 3.1.46; रुच्चथानां प्रीयमाणः, 2.4.33; उपान्मन्त्रकरणे, 1.3.25; संपरिभ्यां करोतौ भूषणे, 6.1.137; ज्ञोऽविदर्थस्य करणे, 2.3.51.
76. अर्थवदधातुरप्रत्ययः।
77. तत्पुरुषः समानाधिकरणः कर्मधारयः, 2.1.42; द्विगुश्च, 2.1.23; संख्यापूर्वो द्विगुः, 2.1.52.
78. तत्पुरुषे कृति बहुलम्। 6.3.14; कोः कत्तत्पुरुषेऽचि, 6.3.101.
79. In the field of śāstras it is not uncommon for an author to take recourse to this device, elimination, while wording definitions.
 - 1) शेषे यजुश्शब्दः, Mīm.Sū. 2.1.37, meaning *mantras* other than Ṛk *Sāman* defined as: तेषामृग्यत्रार्थवशेन पादव्यवस्था, 2.1.35; गीतिषु सामाख्या, 2.1.36.
 - 2) संसर्गाभावाभिन्नाभावः अन्योन्याभावः, *Nyāyasiddhāntamukutāvali* of Viśvanātha.
 - 3.a) सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म, Tai.Up. 2.1. Here the three words *satya*, *jñāna* and *ananta* stand for other than *mithyā* (indeterminate), other than insentient and other than finite.
 - 3.b) नेति नेति, Br.Up. 2.3.6 defines Brahman what it is not.
80. भूवादयो धातवः।
81. प्रत्ययः, 3.1.1 on which Patañjali observes: आधिकारेण्यं प्रत्ययसंज्ञा क्रियते।
82. सुप्तिङन्तं पदम्।
83. अर्थवदधातुरप्रत्ययः प्रातिपदिकम्।
84. योगविभागादिष्टसिद्धिः, *Paribhāṣendurśekhara*, 123.

G.C. NAYAK

**A NOTE ON
PROFESSOR R.D. RANADE'S
CONTRIBUTION TO THE STUDY
OF UPANIṢADIC PHILOSOPHY***

Any study of the Upaniṣadic philosophy, would remain very much incomplete without a study of Ranade's monumental work, *A Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy*. His most significant contribution consists in approaching the Upaniṣadic study with what he would regard as "a critico-historical or a historico-critical spirit." He draws our attention to the fact that the Upaniṣads are genuine philosophic treatises and that they do not propound a single, unitary philosophy. Both the points made by Ranade are very significant. The first point is important in view of the fact that even scholars of the stature of Radhakrishnan have at times

* Modified version of the paper presented in the National Seminar held in the Department of Ancient History, Culture and Archaeology of the University of Allahabad during February 18-20, 1995.

attached greater importance to the poetic inspiration of the Upaniṣads. "Their poetry and lofty idealism", says Radhakrishnan, "have not as yet lost their power to move the minds and sway the hearts of men. They contain the earliest records of Indian speculation."¹ This statement by itself could be considered innocuous and even illuminating perhaps, but Radhakrishnan goes to the extent of pointing out a little later that "the aim of the Upaniṣads is not so much to reach philosophical truth as to bring peace and freedom to the anxious human spirit."² It would be difficult to agree here with Radhakrishnan and even to understand what he wants to maintain, if the Upaniṣads are to be regarded as genuine philosophic treatises, as they should, in view of distinct philosophic truths that we come across in different Upaniṣads propounded by outstanding philosophers like Āruṇi and Yājñavalkya. Ranade very rightly, however, considers Upaniṣads to be philosophically significant in their own right. "The same problems which at the present day divide a Bradley from a Bosanquet, a Ward from a Royce, a Pringle-Pattison from a Mc Taggart", says Ranade, "also divided the Upanishadic philosophers of ancient times."³ This is a candid and important acknowledgement of the Upaniṣads as philosophical treatises in their own right. Radhakrishnan no doubt points out that "the Upaniṣads determine the main issues of philosophical inquiry and mark out the lines of subsequent philosophical discussion."⁴ Ranade, however, has worked out in detail how "all the later systems of Indian philosophy have been rooted in the Upanishads" and he is right in claiming that this "has been shown in detail for the first time in the history of Upaniṣadic literature in the fourth chapter"⁵ of his work.

What is still more important is that the Upaniṣads have all along in our tradition been regarded as propounding one single doctrine, be it Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dvaita or any other variant far that matter acceptable to one tradition or the other. The *Brahma Sūtra: tat tu samanvayāt* (1.1.4) is precisely meant to propound the doctrine that the entire Vedic literature including the Vedānta has a single, unitary, purport of propounding one absolute truth, i.e. the truth of Brahman. This no doubt is only one of the traditions. There is also the different tradition of Jaimini's Pūrvamīmāṃsā which declares with equal emphasis that the whole of Vedic literature has its purport in *kriyā* or action and action alone (*āmnāyasya kriyārthatvād ānarthakyaṃ atadarthhānām*). The whole of Vedic literature having its purport in *karma* or action, according to Jaimini, nothing that does not refer to an action in some form or the other is meaningful or significant. The whole of Vedic literature including the Upaniṣads are interpreted thus to signifying something unitary; they all in our tradition are supposed to have the same purport and propound the same truth. Different schools of Vedānta see their own specific conceptions of Brahman, *nirguṇa*, *saguṇa* and so on, constituting the purport of the Upaniṣads as a whole. Traditionally we are accustomed to look at the Upaniṣads from the standpoint of one of the Ācāryas, Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, Nimbārka or Vallabha. We cannot think, therefore, of the Upaniṣads as treatises belonging to different periods of time and propounding different philosophic theories. The Upaniṣadic passages are interpreted to suit either an Advaita, a Viśiṣṭādvaita or a Dvaita point of view, or the viewpoint of some other variant like Śuddhādvaita. Passages that are evidently

antagonistic to the view point of an Ācārya are interpreted, very brilliantly of course, but sometimes in an apparently forced style, to suit that particular view point some how or the other by that school of thought. The reader of the Upaniṣads are somewhat bewildered by all such conflicting interpretations of the same text; he simply does not know what to make out of them. As against all such brilliant, and yet forced interpretations, if I may be permitted to use this word, Professor Ranade declares in very clear terms, "Let no man stand up and say that the Upanishads advocate only one single doctrine."⁶ This statement of Ranade brings about a revolution in the study of History of Upaniṣadic philosophy and the words of Ranade continue to reverberate in our ears like a sort of fresh revelation. It is "the lack of historico-critical spirit which", according to Ranade, "refuses to see in the Upanishads the bubbling up of the thoughts of numerous sages of antiquity, each of whom tried to express as naively, as simply and as directly as possible the thoughts which were uppermost in his mind, and which he regarded as fully descriptive of the view of reality which consciously or unconsciously had sprung up within him."⁷ This characterization of the Upaniṣadic thinkers as very much distinct and independent in their respective thoughts and approach to reality is illuminating, to say the least. "A careful study of the Upanishads supplemented by a critico-historical spirit", avers Ranade, "will soon reduce to nought all such frivolous notions that there is only one system of thought to be found in the Upanishads." To declare all such notions which would like to give a unitary, single interpretation of the Upaniṣads as "frivolous" requires an insight that is both original and bold, for it is not in any way sanctioned by the tradition. How important

this contribution to the study of history of Upaniṣadic thought is can be realized when one concentrates on the following passage from the preface of Ranade: "Here, in the Upanishads", says Ranade, "we have doctrines of Absolute Monism, of Personalistic Idealism, of pluralism, of Solipsism, of Self-realization, of the relation of Intellect to Intuition and so forth, – doctrines which have divided the philosophic world of today."⁹ It opens a whole vista before us encouraging a critical study of the Upaniṣads in their own right as independent treatises of philosophy, instead of putting them all, with a preconceived notion, in one single basket of Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita or Dvaita and the like.

While discussing the Upaniṣadic thoughts, however, Professor Ranade, in keeping with the spirit of his time, laid utmost emphasis on their speculative character. And this is quite expected from Ranade who, as an interpreter of the History of the Upaniṣadic philosophy, was influenced by the great metaphysicians of India as well as the West. Both Āruṇi and Yājñavalkya are regarded by him as great psycho-metaphysicians. While agreeing with Professor Ranade that both Āruṇi and Yājñavalkya have made significant contributions to the field of psychology as well as metaphysics of their time, I would like to add, however, that these great Upaniṣadic thinkers provide us with brilliant examples of keen philosophical analysis too. A careful study of the philosophies of Āruṇi and Yājñavalkya would dispel once for all the dogmatic view, that seems to be prevalent in some minds even now, that Indian philosophy is out and out speculative and mystical in character and that it has nothing to do with analytic thinking. I can only give certain outline here of analytic trends that are evident in the philosophies of Āruṇi and Yājñavalkya

which can compare favourably well with the approaches of some of the great analytic thinkers of the contemporary West.

Āruṇi of the *Chāndogya* was the first philosopher of the world to propound the philosophy of multiplicity as *vācārambhaṇa*, i.e. 'having its origin in speech'. It is language according to him, that creates multiplicity and when we get rid of these multiple forms created by language we realize the Advaita or non-duality, the unity of all existence. The attention of Śvetaketu is drawn to the unity of all existence as the only Reality as distinguished from the multiple linguistic forms which are ever changing (*vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttiketyeva satyam*, 6.1.4). The unity of existence is realized through the appropriate understanding of a statement which, instead of creating differences, acts as a pointer to the ultimate unity of existence, the statement which occupies a privileged position in the Upaniṣadic literature as a *mahāvākya*, viz. *tat tvam asi* or 'That Thou art'. This is the most significant contribution of Āruṇi of the *Chāndogya* to the history of human thought which was subsequently developed in greater detail by the genius of the great Śaṅkarācārya. *Tat tvam asi* appears to be a descriptive statement, and yet it is not descriptive; it is only a referring expression through which the identity is realized. *Vācārambhaṇa* 'the entire descriptive language' which creates multiplicity is on one side while *tat tvam asi* which is a referring expression, is entirely untouched by the vicissitudes that characterize the descriptive use of language. So in and through the proper grasp of *tat tvam asi*, we are goaded to realize unity as distinguished from multiplicity. In the words of Śaṅkara, *vākyārtha-vicāraṇādhyavasānanirvṛttā hi brahmāvagatiḥ*. Something unique in the whole of

history of human thought was achieved by Āruṇi in his dialogue with Śvetaketu by the use of a pointer – language in the form of *tat tvam asi* as distinguished from ordinary descriptive language that creates multiplicity.

In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, we find Yājñavalkya, once again for the first time in the history of human thought, drawing our attention to the problem of self-knowledge. It is indeed wonderful that even in those early days of humanity, the Upaniṣadic philosopher should be able to lay his fingers on what the eminent twentieth century analytic philosopher of the West, Gilbert Ryle designates much later as the “systematic elusiveness of ‘I’.” The problem for Yājñavalkya was how to account for self-knowledge without diluting in any way the unique position of the self in the knowledge-situation. Yājñavalkya raises a significant question about self-knowledge as follows: *yenedaṃ saravaṃ vijānāti taṃ kena vijānīyāt?*” The self by which everything is known, by what means can that be known? You cannot know the knower of knowing (*na vijñāteḥ vijñātāraṃ vijānīyāt*), and yet the knower, the self, cannot remain entirely unknown, otherwise it would end in absolute scepticism. Yājñavalkya suggested a way out of this dilemma by pointing out that the self is self-luminous or self-effulgent (*svayaṃ-prakāśa*). Gilbert Ryle, came to see the same problem in self-knowledge which he has expressed in the following words: “Should I or should I not, put my knowing self down on my list of the sorts of things that I can have knowledge of? If I say ‘no’, it seems to reduce my knowing self to a theoretically infertile mystery, yet if I say ‘yes’, it seems to reduce the fishing net to one of the fishes which it itself catches. It seems hazardous either to allow or to deny that the judge can be put into the dock.”¹⁰ Ryle’s

solution is of course different from that of Yājñavalkya. Ryle accounts for the systematic elusiveness of the notion of "I" by pointing out that "there is nothing mysterious or occult about the range of higher order acts and attitudes which are apt to be inadequately covered by the umbrella title 'self consciousness'. They are the same in kind as the higher order acts and attitudes exhibited in the dealings of people with one another."¹¹ The constant elusiveness of the self is, on this view, due to the fact that "a higher order action cannot be the action upon which it is performed."¹² This of course is not the way taken by the Upaniṣadic thinker in dealing with the problem of the elusive self. The solution for him lies rather in the direction of an immediate and direct awareness of the self. To the question raised by Janaka, Yājñavalkya says that the self serves as the light for a man when the sun and the moon have both set, fire is extinguished and speech is stopped. "It is through the light of the self that he performs all his activities."¹³ Ryle would of course call it a phosphorescence story. But whatever may be the solution, the genius of Yājñavalkya lies in his awareness of one of the most controversial problems, viz. the problem of self-knowledge, which has received the attention of a number of eminent analytic thinkers of this century like Gilbert Ryle, Yājñavalkya is the first analytic philosopher in the history of human thought, who succeeded in pointing out the paradox of self-knowledge (*yenedaṃ sarvaṃ vijānāti, taṃ kena vijānīyāt, vijñātāraṃ are kena vijānīyāt*). How can you know the knower? There is a paradox involved here in self-knowledge. Yājñavalkya's greatness as a philosopher lies in the fact that he became aware of this paradox for the first time in the history of human thought, long before Gilbert Ryle who

has put the same paradox in his characteristic style in the following words: "Even if the person is for special speculative purposes, momentarily concentrating on the problem of the self, he has failed and knows that he has failed to catch more than the flying coat - tails of that which he was pursuing. His quarry was the hunter."¹⁴ This problem of self-knowledge raised by Yājñavalkya has been taken up for discussion by Ranade of course in his monumental work under the caption *The Epistemology of Self-consciousness*.¹⁵ But according to Ranade, "the Upanishadic answer is that it is true that God and the self are unknowable, but they are not merely objects of faith, they are objects of mystical realization."¹⁶ Other aspects of the problem and its possible solutions are of course not entirely lost sight of; all these are also mentioned by Ranade in his monumental work. In this connection, however, it is worth mentioning that a detailed account of both the problem and its various possible solutions including that which was envisaged by Yājñavalkya and subsequently by the great Śaṅkarācārya has been given by another eminent scholar, Professor A.C. Mukerjee, in his *magnum opus*: *The Nature of Self*, although it is a fact that neither Ranade nor Mukerjee was in a position to evaluate the problem and its solution from the view point of this typical variety of analytic philosophy inasmuch as the Western analytic philosophy of the Rylean variety is only a recent development.

REFERENCES

1. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy* (George Allen & Unwin, rpt in India 1985), p. 138.
2. *ibid.*

3. R.D. Ranade, *A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy* (Bharatiya Vidya Bhawan, Bombay, 1968), Preface.
4. Radhakrishnan, op.cit. p. 264.
5. Ranade, op.cit.
6. ibid. p. 132.
7. ibid. p. 131
8. ibid. p. 132.
9. ibid. Preface.
10. Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (Penguin Books, 1968), p. 178.
11. ibid. p. 189.
12. ibid. p. 186.
13. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, IV.3.6: *ātmaivāsyā jyotir bhavatīti*, etc.
14. Cf. Ryle, op.cit. p. 188.
15. Cf. Ranade, op.cit. p. 198.
16. ibid.

M. SRIMANNARAYANA MURTI

BRAHMINS AND KSHATRIYAS IN THE VEDIC AGE

We find very often the modern Western and Indian Indologists to postulate class conflict and rivalry among the brahmins and the kshatriyas in the Vedic age.¹ The brahmins were also accused of being greedy and demanding large *dakṣiṇās* and gratification from the kshatriyas.² The Upaniṣadic doctrine is held as evolved by the kshatriyas in opposition to the ritualistic science of sacrifice which is developed by the brahmins for a sway over all the communities.³ This paper is aimed at examining the above views in the light of information available in the Vedic literature, epics and *purāṇas* with two presuppositions, namely 1) the Aryans migrated into India through the North-western frontier,⁴ and 2) the Indian heritage is characterized by viewing comprehensively at the material, mental and spiritual aspects of human life as forming an integrated and inseparable unit.

I

The ritual, which is nothing but the manner of performing divine service, is anthropologically responsible

for the physical and mental constriction of man both in the past and in the present. The references to ritual in the *Vedas*, *Brāhmaṇas* and *Āraṇyakas* confirm that the migration (from place to place) as a ritual is performed behind the movement of the Indo-Europeans in different directions, but for which no other reasonable factor could be conjectured for their movement out of their home at a period when they were living in plenty and faced no limits on the land and labour. The language must also have for its manifold development with different ramifications, its sources in the ritual itself. The *R̥gveda* gives a clear indication of the culture of migration called 'śrāmaṇism',⁵ which is chiefly characterized by ascetic tradition with ceaseless movement from place to place, perhaps not to return to the same place again, without any attachment to any place or to any person with ritualistic rites involving oblations to the nature gods in air, water and fire. Already by the time of the composition of the *R̥gveda*, the nature gods obtained anthropomorphic characteristics. Thus the prayers in the *R̥gveda* are addressed to the personified divinities of nature or symbolic representation of the physical objects. Some of the *R̥gvedic* hymns, however, signify simplicity in the rites and common aspirations of the Aryans.

In course of time the preponderate preference of the Fire as the medium of worship to the Air and the Water brought restrictions on the movement of the Aryans for reasons of growing sacramental beliefs with regard to the Fire. The Fire kindled once by a ritualist cannot be extinguished until his corporal body is cremated with it at the end of his life. This led at last, in the name of protection of the Fire, to the household tradition governed by domiciliation, much in opposition to

the śrāmaṇic code of religious conduct. Further it led to the extension of the sacrificial ritual against śrāmaṇism, leading to 'yajñāism' as a religious practice, with which the Buddhists and the Jains were in opposition.

Domiciliation is naturally followed by colonization and creation of facilities for dwelling and eating all through the seasons without migration. Thus this led into the order of the society agricultural operations through deforestation, introduction of division of labour and protection of friends from foes. Thus these domiciliary Aryans had necessarily to develop new techniques in martial arts not only to kill the wild animals but also to overpower men of other colonies and to carry on aggression on enemies. For example, the *R̥gveda* records that Mudgala and Divodāsa, the descendants of Tṛtsu family fought against the natives.⁶ Mudgala set on his chariot driven by his wife Indrasenā, and chased away a band of robbers who stole his thousand cows and brought them back. Divodāsa earned fame as a great warrior by waging a long war against the powerful non-Aryan chief Śambara. He also fought against the non-Aryan king Bhela, who led three tribes - the Ajas, the Signus and the Yakṣas against him.⁷

The acquisition of property by aggression and colonization on the one hand, and the development of Fire-sacrifice on the other led to the evolution of two groups among the Vedic Aryans. When one group adhered to the śrāmaṇic tradition of non-possession and asceticism and to live on with the nature without disturbing it, the other group following modernity in material prosperity developed agriculture and cattle. Because of establishing their sovereignty (*kṣatra*)⁸ these domiciliary Aryans came to be called *kṣatriyas* 'kshatriyas'. Further, these

kshatriyas through their supremacy and dominion obtained by accumulated wealth encouraged brahmins for making the sacrificial ritual more complicated by involving large number of priests and sacraments. They sought the help of the śrāmaṇic Aryans who were living in isolation in the outskirts of cities, in deep forests or on the river banks to develop those sacrifices.⁹ Thus several manuals called *Brāhmaṇas* were written on the science of sacrifice and thus these śrāmaṇic Aryans came to be called *brāhmaṇas* 'brahmins',¹⁰ in contradistinction to the kshatriyas. These brahmins were always pressed into the service of the kshatriyas as priests at very lucrative *dakṣinās* 'fees' for performing sacrifices for them. Therefore the distinction of the brahmin and the kshatriya arose in a natural way within one group of people bound by identical destiny and belief. The *R̥gveda* clearly evidences that Viśvāmitra was a *hotṛ*-priest of Hariścandra Vaidhasa, while Ayāśya, Jamadagni and Vasiṣṭha were *udgātṛ*, *adhvaryu* and *brahman* respectively. Similarly Viśvāmitra and Vasiṣṭha were the priests of Sudās, a descendant of Tṛtsu.¹¹ That the kshatriyas are the sacrificers and patrons is restated by Vālmīki; Kuśadhvasa, the brother of Janaka, is called the protector of sacrifices (*yajñagoptā*).¹²

By the time of the king Bharata (c. 2200 B.C.) the kshatriyas occupied the land called Saptasindhu (Avestha *hepta hindu*), i.e. the area in which seven rivers: the Sindhu with its tributaries - the Vitatsā (now Jhelam), the Asiknī (Chenab), the Paruṣṇī (Rāvi), the Vipās (Beas) and the Śutudrī (Sutlej) -, and the Gaṅgā flow.¹³ The different kshatriya families were connected for the purpose of bringing unity among them, by drawing a common lineage from one common ancestor called

Manu. The Ikṣvākus, the Yadus, the Pūrus, the Jahnus and the Trtsus are some of the clans already referred to in the *R̥gveda*. The *Purāṇas* like *Viṣṇu* and *Mārkaṇḍeya* give the genealogies of these clans. But in spite of all the genealogies they were often indulging in internal fights. For example, a group of ten kings of Aryan descent belonging to the families of Yadu, Turvasa, Druhyu, Anu, Puru, etc., formed into a confederacy and attacked Sudās on the bank of the River Paruṣṇī.¹⁴ Vasiṣṭha functioned as the priest and guided Sudās to victory by the grace of gods.¹⁵

Domiciliation, formation of settlements and kingdoms, preponderance of the Fire worship, Indra as the principal deity in the sacrifice are confirmed by the use of the two words *viśpati*/*viśaspati* and *dampati* in the *R̥gveda*. The words *viś* and *dam* denote house. The word *viś* also got the extended meaning of settlement, community, tribe and also subjects. So *viś-pati*, *viśāṃ-pati* or *viśas-pati* means the chief of a settlement or tribe, lord of the house, lord of the people and applied to the king, Agni and Indra. Similarly *dam-pati* (Gk. *despotis*) means the lord of the house and applied to Agni, Indra and Aśvins.¹⁶

The Aśvamedha, the Rājasūya and the Aindra-abhiśeka are some of the sacrifices developed exclusively for the kshatriyas. All of them are performed by the brahmin priests and matching to the status of the sacrificers, the brahmins are richly remunerated with *dakṣiṇās* in the form of cattle and jewels. Bharata made conquests both in the west and east of his kingdom, which lay on either side of the river Sarasvatī. The *Śatapatha-Brahmaṇa* (13.5.4.21) records his conquest over Satvants, the descendants of Yadu. The *Aitareya-*

Brāhmaṇa (39.9) and the *Mahābhārata* (7.63.8) confirm the conquests he made upto the river Gaṅgā.¹⁷ Not only he performed the *Aśvamedha*, but also was consecrated by the celebrated sage (*ṛṣi*) *Dīrghatamas* with the exalted form of coronation rite - the *Aindra-mahābhīṣeka*. The *Ikṣvāku* kings *Sagara*, *Daśaratha*, *Rāma* and the *Bharata* kings *Sudās*, *Yudhiṣṭhira*, etc., performed *Aśvamedhas*. *Yudhiṣṭhira* performed also the *Rājasūya*. The injunction *rājā rājasūyena svārājyakāmo yajeta*¹⁸ clearly testifies the exclusiveness of this sacrifice to the *kshatriyas*.

II

There were close interactions between the brahmins and the *kshatriyas*. When the king *Bharata* found none of his sons was fit to inherit his kingdom he adopted the grandson of the brahmin *Bhāradvāja*.¹⁹ Similarly a descendant of the *Viśvāmitra* family called *Kauśika* or *Gādheya* could become a brahmin by virtue of his spiritual attainments and adopt *śrāmaṇism*.²⁰ The *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* informs that a sage called *Saubhari* married the fifty daughters of *Māndhātṛ* and returned to *śrāmaṇism* on realizing futility of the household tradition.²¹ One king by name *Nābhāga*, the son of *Diṣṭa* resorted to the code of conduct of the *Vaiśyas*.²²

The brahmins remained as priests to the *kshatriyas*. The descendants of *Vasiṣṭha* were the permanent priests of the *Ikṣvākus*. The *Vasiṣṭhas* were always docile and penance-oriented brahmins, but always associated with the *kshatriyas* like *Sudās*, *Hariścandra*, *Daśaratha*, etc.²³ While *Gautama* remained as a *śramaṇa*, his son *Śātānanda* was a family priest of *Janaka*.²⁴ Even among the brahmins some families underwent training in

martial arts and became revolutionary,²⁵ while practising śrāmaṇism. The family of Bhṛgu was always haughty in temper and aggressive on the erring kshatriyas and they carried the weapon paraśu (PIE. *pelekus, Gk. pelekus, cf. Goth. *filhan*) 'hatchet' as a symbol of their involvement in martial arts. They were always playing a decisive role in the battles.²⁶ They fought against Sudās. They imparted training in the use of special type of fire missiles called *Bhārgavāstras* including the *brahmāstra* (the word *brahma* signifying the brahmin) to the deserving brahmins and kshatriyas. For example, the sage Aurva of the Bhārgava family taught Sagara of the Ikṣvāku family the *Vedas*, *śāstras* and martial arts like the use of *Bhārgavāstras*.²⁷ Similarly the brahmins Kṛpa and Droṇa also received instruction in the warfare and the *brahmāstra* from one descendant of the family called Paraśurāma Bhārgava.²⁸ From this same Paraśurāma Bhārgava Karna obtained the *brahmāstra* declaring himself falsely as a Bhārgava; of course he was cursed later by the sage on confession of himself as a sūta.

Further, there were free marital relationships between the brahmins and the kṣatriyas. The śrāmaṇic family of Bhṛgu, the yajñaic family of Ikṣvākus and Bharatas had always exchange of daughters in marriages. For example, Cyavana, a descendant of Bhṛgu and the son of Dadhīci,³⁰ married princess Sukanyā, the daughter of the king Saryāti.³¹ Cyavana's son Apnavāna married princess Ruci, the daughter of the king Nahuṣa and the sister of Yayāti. Urvā, the grandson of Apnavāna, married princess Satyavatī, the daughter of the king Gādhi of Kanyākubja and sister of Viśvāmitra.³² Their son Jamadagni married princess Reṇukā of the

Ikṣvāku family. Their son Paraśurāma got himself distinguished as a great warrior and the author of a hymn in the *Ṛgveda* (10.110).

The brahmins never hesitated to discard the kshatriyas when they transgressed the normal code of conduct. For example, when Viśvāmitra wanted to be yājaka 'priest' for the sacrifice of Triśaṅku, Mahodaya - a descendant of Vasiṣṭha family - declared that the brahmins should not participate in that sacrifice.³³ The *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* records that the kshatriya kings Haihayas and Tālajaṅghas were discarded by the brahmins for making their clans impure by cross breeding with Śakas, Yavanas, Kambojas, Pāradas, Pahlavas, etc.³⁴

Had there not been a gradual development and bifurcation of the Aryans into brahmins and kshatriyas it would not have been possible for the interchangeability, and Viśvāmitra would not have been a priest as well as the author of several hymns including the *Gāyatrī-mantra*. While the descendants of Vasiṣṭha remained as śramaṇas and brahmins, the descendants of Viśvāmitra adapted yajñaism and came to be known as kshatriyas. Thus one of Viśvāmitra's descendants Gādheya or Kauśika reverted to śramaṇism and got recognized as a brahmin by the family of Vasiṣṭhas. This is further confirmed by the inclusion of Viśvāmitra among the seven seers and in the *pravara* and *gotra* of the brahmin families.³⁵ Had there been a class conflict this tradition would not have arisen or survived through generations from time immemorial.

Therefore from the above account it can be concluded that in the early age a brahmin could become a kshatriya and vice versa on the basis of the mode of

ritual and code of conduct. It became indeed possible because of the oneness in the religious belief. However, for the mundane existence the brahmin has come under the obligation to the kshatriya.³⁶

III

The *dakṣiṇā* prescribed in the *Śrauta* and the *Gṛhya* *sūtras* for each rite in a sacrificial ritual may give an impression for a casual observer that the brahmins were greedy. For example, in the *Rājasūya* of the kshatriya kings the *dakṣiṇās* range from a cow to a cart driven by three horses, new clothes, a bull, a thousand and even one hundred thousand cows.³⁷ But such a practice was acceptable to the kshatriyas because of staunch religious belief. The RV. 1.71.4 says that Bhṛgu made Agni the messenger of Gods. This seems to mean that this seer Bhṛgu is the first to popularize the practice of worshipping gods by offering in Fire among the brahmins. Therefore the kshatriyas, being ardent followers of Fire-worship and domiciliation, began to appoint the descendants of Bhṛgu family as their priests. While the *Kātyāyana-śrautasūtra* prescribes the Bhārgava as the *hotṛ* priest invariably in the *Abhiṣecanīya* rite in the *Rājasūya*, the *śrauta-sūtras* of the *Kaṭha* and the *Maitrāyaṇīya śākhās* consider that a Bhārgava shall be the *hotṛ* in all the rites of the *Rājasūya*.³⁸ There is also another reason that there was slackness among the kshatriyas as well as brahmins. Because of the preoccupation in the statecraft and warfare the kshatriyas had to depend upon the brahmins for their religious merit to obtain political stability through various sacrifices. They venerated the ascetic brahmins³⁹ as men of worship and offered huge *dakṣiṇās* for officiating as priests. Of course misuse of position and status is inevitable in

any society. So some brahmins contended themselves by confining themselves as sacrificial priests and got attracted to the *dakṣiṇās*.⁴⁰ Perhaps they were even reciting the hymns in the ritual without knowing their meanings.⁴¹

IV

The dogmatism led to the spiritual revolution in the Aryan domiciles in the sixth century B.C. The Gangetic plateau, particularly in the city-kingdoms like Videha, Vaiśālī, Kosala and Magadha, became the centre of agricultural economy and the kings ruling these areas became very prosperous with unbound luxury. The kshatriyas started raising questions of philosophical nature over and above what the sacrificial religion can answer. Citra Gāṅgyāyana (KBU. 1), Pratardana Daivodāsa (KBU. 3.1), Ajātaśatru Kāśya (KBU. 4.1; BṛhU. 2.1), Ugrasena Janaka of Videha (BṛhU. 4.1-3), Aśvapati Kaikeya (ChU. 5.13), Gautama the Buddha and Mahāvīra Vardhamāna are some kshatriyas who proved futility of the sacrifice to alleviate the grief of the man and raised philosophical questions about the soul.

Further, the Āraṇyakas and the classical Upaniṣads testify the reversion of the kshatriyas from domiciliation to asceticism. For example, the *prāṇopāsanā* in the *Kauṣītaki-brāhmaṇopaniṣad* (2.2) teaches nonattachment (*vairāgya*) to the extent that the aspirant takes a vow not even to go for alms.⁴² Thus the same kshatriyas who promoted agriculture, colonization, expansion of kingdoms and royal luxuries were the first to quickly realize the futility of the mundane pleasures and reverted to the ascetic tradition.⁴⁴ This led to the formation of four *āśramas* 'states' and four *puruṣārthas*

'goals or values of human life'. The fourth value, namely *mokṣa* 'liberation from the cycle of birth and death' came to be recognized.⁴⁴ The kshatriyas have not discarded the *karma-kāṇḍa* as known from the *Saṃhitās* and *Brāhmaṇas* while advocating the upaniṣadic doctrine. Further, they developed a sacrifice mixed with both the concepts like *Viśvajit* or *Sarvajit* ('conquering all including the internal enemies of attachment, hatred, etc.').⁴⁵ The sacrificer was also called *sarvajit*; the sage *Kauṣītaki* who was the author of the *Kauṣītaki-brāhmaṇa* and the *Kauṣītaki-brāhmaṇopaniṣad*, was called *sarvajit*.⁴⁶

Even the *upāsanās* developed in the *Āraṇyakas* involve some ritual to be performed, of course, at a lower level than what is found in the sophisticated brahmanic sacrifice. The *upāsanās* are of two types, namely *saguṇopāsanās* in which the meditation with some ritual is prescribed on some deity, and *nirguṇopāsanās* in which no deity is found prescribed. The *Āraṇyakas* in the main give the first type of *upāsanās* and the *Upaniṣads* the second type.

Even the Ikṣvāku prince Gautama the Buddha resorted to the forest⁴⁷ in the same way as the king *Bṛhad-ratha* as described in the *Maitrāyaṇyupaniṣad*. *Bṛhad-ratha* undertook severe meditation and found out the futility of the worldly pleasures.⁴⁸ The only difference is that the Buddha denounced completely the sacrifice while adhering to the Vedic divinities and *Āryan* code of conduct. *Jina Vardhamāna*, a kshatriya prince of the *Jñāta* clan and a native of *Vaiśālī*, is another example. Both the Buddha and *Jina Vardhamāna* did not discard the principal *Āryan* code of life, namely 'migration and asceticism'.⁴⁹

The Vedic kshatriyas while reverting to the asceticism did not sever their connection with the brahmins. They taught the brahmins the *Brahma-vidyā* 'knowledge of the Brahman'. The brahmins taking the lead from the kshatriyas preached the upaniṣadic doctrine. For example, the sage Vāruṇi of the Bhṛgu family approached his father Varuṇa to teach him the Brahman and the latter taught his son in a profound way in the *Taittirīyopaniṣad*.⁵⁰

Therefore, it appears reasonable that the four sections of the *Veda*, namely, *Samhitā*, *Brāhmaṇa*, *Āraṇyaka* and *Upaniṣad*, are gradually evolved representing the four stages and four values of human life.⁵¹ It also hints at the tripartite stratification of the Aryan community as against non-aryans. It was only during the politico-social change in the early Christian era, the caste system got solidified and the law givers like *Manu* and *Yājñavalkya* tried to divide the castes combining the religion with politico-social conditions. Even the classification and enumeration of castes in these law books of *Manu* and *Yājñavalkya* are neither absolute nor comprehensive save illustrative.⁵² Therefore the *Upaniṣads* cannot be held as standing in opposition to the *Brāhmaṇas*.

REFERENCES

1. For example Raveendra N. Batra observes: "However, it appears that the kshatriyas had not handed to have supreme status to brahmins on a silver platter. There seemed to have been a long tussle for supremacy between the two upper classes", *The Downfall of Capitalism and Communalism*, Macmillan, Delhi, 1978, p.181. Such statements might have been based on such passages in the early literature like: *pratilomarūpam eva tat syād yat kṣatriyo brāhmaṇam upanayet*, *Kauṣītaki-brāhmaṇopaniṣad*, 4.18.

2. There are also some passages in the Vedic literature itself referring to the rise of such a situation in the later Vedic period. For example Śābarasvāmin in his *Bhāṣya* on the *Jaininīya-mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, 1.3.3.4 indicts the priests that they formulated certain injunctions (*smṛti-vākyas*) with selfish motive (*lobha*). The injunction *vaisarjanīyahomīyaṃ vāso 'dhvaryur gr̥hṇāti* is an example, according to which the new unbleached clothes of the sacrificer, his wife and children shall be taken away by the Adhvaryu priest at the end of the *homa* performed to abandon the intermediary consecration (*dīkṣā*) in the context of the ritual relating to the *Agniṣomīya-paśu* in the *Jyotiṣoma* sacrifice. On the ground that this injunction is made out of selfish motive, it is decided that the sentence is invalid and hence the clothes need not be given to the Adhvaryu; cf. *apramāṇaṃ smṛtiḥ. atrānyaṃ-mūlam. lobhād ācaritavantaḥ kecit tata eṣā smṛtiḥ. upapannataraṃ caitat, Śābarabhāṣya*, 1.3.3.4.

Cf. "We cannot easily imagine that the Brāhmaṇas who lived on sacrifices had among themselves people who were most hated by the priests among the 'greedy ones' who believed in nothing, i.e. those who offered no sacrifices and gave no gifts to the priests", Maurice Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature*, vol.1, tr. V. Srinivasa Sarma, Motilal, Delhi, 1981, p.210.

3. Raveendra N. Batra, op.cit., p.181; see also Winternitz, op.cit., p.211.
4. A.A. Macdonell, *A History of Sanskrit Literature*, Motilal, 1979, p. 118.
5. The word *śramaṇa* occurs for the first time in the *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*. Later it is found in the *Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka*. But this tradition is already known as evidenced by RV. 10.136. When Buddhists used the same word *śramaṇa* in a more technical sense, the Vedic *śramaṇas* came to be called *nigama-śramaṇas*. For more details see my introduction to the *Kaṇkaryaratnāvalī*, S.V.U. Oriental series 26 (= S.V.U. Oriental Journal, 28), 1993, pp. 2-8, 26-34.

Vālmīki calls Śabarī a *śramaṇī* 'a female mendicant'; cf. *sa cāśya kathayāmāsa śabarīm dharmacārīṇīm/ śramaṇīm dharmanipuṇaṃ abhigaccheti rāghava//*

Rāmāyaṇa, cr. ed. Baroda, 1.1.46.

6. P.L. Bhargava, *Founders of India's Civilisation - Lives of ten pre-Buddha greatmen of India*, Asian Humanities Press, Berkeley, 1992, pp. 13, 30, 31.
7. RV. 7.18.18-19.
8. Cf. *varuṇaḥ kṣatram indriyaṃ bhagena savitā śriyam/ sutrāmā yaśasā balaṃ dadhānā yajñam āsata*// TB. 2.6.13.3. Varuṇa, the lord of social order, bestows on the yajamāna the strength and valour. It means that the yajamāna through his sacrifice obtains the capacity to enforce law and order in his domain. A separate branch of learning called *kṣatra-vidyā* comprehending warfare and statecraft came to be recognized, in contrast to the *Veda* to be studied by the brahmins as well, in the *Chāndogyaopaniṣad*, 7.1.2.
9. Gautama's hermitage (*āśrama*) is in the forest abutting upon the outskirts of the city Mithilā on the way linking with Viśālā of the king Sumati (*Rāmāyaṇa*, 1.47.9-11). Viśvāmitra's *Siddhāśrama* is in the middle of the forest lying between Ayodhyā and Viśālā at a distance not very far from the confluence of the rivers Sarayū and Gaṅgā (*Rāmāyaṇa*, 1.22). Vālmiki has his hermitage on the bank of the river Tamasā which is very close to the river Gaṅgā (*jagāma tamasātīraṃ jāhnavyās tv avidūrataḥ*, *ibid.* 1.2.3).
10. Appayadīkṣita has rightly analysed the word *brāhmaṇa*: *brahma aṇāti avagacchatīti brāhmaṇaḥ*, *Parimala-ṭīkā* on the *Kalpataru* on *Bhāmatī*, BS. 3.4.47 (Parimal pub. 1981).
11. RV. 7.18; *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa* 39, P.L. Bhargava, *op.cit.* p. 22.
12. *tam ahaṃ draṣṭum icchāmi yajñagoptā sa me mataḥ*, *Rāmāyaṇa*, 1.69.4.
While the personal name Śīradhvaja of Janaka symbolizes cultivation, Kuśadhvaja signifies the sacrifice in which kuśa grass grown in the agricultural field is used in lieu of *darbha* grown in wild; cf. M. Srimannarayana Murti, 'Green Revolution in the Vālmiki-Rāmāyaṇa', *S.V.U. Oriental Journal*, vol. 37, p.70.
13. A.A. Macdonell, *op.cit.* pp. 118-120.
14. RV. 7.18, 19, 33, 83.
15. RV 7.18.
16. cf. RV. 5.22.4; 1.26.7; 7.7.4; 2.39.2; Also *viś-patnī*, RV. 3.29.1.
17. AB. 39.9; *Mahābhārata*, 7.63.8.
18. Quoted in the *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa*, p. 150 (BORI, 1972);

- ŚB. 11.2.3.12; cf. *rājño rājasūyaḥ*, KŚS. 15.1.1; *sa rājasūyene-
ṣṭvā rājeti nāmādhatta*, *Gopatha-Brahmaṇa*, 1.5.8.
19. *Mahābhārata*, 1.94; *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* 4.19.
20. Vasiṣṭha calls Viśvāmitra *kṣatrabandhu* (*Rāmāyaṇa*, 1.55.3); but at the end Viśvāmitra gets recognition as a brahmin; *evaṃ tv anena brāhmaṇyaṃ prāptam*, *ibid.* 1.64.19.
21. *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*, 4.2.
22. *ibid.* 4.1.19; *diṣṭaputras tu nābhāgo vaiśyatām agamat*. This may also hint at a further bifurcation of the kshatriyas into *kṣatriya* 'warrior' in a narrowed sense from 'settler' in opposition to 'migrant' and *vaiśya* 'resident/agriculturist'. The word *viś* in *vaiśya* certainly refers to the house and accumulation of wealth, promotion of agriculture and development of trade and industry. Thus the *kṣatriya* who is looking after the property of the house is called '*vaiśya*', while the word *kṣatriya* underwent contraction of meaning to 'one who is a warrior and engaged in protection and distribution of wealth'. Thus the words *viṣṇu* (from < *viś*'), *bhagavān* (< *bhaga* 'share') and *kṛṣṇa* (< *karṣ* 'to plough') to the deity Viṣṇu comprehend the aspects of protection and promotion of happiness and wealth. Therefore the same Aryan is called *brāhmaṇa*, *kṣatriya* and *vaiśya* depending upon the profession and thus all the three of them get the right to recite the *Veda* and to practice the Vedic religion.
23. *Rāmāyaṇa*, 1.69.14. When Viśvāmitra wants to take away the Kāmadhenu cow by force Vasiṣṭha realizes that Viśvāmitra was in an advantageous position for being not only a king but also a mighty *kṣatriya* and the lord of the land, and hence expresses that he was not so strong as his adversary was to restore the cow to himself; cf.
*na hi tulyaṃ balam mahyam rājā tv adya viśeṣataḥ/
balī rājā kṣatriyaś ca pṛthivyāḥ patir eva ca// ibid.* 1.51.11.
24. *gautamasya suto jyeṣṭhas tapasā dyotitaprabhaḥ// ibid.* 1.51.2.
25. Paraśurāma of the Bhṛgu family, Śaradvat and his son Kṛpa of the Gautama family, Droṇa and his son Aśvatthāman of Bhāradvāja family obtained distinction in martial arts, archery in particular. Śaradvat is called variously as Satyadhṛti and Śarastamba. Satyadhṛti appears to be the personal name (cf. *śatānandāt satyadhṛtir dhanurvedāntago jajñe*, *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*, 4.19.64). Śarastamba and Śaradvat are the adjectives for his

seed fell on the bunch of arrows when it got ejaculated on seeing Urvaśī (cf. *satyadhṛter varāpsarasam urvaśīm dṛṣṭvā retaskannaṃ śarastambe papāta*, *ibid.* 4.19.65). When he evinced interest in archery it was a shock to his parents; cf.

*maharṣer gautamasyāśic charadvān nāma nāmataḥ/
putraḥ kila mahārāja jātaḥ saha śarair vibho//
na tasya vedādhyayane tathā buddhir ajāyata/
yathāsya buddhir abhavad dhanurvede paraṃtapa//*

Mahābhārata, 1.120.1-3.

26. RV. 7.18.6

27. The Ikṣvāku king Bāhu fled with his wife into the forest being defeated by the enemy kings of Haihaya and Tālajaṅgha families. He died in the forest and his wife desired to commit concretion. Aurva rescued her and she delivered a child, who was named Sagara, *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*, 4.3.26-27.

28. See my article 'Ayoniya in Epics and Purāṇas', *S.V.U. Oriental Journal*, 32-34, pp. 57-73.

29. After Paraśurāma, the son of Jamadagni all the descendants of Bhṛgu appear to have been called Paraśurāma Bhārgava, just like the descendants of Raghu as Rāghava. So we come across many Paraśurāmas in the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*. By virtue of the śrāmaṇic tradition, they commanded high respect from the kshatriyas.

30. *Pañcaviṃśa-Brāhmaṇa*, 14.6.

31. *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*, 4.1.5.1.

32. P.L. Bhargava, *op.cit.* p. 24.

33. *kṣatriyo yājako yasya caṇḍālasya viśeṣataḥ/
katham sadasi bhoktāro havis tasya surarṣayaḥ//*

'Rāmāyaṇa, 1.58.14.

34. *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*, 4.3.41-48.

35. The pravara of brahmins contains one of the eight ṛṣis, namely Kaśyapa, Atri, Bhardvāja, Viśvāmitra, Gautama, Jamadagni, Vasiṣṭha and Agastya. Excluding Agastya the rest are called *sapatarsis*:

*kaśyapo 'trir bharadvājo viśvāmitro 'tha gautamaḥ/
jamadagnir vasiṣṭhaś ca saptaite ṛṣayaḥ smṛtāḥ//*

36. "In the Rig-veda the brahmin frequently appears to be of less importance than the rajanya (kshatriya)", Charles Drekmeier, *Kingship and Community in Early India*, (Stanford; Stanford

University Press, 1962), p. 21; quoted in: Raveendra N. Batra, op.cit. p.178.

37. Cf. *Kātyāyana-śrauta-sūtra*, 15.1.12, 15, 22; 15.2.20; 15.4.51. The inscriptional evidences confirm the existence of this practice; cf. "Official (not monastic) caves at the important Nānāghāt pass... record full details of the innumerable donations as yajña [sacrificial] fees made over to brahmins by the Sātavāhana kings: cattle by the thousand, elephant, chariot, horses, coined money, and so on", D.D. Kosambi, *The Culture and Civilization of Ancient India in Historical Outline* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 184.

There are even expiatory rites prescribed for failing to give *dakṣiṇās* properly. For example the *Prāyaścitta* of the *Vārāha-pariśiṣṭa*, I.12 prescribes to give land with crop as *dakṣiṇā*, if one does not prosper as a result of having performed a sacrifice without giving away *dakṣiṇā*, C.G. Kashikar (ed. with tr.), *Prāyaścittam - Vārāhapariśiṣṭam*, *S.V.U. Oriental Journal*, vol. 32-34, p. 337.

38. *bhārgavo hotā*, *Kātyāyana-śrauta-sūtra*, 15.4.1. Com. thereon: *atrābhiṣecanīye bhrgusagotro brāhmaṇo hotā bhavati. sarvasminn api rājasūye bhārgava eva hoteti kathamaitrasūtrayor asti* (ed. Albrecht Weber, Varanasi 1972).
39. The brahmins and the kshatriyas were initiated in the *Veda*, etc., in the same *gurukula* by the same teacher, just as Kṛṣṇa and Sudāma (Kucela) in the *gurukula* of Sāndīpani, and Drupada and Droṇa of Bharadvāja. The reckless attitude of Drupada towards Droṇa led to the great bloodshed in the Kurukṣetra - the battlefield of the Kauravas and Pāṇḍavas. Had he fulfilled the desire of his classmate Droṇa by giving a milch-cow there would not have been a need for Drupada to pray for a girl (Draupadī) to be married to Arjuna and a boy (Dhr̥ṣṭadyumna) to be a slayer of Droṇa (*Mahābhārata*, 1.154.1-7; 155.41-45; 176.8).
40. cf. *sadasy eva vyaṇ svādhyāyam adhītya harāmahe yan naḥ pare dadāti*, *Kauṣītaki-brāhmaṇopaniṣad*, 1.1.
41. *duṣṭaḥ śabdaḥ svarato varṇato vā mityā prayukto na tam artham āha/ sa vāgvajro yajamānaḥ hinasti yathendraśatruḥ svarato 'parādhāt//*

The above verse quoted in the *Mahābhāṣya*, 1.1.1, p. 2, circumstantiates the adverse situation to the brahmins for not knowing the meaning of the mantras he utters. So the Mīmāṃsakas have made it mandatory by the injunction that in the sacrificial ritual the hymns become fruitful when they are read knowing full well their meanings (*mantrāṇāṃ ca prayogasamavetārthasmā-rakatayārthavatvam. na tu taduccāraṇam adṛṣṭārtham, Mīmāṃsā-nyāyaprakāśa*, p. 201).

The maxim (*nyāya*) called *brāhmaṇa-parivrājaka* applied by Śaṅkara in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* (1.4.16) signifies that there were many *brāhmaṇās* who were continuing to be *śramaṇas*; otherwise the collocation (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) and the formation of the descriptive compound (*karmadhāraya*) would not have become possible. The kshatriya can also become a *parivrājaka* reverting to asceticism. So the Buddha and Mahāvira are also called *parivrājakas* even though they condemned the sacrifices. Similarly Kaikeyī's request for Rāma's residence in the forest for fourteen years is nothing but imposing migratory tradition of asceticism on Rāma as against his natural claim to be domiciled in the city and enjoy the same order of life of his father (*Rāmāyaṇa*, II.10.27-28; 12.14).

42. *tasmai vā etasmai prāṇāya brahmaṇa etāḥ sarvā devatā ayācamānāya baliṃ haranti. tatho evāsmāi sarvāṇi bhūtāny ayācamānāyaiva baliṃ haranti ya evam veda. tasyopaniṣan na yāced iti, Kauṣītaki-brāhmaṇopaniṣad*, 2.2.
43. *br̥hadratho vai nāma rājā virājye putram nidhāpayitvā idam aśāsvataṃ manyamānaḥ śarīraṃ vairāgyam upeto 'raṇyaṃ nir-jagāma, Maitrāyaṇīyopaniṣad*, 1.2.
44. The stages of learning the Veda (*brahmacarya*), performing sacrifice (*gṛhastha*), going to the forest (*araṇyāyana* = *vānaprashta*) and liberation (*saṃnyāsa*) are hinted at in ChU. 8.5.1.
45. *ekāha u ced viśvajit rātrisatrasya vā viṣuvān atirātra eva syāt. yo 'nyatra viśvajitaḥ sarvaṃ dadāti. viśvajic cet sarvaṃ eva, Kauṣītaki-Brāhmaṇa*, 25.13.3, 9-10.
sarvajitā sarvaṃ ajanayat. viśvajitā viśvaṃ ajanayat, Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa, 22.8.4-5.

See also KB. 25.14; TB. 16.7.2.

This is also expressed otherwise in *uśan ha vai vājaśravasaḥ sarvavedasaṃ dadau, Kāṭhupanīṣad*, 1.1. (*Sarvavedas* means

'all property'). Kālidāsa: *tam adhvare viśvajīti kṣitīśam niḥśeṣaviśrāṇitakośajātam*, *Raghuvamśa*, 5.1.

46. *athātaḥ sarvajītaḥ kauṣītakes triṇy upāsānāni bhavanti*, *Kauṣītaki-brāhmaṇopaniṣad*, 2.7.

47. Even though he was born in the Lumbini Grove near the ancient town of Kapilavastu in the modern dense terain region of Nepal his religious activity was mostly around Vaiśālī. The second Saṅgiti of Buddhists was held at Vaiśālī, and the events in the life of Buddha in this great city were referred to in the early inscriptions and sculptures at Dhānyakāṭaka in Andhra Pradesh, B.S.L. Hanumantha Rao, 'The Mahāvīnaya-dharas', *S.V.U. Oriental Journal*, 27 (1984), pp. 12-13; 'The Sāla Sects of Andhakas', *ibid.* 30-31 (1987-88), p. 47 (cf. AR. for 1959-60, no. 59, p. 50).

The merits of moving to the forest (*araṇyāyana*) and of performing sacrifices (*satrāyana*) are equated to *brahmacarya* 'moving in the Veda': *atha yat satrāyanaṁ ity ācakṣate brahmacaryam eva... atha yad anāśakāyanam ity ācakṣate brahmacaryam eva tat*, ChU. 8.5.2-3. The very word *araṇya* is derived as by the combination of two words *ara* and *ṇya* (ChU. 8.5.4). *Ara* and *ṇya* are two rivers of *aṛiṣaḍvarga*, namely *rāga*, *dveṣa*, *kāma*, *krodha*, *moha* and *mātsarya*.

48. *sa tatra paramaṁ tapa āsthāyādityam udīkṣamāṇa ūrdhva-bāhus tiṣṭhati*, *Maitrāyaṇīyopaniṣad*, 1.2.

49. Therefore the *nigama-śramaṇas* and *nāstika-śramaṇas* are called *parivrājakas*: cf. M. Srimannarayana Murti, *Kaīṅkaryaratnāvalī* (ed.), intr. p.30, fn.12.

50. In the same way Śvetaketu was instructed by his father about the identity of the individual self with the Brahman by the *mahāvākya*: *tat tvam asi śvetaketo*, ChU. 6.8.7, etc.

Such passages like "how can a brahmin learn from a kshatriya" (KBU. 1.1) are to be treated as ridicules for there are several ridiculing statements in the Upaniṣads themselves; for example the priests in the Sārasvata sacrifice call the priest Kavaṣa Ailūṣa a *dāsyāḥputra* 'bastard' (*Chāgaleyopaniṣad*, 1), and the sage Raikva calls the rich donor Jānaśruti a *śūdra*, when the latter approached him for instruction in the upaniṣadic doctrine (ChU. 4.1-3). Similarly in the *Aitareya-brāhmaṇa* (7.17/34.5) the brahmin Śunaḥśepa calls his father Ajīgarta Sauyavasi a

śūdra for the latter's treacherous act of giving him away as a sacrificial victim and accepting to bind and immolate him.

51. Vidyāraṇya shows the interrelationship among the Brāhmaṇa, Āraṇyaka and Upaniṣad portions by grading the happiness obtained. The happiness obtained in this world is worthless and hence the happiness in the heaven obtainable by the performance of sacrifices in conformity with the Saṃhitās and the Brāhmaṇas is desirable. Dejection of the heavenly happiness is 'more desirable' because they are to be fulfilled with hard labour. Thus the upāsanās prescribed in the Āraṇyakas are preferable, for they involve less strain. The 'most desirable' is the knowledge of the self which is dealt with in the Upaniṣads, for this happiness is eternal.

*manuṣyebhyo hitatamaṃ varaṃ vavre pratardanaḥ/
hitaṃ hitataraṃ candro mene hitatamaṃ dhiyā//
hitaṃ svargasukhaṃ martyasukhād apy adhiakatvataḥ/
tadvairāgyaṃ hitataraṃ yāgādyāyāsavarjanāt//
svātmabodho hitatamo nityānandānubhūtidah/*

Anubhūtiprakāśa, 8.4-6.

Therefore there is every need to review the views of the scholars like: "Though the Upaniṣads generally form a part of the Brāhmaṇas, being a continuation of their speculative side (*jñāna-kāṇḍa*), they really represent a new religion, which is in virtual opposition to the ritual or practical side (*karma-kāṇḍa*)", A.A. Macdonell, *A History of Sanskrit Literature*, p. 184 (Motilal, 1971).

52. *Manusmṛti*, chapter 10.

NARASINGHA CHARAN PANDA

A STUDY OF ORNAMENTS IN THE VEDIC LITERATURE

The use of ornaments in the Vedic period is very interesting to study. Though the term *alaṃkāra* in the sense of ornaments is noted in the Post-Saṃhitā period, there are various types of ornaments mentioned in the Saṃhitās. The word *alaṃkāra/araṃkṛta* is found in the *Atharvaveda* (II.12.7), *Āpasthamba-Dharma-Sūtra* (II.149, XXVI.18), *Gautama-Dharma-Sūtra* (XVIII.21), *Kātyāyana-Śrauta-Sūtra* (VIII.9.26, IX.7.4), *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* (VIII.8.2, 8.5, 9.1) and also in the *Kauṣītaki-Upaniṣad* (1.4).

The term *alaṃkāra* is derived from the root *kṛ* with the indeclinable *alam* or *aram*, which means 'ornament', 'decoration', 'beautification' and 'ornamentation', etc. The word *alaṃkāra* is defined by different lexicographers as: The *Amarakośa* counts five names of ornament, viz. *alaṃkāras tv ābharaṇaṃ pariṣkāro vibhūṣaṇam. maṇḍanaṃ ca*.¹ The *Vaijayantīkośa* also gives the five synonyms of *alaṃkāra*.² It further elaborates

these synonymous terms in the following way:

alamkāras tv ābharaṇaṃ
bhūṣaṇaṃ maṇḍanaṃ punaḥ/
vibhūṣaṇaṃ pariṣkāraḥ
karṇikā karṇabhūṣaṇaṃ //³

Thus *alamkāra* means *ābharaṇa* 'ornament', while *bhūṣaṇa* (*bhūṣyate* 'nena, $\sqrt{bhūṣ} + karaṇe lyuṭ$) means *maṇḍana* 'adoration'; *vibhūṣaṇa* means embellishment and finally *karṇikā* stands for *karṇabhūṣaṇa*, 'ear ornament'. Besides, the *Medinīkośa* too elucidates the term *alamkāra*: *alamkāras tu hārādāv upamādāv alamkṛtau*,⁴ 'alamkāra is in ornaments like necklace, etc., figures of speech like simile etc., and decoration or beautification'.

The ornaments for the body starts from the head down to the feet, i.e. head-ornaments, ear-ornaments, neck and chest-ornaments, waist-ornaments and feet-ornaments.

A) HEAD ORNAMENTS:

There were a number of head ornaments mentioned in the Vedic texts. The names of these ornaments are: *stukā*, *stūpa*, *kumba*, *kurīra*, *opaśa*, *śṛṅga*, and *tirīṭa*, etc. *Stukā* denotes a 'tuft of hair' or wool in the *Ṛgveda*,⁵ *Atharvaveda*⁶ and other later texts.⁷ R.T.H. Griffith translates it as 'locks of hair'.⁸ *Stūpa*⁹ means 'tuft of hair' and *stūpa*¹⁰ also denotes the 'top-knot' of hair as designating the upper part of the head. *Kumba* is mentioned with *opaśa* and *kurīra* as an ornament of women's hair in the *Atharvaveda*, VI.138.3:

klība klībaṃ tv ākaraṃ vadhre vadhriṃ
tv ākaraṃ arasārasaṃ tv ākaraṃ/

kurīram asya śīrṣāṇi
kumbhaṃ cādhinidadhmasi //

Sāyaṇa explains *kurīra* as 'a net of hair' and *kumba* as 'its ornament' and he also quotes from the *Āpastamba-Śrauta-Sūtra* (X.9.5) in support.¹¹ Thus both the words signify some distinctively womanish head-dress or ornament. The word *kurīra*¹² denotes some sort of head ornaments used by women in the descriptions of the *R̥gveda*¹³ and *Atharvaveda*.¹⁴ According to the *Yajurveda-saṃhitās*¹⁵ the goddess *Sinivālī* is described by the epithets *su-kapardā*, *su-kurīra*, *svopaśā*, as wearing a beautiful head-dress.

Geldner¹⁶ translates *kurīra* as 'horn' and *kurīrin* as 'a crested animal'. But according to Macdonell and Keith¹⁷ *kurīrin* (having a *kurīra*) is a word occurring in an ambiguous passage of the *Atharvaveda*, in which it may be taken either as a noun meaning a 'crested animal', perhaps as Zimmer¹⁸ suggests the 'peacock', or as an epithet of the word *aja* 'goat', in which case it might mean 'horned'. But even in the latter alternative a metaphorical application of the word seems sufficient, just as in the *Pañcaviṃśa-Brāhmaṇa* (XIII.4.3) *opaśā* is used for the horns of cattle, and thus renders unnecessary the adoption of Geldner's¹⁹ view that the original meaning of *kurīra* is 'horn'. Suryakanta²⁰ translates the word *kurīra* as *śīraveṣṭana* 'head-dress for women'. He quotes a line from the *Gopatha-Brāhmaṇa* (III.21): *kurīram dhārayet jaṭāvān syāt*. According to Monier Williams²¹ *kurīra* is a kind of head-dress for women. But according to Ray Govind Chand²² it was a head-ornament with which the head of a bride was adorned. He has identified *kurīra* with *śṛṅga* or *mukuta*. Finally A.C. Das²³ is of the opinion that the word *kurīra*,

probably meant a form of coiffure in which the hair was braided in to erect crests. *Tirīṭa* has also been described as a head ornament, or head-dress or diadem.²⁴ It is found in the *Atharvaveda* in the adjectival derivative *tirīṭin* used of a demon, and presumably meaning 'adorned with a tiara'. This way, *ātakā*,²⁵ *pratisara*²⁶ and other head ornaments are also found in the Vedic *Samhitās*.

B) EAR ORNAMENTS:

Like head ornaments, the description of ear ornaments are also found in the Vedic literature. Among the major ear ornaments of the Vedic period special mention may be made of *karṇasobhana*, *pravarta*, *hiraṇyakarṇa*, *vṛṣa-khādi*, etc.

*Karṇasobhana*²⁷ denotes an ornament for the ear. It was most probably the name of *kuṇḍala*, worn by both men and women. Some deity is also called 'gold-eared' as mentioned in the *Rgveda*.²⁸ *Pravarta* means a round ornament, i.e. an ear-ring,²⁹ as it is derived from the root *vṛt*, which means to encircle. Hence, it seems probable that the ear-ornament called *pravarta* might have been circular, similar to the present day *kuṇḍala*. In the *Atharvaveda* the word *pravarta* also occurs in the sense of circular ornament, as: *vijñānaṃ vāso 'haruṣṇīṣaṃ rātrikeśāḥ haritau pravartau kalamalirmaṇiḥ*.³⁰

Macdonell after Mahīdhara's commentary on the *Taittirīya-Samhitā* interpreted the term as round-shaped-ear-ornament. Probably, *hiraṇyakarṇa*³¹ was an ear-ornament made of gold. *Vṛṣakhādi* is also a type of ear-ornament mentioned in the *Rgveda*.³² Macdonell after following Bollensen's reference³³ suggested the

meaning of the term *vṛṣakhādi* as 'strong ring', while R.T.H. Griffith translates this (term) as 'strong men's ring'. M. Williams renders it as 'having large bracelets or rings'.

C) NECK AND CHEST ORNAMENTS:

Neck and chest ornaments were too popular ornaments used by both men and women in Vedic times. In the neck and chest ornaments special mention may be made of *rukma*, *niṣka*, *hiraṇya-srak*, *sraj* and *maṇi*. *Rukma* (in the *Ṛgveda*³⁴) denotes golden ornament for the neck, which came down to the chest or breast. In the *Brāhmaṇas*³⁵ it designated a gold plate. Sāyaṇa, while commenting *rukmaṇvakṣasaḥ* of *Atharvaveda* (VI.22.2), writes: *rukmaḥ svarṇamayam ābharaṇam vakṣaḥsthale yeṣāṃ*. Griffith translates *rukmaṇvakṣasa* as 'wearing ornaments of gold on their breasts'. It was an ornament circular in shape and worn round the neck or on the breasts, may be a sort of necklace. Similarly, *niṣka* is frequently mentioned in the Vedic texts as a golden ornament worn on the neck. The *Ṛgveda*³⁶ states: *śataṃ rājño nādhmānasya niṣkā* 'a hundred necklets from the king beseeching'. Other examples from the *Atharvaveda* (V.17.14, XX.127.3), *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* (XIII.4.1, 7.11) *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa* (VIII.22), *Kātyāyana-Śrauta-Sūtra* (XIV.2.28),³⁷ *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* (IV.2.1), etc., are also found in this respect. As *niṣkas* were used as coins, we may guess that they were either of round or square shape and strung together as neck-ornaments. Even today, gold coins are strung together and worn on the neck both by men and women in our country. *Hiraṇya-srak* is also described as a neck ornament in the *Atharvaveda* (X.6.4) as: *hiraṇyasrag ayaṃ maṇiḥ śraddhāṃ yajñam mahodadhat. gr̥he vasatu no*

'tithih. W.D. Whitney translates this as 'golden-garlanded amulet' and R.T.H. Griffith translates this as 'amulet decked with chain of gold'. Similarly *sraja*³⁸ was also a garland, ordinarily worn by men, and made either of flowers or golden lace wrought into flowers. The *Ásvins* are described as *puṣkara-sraja* 'lotus-wreathed'. The *maṇi* also worn round the neck, as in the *R̥gveda* (I.122.14) we find the epithet *maṇigrīva* 'having a jewel on the neck'. The jeweller (*maṇikāra*) is mentioned in the list of victims at the *puruṣamedha* in *Yajurveda*.³⁹

D) WRIST ORNAMENTS:

The ornaments which were worn on the wrist like a *kaṅkaṇa*, mentioned in the Vedic texts were, *khādi*, *parihasta*, *śaṅkha*, etc. *Khādi* was an ornament for arms. It was either a golden 'anklet' worn both by male and female or an 'armlet' worn on the arm or wrist like a bangle. It also sometimes signified a ring on the hands, known as *khādihasta*, mentioned in the *R̥gveda*.⁴⁰ *Parihasta*⁴¹ was also an ornament for the wrist. *Sāyaṇa* renders it: *parihastam hastam pariveṣṭya vartamānam kaṅkaṇādirūpam*⁴² *Monier Williams* writes: "*parihasta* an amulet put round the hand to secure the birth of a child."⁴³ Hence it is now clear that *parihasta* was a wrist ornament; but about its shape it is still doubtful, without any evidence. *Śaṅkha* in the *Atharvaveda*,⁴⁴ with the epithet *kṛśana*, denotes a pearl-shell used as an amulet. In the later literature it denotes a 'shell' or 'conch' used for blowing as a wind instrument.⁴⁵

E) WAIST ORNAMENTS:

Among the waist ornaments *mekhalā* and *muñja* were most popular girdles in the Vedic period. *Mekhalā*

denotes 'girdle' in the later Saṃhitās and the Brāhmaṇas. A discussion on *mekhalā* is found in the Atharvaveda, VI.133. This *sūkta* is only meant for *mekhalā-bandhanam*. *Mekhalābandhana* is also popular these days both by men and women. In the *Āśvalāyana-Grhya-Sūtra* it is said that the 'girdle' of the brāhmaṇa (*brahmacārin*) should be made of *muñja* grass, that of a kṣatriya of a bow-string and that of a vaiśya woolen.⁴⁶

F) FEET ORNAMENTS:

Khādhi and *hiranyapāvā* were the best ornaments, which were worn on the feet. *Khādi*, the word *khādaya* occurs in the *Ṛgveda* (V.54.11), which is translated by R.T.H. Griffith as 'anklets on feet'. According to M. Monier Williams this means 'a ring worn on the hands or feet (by the Maruts) (*Ṛgveda*, V.54.11). Probably *khādi* was a bangle for feet, which was quite thick and about its actual shape it is still doubtful. *Hiranyapāvā*⁴⁷ was a feet ornament made of gold, as it seems from its name. Griffith translates the word *hiranyapāvā* as 'gold-ringed fingers'.

In addition to these ornaments some other ornaments are also mentioned in the Vedic texts, viz. *añji*, *nṛmṇa*, *ṛṣṭi*, *stāgara*, *phaṇa*, *vimukta*, *ātakā*, *yoktra*, *raśanā*, *mauli*, *prāvepa*, *prākāśa*, etc.

Out of these above mentioned ornaments some were used on a regular basis and some were on different occasions. So it is now clear from this study that men and women were used to wear ornaments of high qualities in the Vedic period.

REFERENCES

1. Amarakośa, II.6.101-102.
2. Vaijayantīkośa, IV.3.133, cf. V.4.41.
3. ibid. IV.3.133.
4. XVIII.242a.
5. IX.97.17.
6. VII.74.2; see W.D. Whitney's English translation on AV).
7. Kāthaka-Saṃhitā, II.2; XXV.2; Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa, III.2.1.13, etc.
8. Hymns of the Ṛgveda, vol. II, p. 360 (Chowkhamba Bhawan Prakashan, Varanasi, 1971).
9. Vājasaneyi-Saṃhitā, II.2; XXV.2; Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa, I.3.3.5; III.5.3.4.
10. Ṛgveda, I.24.7, VII.2.1; Taittirīya-Saṃhitā, III.3.6.5; Pañcaviṃśa-Brāhmaṇa, XIII.4.4.
11. yasmād evaṃ tasmād asya dveṣasya napuṃsakībhūtasya sīrṣaṇi śirasi kurīraṃ keśajālaṃ kumbhaṃ tad ābharaṇaṃ ca strīṇāṃ asādhāraṇaṃ adhinidadhmasi upari nikṣipāmaḥ. yad āha āpas-tambaḥ - 'atra patnīśirasi kumbakurīraṃ adhyūhate' (Āpas-tamba-Śrauta-Sūtra, X.9.5) iti, Sāyana-Bhasya on Atharvaveda, VI.138.3.
12. 'decorated with the head-dress called kurīra', Monier Williams, Sanskrit English Dictionary, p. 294 (1986 edition).
13. X.85.8.
14. VI.138.3.
15. Taittirīya-Saṃhitā, IV.1.5.3; Maitrāyaṇī-Saṃhitā, II.7.5, Vājasaneyi-Saṃhitā, XI.56.
16. Vedische Studien, I, pp. 131-132.
17. Vedic Index of Names and Subjects, vol. I, p. 164.
18. Altindisches Leben, 91.
19. Vedische Studien, I.130.
20. A Practical Vedic Dictionary, p. 251 (1981 Delhi edition).
21. Sanskrit English Dictionary, p. 294.
22. Vaidika kālīna Ābhūṣaṇāḥ.
23. Ṛgvedic Culture, ch. V, p. 218 (Bharatiya Publishing House, Varanasi, rpt ed.).
24. M.M. Williams, Sanskrit English Dictionary, p. 448; R.T.H. Griffith, Hymns of the Atharvaveda, (VIII.6.7), vol. I,

- p. 337; W.D. Whitney, *Hymns of the Atharvaveda* (VII.6.7), vol. II, p. 495.
25. *Rgveda*, V.55.6.
26. *Atharvaveda*, VIII.5.1.
27. *uta naḥ karnaśobhanā purūṇi dhṛṣṇavā bhara*, *Rgveda*, VII.78.3.
28. I.122.14, cf. *Rgveda*, I.64.10.
29. M.M. Williams, *Sanskrit English Dictionary*, p. 693; & Surya-kanta, *Vedic Dict.*, p. 470.
30. *Atharvaveda*, XV.2.5, cf. *ibid.* XV.2, 13, 19, 25.
31. *Rgveda*, I.122.14.
32. *astāra iṣum dadhire gabhastyor anantaśusmā vṛṣasvādayo naraḥ*, I.64.10cd.
33. Bolleusen, *Orient and Occident*, II.461.
34. I.64.4, 166.10; V.56.1; 57.5; VII.56.13; VIII.20.11; X.78.2. Cf. *Atharvaveda*, V.12.6; VI.22.2; IX.5.25; *Taittirīya-Saṃhitā*, II.3.2.3; V.1.10.3; *Vājasaneyī-Saṃhitā*, XIII.40; etc.
35. *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*, III.5.1.20; V.2.1.21; *Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa*, I.8.2.3; 9.1. etc.
36. I.126.2, cf. II.83.10; V.19.3; VII.56.11.
37. *saptadaśa vṛṣalyo niṣkakaṇṭhyāḥ* - means the śūdra women (or unmarried girls) wearing golden necklaces should also be given as seventeen (hundred) gifts. This indicates that in ancient times the women were fond of ornaments.
38. *Vājasaneyī-Saṃhitā*, XXX.7; *Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa*, III.4.3.1.
39. *Rgveda*, IV.38.6; V.53.4; VIII.47.15; 56.3; *Atharvaveda*, I.14.1 (where it means a 'cluster of flowers' from a tree); *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*, XIII.5.4.2, etc.
40. VII.56.13; I.168.3; V.58.2.
41. *Atharvaveda*, VI.81.1-3.
42. See Sāyaṇa's commentary on *Atharvaveda*, VI.81.3.
43. *Sanskrit English Dictionary*, p.604, cf. Suryakanta, *Practical Vedic Dictionary*, p. 416.
44. *śaṅkhaḥ kṛśanaḥ pātv aṃhasaḥ*, IV.10.1; *śaṅkha āyusprataraṇo maṇiḥ*, IV.10.4.
45. *yathā śaṅkhasya dhyāyamānasya na vāhyāṇ śabdāṇ śaknuyād grahaṇāya, śaṅkhasya tu grahaṇena śaṅkhadhmasya vā śabdo grhītaḥ*, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad*, II.4.8.

46. *teṣāṃ mekhalā - mauñjī brāhmaṇasya dhanujyā kṣatriyasya āvī vaiśyasya, Āśvalāyana-Gṛhya-Sūtra, I.19.10-11.*
47. *Ṛgveda, IX.86.43.*

S.K. LAL

METAPHORS IN THE ṚGVEDA*

with special reference to Nadi-sūktas

On the nature of Vedic poetry, Ṛṣi Vasiṣṭha avers:

siṣakti sā vām sumatiś canīṣṭhā ..., RV. 7.30.2.

“O Aśvins! This most lovely eulogy waits upon you”.¹

In the Vedic terminology, *mati* means ‘a prayer, an eulogy, a poem’.

The poem should be most lovely and pleasing. Vasiṣṭha is an ardent admirer of Sarasvatī. He soliloquizes:

brhad² u gāyīṣe vaco 'sūryā nadinām /
sarasvatīm in mahayā suvṛktibhiḥ
stomair vasiṣṭha rodasī// RV. 7.96.1.

* Paper read at the National Seminar on the Metaphors in Vedic Literature, 24 - 26 December, 1996, jointly organized by Mahārṣi Sāṇḍipani Rāṣṭriya Veda-vidyā Pratiṣṭhāna, Ujjain, and Centre of Advanced Studies in Sanskrit, University of Poona, Pune - 411 007.

"You (i.e. I, Vasiṣṭha) sing a lofty(song) for Saras-vatī, the mightiest among the rivers..."

A similar view has been echoed by Ṛṣi Gṛtsamada when he repeatedly proclaims in a refrain like manner³ *bṛhad*² *vadema vidathe suvīrāḥ*/ RV. 2.1.16d. These two instances provide an idea of a poem, the Vedic Ṛṣi-poets had in mind. The poetry should be *hṛdya* (RV. 5.42.2) and *vandhura* (RV. 10.119.5).⁴ Purity of thought and diction is the *summum bonum* of Vedic poetry. The poetry should be *śuci* (RV 7.93.1), and have a pure form (*śucipeśas*, RV 8.26.11). Clarity, brilliance (*śukravarṇa*, RV. 1.143.7), and sweetness (*madhumat*, RV. 8.3.15) are the qualities most cherished in Vedic poetry. The poetry should be free from all blemishes, pure and crystal clear. In the famous Jñāna-sūkta (RV. 10.71), the poet says:

saktum iva tita-unā punanto
yatra dhīrā manasā vācam akrata/ RV. 10.71.2ab.

"Where, like men cleansing corn flour in a cribble,
the wise in spirit, have created language."

Attempts have, therefore, been made to find out the real mind of the Vedic poets and to study the Vedas from poetical and rhetorical points of view. A large number of scholars have engaged themselves in the study of Vedic poetry⁵ (see the Select Bibliography). They have paid attention to the study of figures of speech also in the Veda.⁶ However, much attention has been paid to the study of similes in the Vedic literature.⁷ The metaphors have received less attention.⁸ Hence, we propose to study metaphors in the Rgveda. As an initial study, we present here a few instances of metaphors as employed by the Ṛṣi-poets in the hymns to Nadi.

A metaphor has often been employed in the prayers to and the eulogies and delineations of the waters in general and the rivers in particular. The rivers have been prayed to for food, long life, and cattle (RV. 4.19.7). They come to the help of a beseecher to grant him wealth and riches (RV. 5.49.4), and protection (RV. 6.52.4). Hence, one of the attributes of the rivers is 'motherhood'. They have been regarded as loving, kind, and generous mothers (RV. 10.64.9). Therefore, the words *mātr̥*, *ambā*, etc. have been commonly and frequently superimposed on them. In the famous *Viśvāmitra-nadī-saṃvāda-sūkta* (RV. 3.33), Viśvāmitra says that he has come to the most maternal river, the Vipāś (vs. 3: *mātr̥tamām vipāśam*). Ṛṣi Dīrghatamas says that the most motherly rivers did not devour him (RV. 1.158.5: *na mā garan nadyo mātr̥tamāḥ*).⁹ Ṛṣi Medhātithi Kāṇva addresses the waters directly as mothers:

ambayo yanty adhvabhiḥ, RV. 1.23.16a.¹⁰

One may also refer to the famous prayer:

*ambitame nadītame devitame sarasvati/
aprasastā iva smasi prasastim amba nas krdhi//*
RV. 2.41.16.

They are the most motherly physicians (*bhiṣajo mātr̥tamāḥ*) (RV. 6.50.7). Before the mother Sarasvatī, the poet considers himself as a babe totally dependent on her. The benevolent and motherly aspect of the river Sarasvatī has been brought out prominently by the metaphorical use of the word *stana*:

*yas te stanah śāsāyo yo mayo bhūr
yena viśvā puṣyasi vāryāni/
yo ratnadhā vasuvidyaḥ sudatraḥ
sarasvatī tamih dhātave kaḥ//* RV. 1.164.49.

"The breast of thine exhaustless, spring of pleasure, wherewith thou feedest all things that are choicest, wealth-giver, treasure-finder, free bestower, - bring that, Sarasvatī, that we may drain it."

The poet prays apparently not to Sarasvatī but to her breast which is a feeder and nourisher of all, and longs that spring of life to suck. Apart from a metaphor, this R̥K is a very good example of metonymy.

But what is intriguing in this connection is that else where the poet longs for the *stana* of Sarasvān, the male counterpart of Sarasvatī:

pipivāmsam sarasvataḥ
stanam yo viśvadarśataḥ/
bhakṣīmahī prajāmiṣam// RV. 7.96.6.

"May we enjoy Sarasvān's breast, all-beautiful, that swells with streams; may we enjoy progeny and food."

The nature, function and characteristic features of Sarasvān are analogous to that of Sarasvatī. Sarasvatī is regarded as belonging to three places (*triṣadhassthā*, RV. 6.61.12), terrestrial, mid-regional, and celestial. Sarasvān too is regarded as a god of the mid-region,⁸ and is identified with the clouds. The function of the clouds is the same as that of *stana* of Sarasvatī on the terrestrial level. Hence the poet has extended the metaphor of *stana* to the male Sarasvān also.

Closely allied with the idea of mother-hood, another feature associated with the waters is that of creation. Hence the waters are regarded as young and fertile dames. The epithet *janitrī* has been appropriately superimposed on them:

.... *viśvasya sthātur jagato janitriḥ*/ RV. 6.50.7d.

The waters are regarded as young dames (*yuvatīḥ*: RV. 4.19.7); the river Sarasvatī is regarded as 'the hero's wife' (*vīrapatnī*: RV. 6.49.7). There is a beautiful metaphor in RV. 4.30.12 where a river full of water has been described as a youthful and vibrant damsel trotting along the threshold of youth. The word is *vibālyam*:

*uta sindhum vibālyam vitasthānām adhi kṣami/
pariṣthā indra māyayā*// RV. 4.30.12.

Sāyaṇa's comm.: *he indra uta api ca vibālyam vigatabālyāvasthām sampūrṇajalām*

Compare Griffith's tr.: " ...the overflowing river..." Sāyaṇa catches the poetic beauty of the word *vibālyam*; Griffith misses it.

Besides motherly feelings, the R̥ṣi-poets have displayed sisterly feelings too towards the rivers. Viśvāmitra addresses the rivers Vipās and Śutudrī as sisters:

*o! ṣu svasāraḥ kāravé śṛṇota
yayau vo durādanasā rathena*/ RV. 3.33.9ab.

"Listen quickly, sisters, to the poet who has arrived from afar with a wagon and car..."

Similarly, the waters also are regarded as sisters:

*ambayo yanty adhvabhir
jāmoyo adhvariṇatām/
pr̥ñcatī madhunā payah*// RV. 1.23.16.

"Along their paths the mothers go, sisters of priestly ministrants, mingling their sweetness with the milk."

The very sound of the word *svasārah* or *jāmayah* creates an image of a sister, and all the qualities of a sister are imposed on the rivers.

The waters and rivers are endowed with human like characteristics, such as, protection, nourishment, welfare, etc. Hence, a very significant epithet *mānuṣī* has been used for waters. The waters are regarded as *mānuṣīḥ*.¹³ The word *mānuṣīḥ* connotes all that the vernacular terms *manuṣyatā* (Hindi) and *mānuṣakī* (Marathi) denote.

In the Vedic mythology, the universe is a cosmos, bound and regulated by the cosmic law, *Ṛta*. Every animate or inanimate object has to follow this *Ṛta* which makes one do his or her duty methodically and unfailingly. So do the rivers. They perform their duties unceasingly (RV. 2.28.4). This has given rise to the rivers and waters to be connected with *Ṛta*. They are *ṛtajñāḥ* (RV. 4.19.7) and *ṛtāvariḥ* (RV. 3.33.5; 56.5):

prāgruvo nabhanvo na vakvā dhvasrā
apinvad yuvatīr ṛtajñāḥ/ RV. 4.19.7ab.

“He let the young maids skilled in law, unwedded,
like fountains, bubbling forth streaming onward.”

Further the *Ṛṣi* says :

ramadhvaṃ me vacase somyāya
ṛtāvariḥ upa muhūrtam evaiḥ/ RV. 3.33.5ab.

“Linger a little at my friendly bidding, rest holy
ones (i.e. *Vipāt Śutudrī*) a moment in your journey.”

Griffith's translation of *ṛtāvariḥ* 'holy ones' does not convey the true sense. As a matter of fact *ṛtāvariḥ* has

been metaphorically used here, replacing a word for a river which has not been used in the R̥k, hence it need not be translated.

Vasiṣṭha has opened up the door of R̥ta for the river Sarsvatī (RV. 7.95.6):

*ayam u te sarasvati vasiṣṭho
dvāraṁ ṛtasya subhage vyāvah/* RV. 7.95.6ab.

In *dvārau ṛtasya*, the word *dvārau* subserves a good example of a metaphor.

The waters are regarded as beneficent cows (RV. 5.53.7). Therefore, the rivers are also regarded as cows:

*tatṛdānāḥ sindhavaḥ kṣodasā
rajaḥ pra sasrur dhenavo yathā/
syannā āśvā ivādhvano
vimocane vi yad vartanta enyaḥ//* RV. 5.53.7.

“The bursting streams in billowy floods have spread abroad, like milch kine, over the firmament. Like swift studs hasting to their journey’s resting place, to every side run glittering brooks.”

The words *dhenavaḥ*, *āśvāḥ*, and *enyaḥ* may be noticed. These words signify three different aspects of rivers; *dhenavaḥ* points out their motherliness, *āśvāḥ* indicates speed, and *enyaḥ* shows variegated colour of a river. The imagery becomes vivid when one looks at a river flowing and the rays of the sun falling on her waters making them shining and lustrous. Even the word *rajaḥ* in the R̥k has a metaphorical usage. *Rajaḥ* means *antarikṣaloka* (mid-region) and also dust. Cows are connected with both.

The clouds are also regarded as cows (*dhenavaḥ*):
udīrayathā marutaḥ samudrato yūyaṃ
vr̥ṣṭim varṣayathā puriṣeṇad/
na vo dasrā upadasyanti dhenavaḥ
śubhram yātām anu rathā avṛtsata// RV. 5.55.5.

In this connection, the use of the word *aghnyā* is very significant. Viśvāmitra addresses the rivers Vipāś and Śutudrī as two bulls (*aghnyau*), because they are as mighty and charging as the two bulls:

udva ūrmiḥ śamyā hantvāpo yoktrāṇi muñcata/
maduṣkṛtau vyenasāghnyau¹⁴ śūnāmaratām//
 RV. 3.33.13.

“.... And never may the pair of bulls, harmless and sinless, waste away.”

Aghnyā, as such, is an epithet of a cow metaphorically used. But, it may be pointed out, that a masculine *aghnya* is also found and it means ‘a bull’:

praśamsā goṣv aghnyam/ RV. 1.37.5a.

It may have been used either on the analogy of *aghnyā* (for a cow) or at a certain point of time, the bull too must have been regarded as ‘not to be killed’. It is a beautiful metaphorical expression indeed. The bull here is the Maruts (regarded as one group) and *goṣu* means ‘in the clouds’. In another place:

ny aghyasya¹⁵ mūrdhani
cakraṃ rathasya yemathuh/
pari dyām anyad īyate// RV. 1.30.19.

“O Aśvins, you place one chariot wheel on the top of the head of the Bull; the other revolves round the sky.”

The waters (milk) of the cows (clouds) have been drunk up by the demon; hence the clouds have become dry. Such clouds (devoid of water) are regarded metaphorically as *starī* (a barren cow). It is one of the Indra's feats that he milks the dry cows:

...adhog indrah staryo damsupatnīh/ RV. 4.19.7d.

The Vedic myth of Vṛtra (the cloud demon) concealing all the waters in him and Indra piercing the demon and thereby releasing the waters has given rise to two significant words, *kośa* (also *dr̥ti*) in the case of the clouds, and *viṣitā* in the case of the rivers:

pra parvatānām uśatī upsthadsve
iva viṣite hāsamāne/
gāv eva śubhre mātārā rihāṇe
vipaṭ chutudrī payasā javete// RV. 3.33.1.

"Forth from the bosom of the mountains, eager as two swift mares with loosened reins contending, like two bright mother cows who lick their youngling, Vipās and Śutudrī speed down their waters".

The entire R̥k presents a beautiful imagery of a river (in this case two rivers Vipās and Śutudrī) rising from the mountain and speeding forward with full force and full of water. Note the words *parvatānām upasthāt*, *viṣite*, *hāsamāne*, and *śubhre*. All these words present a series of metaphors embellishing the entire imagery. Further, *kośam* stands for *megham* (not mentioned in the R̥k) in RV. 5.83.8 and *viṣitāḥ* qualifies *kulyāḥ*:

mahāntaṃ kośam udacā ni ṣiñca
syandatām kulyā viṣitāḥ purastāt/ RV. 5.83.8.

"O Parjanya! Lift up the mighty vessel; pour down the water, and let the liberated streams rush forward."

It may be pointed out that now *kulyā* is regarded as a synonym of *nadī*, but in its original form it may have been used as a metaphor, i.e., an object possessing two banks, a river. All the three words *kośa*, *viṣitā* and *kulyā* are good examples of a metaphor.

abhikranda stanaya garbham ādhā
udanvatā pari diyā rathena/
ḍṛtiṃ su karṣa viṣitaṃ nyanācam
samā bhavantudvato nipādāḥ// RV. 5.83.7.

“Thunder and roar; the germ of life deposit. Fly round us on thy chariot water-laden. Thine opened water-skin draw with thee downward, and let the hollows and the heights be level.”

Notice the words *garbham ā dhā* and *viṣitaṃ ḍṛtiṃ*. Parjanya has been solicited to loosen his *ḍṛti* (the clouds) downwards, and deposit the embryo among the plants. The simple sense is: Let Parjanya send down rains, and let the plants grow. The metaphorical use of *garbha* and *ḍṛti* has enhanced the beauty of the stanza.

It is a natural phenomenon that the rivers fall into the sea. A common word for the sea is *samudra*. However, many a time, this word is replaced by another word *yonī*:

enā vyaṃ payasā pinvamānā
anu yoniṃ devakṛtaṃ carantiḥ/
na vartave prasavaḥ sargatatkaḥ
kimyur vipro nadyo jōhavīti// RV. 3.33.4.

“We two who rise and swell with billowy waters move forward to the home which gods have made us. Our flood may not be stayed when urged to motion. What would the singer calling to the rivers?”

This natural phenomenon has given rise to a word *sayoni* which has been metaphorically used for a river:

*r̥ṣe janitrīr̥ bhuvanasya patnīr̥ apo
vandasva savṛdhaḥ sayoniḥ*// RV. 10.30.10cd.

Sayoniḥ (pl.) has been used here for rivers (or waters).¹⁶

We have seen that *Sarasvatī* is regarded as pervading three regions (RV. 6.61.12: *triṣadhasthā*). AV. 6.100.1 mentions three *Sarasvatīs*. The three *Sarasvatīs* metaphorically mean three forms of deified *Sarasvatī*, on earth, in the mid-region, and in the heaven. Only after comprehending the metaphorical meaning of *triṣadhasthā* can one understand the following R̥k:

*pāvīravī kanyā citrāyuh
sarasvatī vīrapatnī dhiyam dhāt*/ RV. 6.49.7ab.

Pāvīravī-kanyā (lightning's daughter) is *Sarasvatī* who has been prayed to for *dhi*. In this R̥k, *Sarasvatī* has been elevated to a goddess of speech on par with *Vāk* who is very often metaphorically compared to the lightning's thunder (RV. 1.164.11).

In another place, the very thunder of the lightning (*pāvīravī tanyatur*) has been beseeched, along with other divinities like *Aja Ekapād*, *Divo Dhartā*, *Viśve-devāḥ*, etc. But what is *pāvīravī tanyatur*, unless we metaphorically understand it to mean *mādhyamikā vāk*?:

*pāvīravī tanyatur ekapādajo
divo dhartā sindhur āpaḥ samudriyaḥ
viśve devāsaḥ śṛṇvan vacāṃsi me
sarasvatī saha dhībhiḥ puramdhyā*//RV. 10.65.13.

"Thunder, the lightning's daughter, *Aja Ekapāda*,
heaven's bearer, *Sindhu*, and the waters of the

sea, hear all Gods my words, Sarasvatī give ear together with *purandhī* and with 'holly thought.'

In this connection, it is important to note that at RV. 7.96.1cd *Sarasvatī* has been regarded as *rodasī*:

sarasvatīm in mahayā suvrktāḥ bīh
stomair vasiṣṭha rodasī/

The word *rodasī* generally means *dyāvāpṛthivī*. Why *Sarasvatī* has been regarded as *Rodasī* can be understood only on the metaphorical plane, and only when we accept the two forms of *Sarasvatī* as *Vāk* in the *Dyuloka* and as a river in the *Pṛthivī-loka*.

It may be emphasized that the Vedic Ṛṣi-poets did take recourse consciously to put forth their views forcefully and beautifully. They were conscious poets. The metaphor served both the purposes, namely, forcefulness and embellishment, as well. Further, the metaphors used by the Ṛṣi-poets reveal also the mental attitude, social behaviour and customs of the Vedic people.

REFERENCES

1. Unless otherwise pointed out, the translation used here is by R.T.H. Griffith.
2. Note the word *bṛhat* in the two instances which means simply 'high, tall, large, wide, etc.'. None of these senses fits in unless a term like *stotram* is supplied. In English rhetorics, this is what is known as metonymy, and metonymy is a kind of metaphor.
3. RV. 2.2.13; 11.21; 13.13; 14.12; 15.10, etc.
4. *aham taṣṭeva vandhuram paryacāmi hṛdā matim/* Cf. also *Śākuntala*, 6.12: *katham nu tam vandhurakomalāṅgulim...*
5. Gonda has subjected the Vedic poetry to a thorough examination of the poetical elements in his works (see Nos. 23-29). In his work *The Vision of the Vedic Poets*, he has studied the roots (and their derivatives), such as *dhi*, *drś*, *cakṣ*, and terms like *vīpra*, *ṛṣi*, *kavi*, *manīṣā*, etc. and avers that words like these

used by the Vedic poets provide a peep into their mind and vision about their poetic creation. He has also studied the syntax, and verse structure of the *Veda* (No. 26), stylistic repetition in the *Veda* in general (No. 27) and of the *Atharva-veda* in particular (No.23). T.G. Mainkar has also studied the *R̥gvedic* repetitions (No.38). Gonda has worked on the ellipsis, brachylogy, etc. in the *R̥gveda* (No.28). Velankar's articles "Word-economy and *R̥gvedic* interpretation" (No. 82) and "Kavi and Kāvya in *R̥gveda*" (No. 81) are important contributions to Vedic poetic study. By far the most prolific writer on Vedic poetry is P.S. Sastri. In a number of books and articles, he has studied comprehensively the Vedic poetry on the topics such as *R̥gvedic* aesthetics, origins of the songs of the *R̥gveda*, *R̥gvedic* theory of inspiration, etc. (Nos. 49-66). S.S. Bhawe has made poetic study of Soma hymns (Nos. 7 & 8). The works of C.K. Raja (No. 47), G.N. Chakravorthy (No. 10), Promod Ranjan Ray (No. 48), Krishna Kumar Dhavan (No. 17), G.V. Devasthali (No. 15), and Mahendra Kumar Varma (Nos. 73-76) are also important in the study of Vedic poetry. Varma has evaluated also the poetry of Madhuchandas Viśvāmītra, and Gr̥tsamadas (Nos. 74,76). The poetry of Gr̥tsmadas has been studied by Rahurkar also (No. 46). Sushil Kumar De has studied ancient Indian erotic literature, and devotional poetry and hymnology (Nos. 13 & 14). Willard Johnson's work is also a useful addition (No. 34). Boris Oguibenine has made a comparative study of Homeric and Vedic poetry (No. 42). Similarly Emile Ben-eveniste has studied Indo-Iranian poetry (No. 3). P.S. Sastri has studied the lyrics of the *R̥gveda* (Nos. 53-57), and *R̥gvedic* ballads (Nos.58 & 59). He has pointed out that some sort of a 'theory of poetry' exists and it can be culled from the *R̥gveda* (Nos.65 & 66); similarly some kind of principles of criticism can also be found in the *R̥gveda* (Nos. 63 & 64). Vidya Nivas Misra has found 'foundations of Sanskrit poetics in the *R̥gveda*' (No. 40). Calvert Watkins believes in the Indo-European background of Vedic poetics (No. 88), and J. Tilaksiri has pointed out the 'technical and aesthetic theory of poetry in Sanskrit' in the *R̥gveda*. According to him poet theorists of the *R̥gveda* had made conscious efforts in the composition of their poetry (No. 71). Vagishwar Vidyalankar had studied Vedic rhetorics (No. 72).

The numbers indicate the numbers of the Select Bibliography appended herewith.

6. D.R. Bhandarkar has studied the development of figures of speech in the *Ṛgveda* (No. 4). Venkatsubbaiah has made available (in his translation) the observations of Bergaigne on the figures of speech in the *Ṛgveda* (No.83 & 84), P.S. Sastri has also studied some figures of speech like *upamā*, *atīśayokti*, *rūpaka*, *utprekṣā*, etc. in the *Ṛgveda* (No.52). Similarly Vidyānidhi (No. 87) and Ayodhya Prasad Dvivedi (No. 20) have studied *anuprāsa*, *yamaka*, *upamā*, *ananvaya*, *vyājokti*, *apahnuti*, *svabhāvokti*, *vakrokti*, *bhāvika*, etc. Saroj Naranga (No.41) and K. Krishnamoorthy (No. 35) have studied figures of speech and poetic figures in the *Atharvaveda*. S.N. Gajendragadkar (No. 22) has studied the *alaṅkāras* in the *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa*. P.S. Sastri has brought out some imageries from the *Ṛgveda*. Prahlad Kumar, in his work *Ṛgvede 'laṅkārah'* has made a detailed study of the figures of speech in the *Ṛgveda*.
Among the individual *alaṅkāras*, G.V. Devasthali has studied *śleṣa* in the *Bhāradvājamaṇḍala* of the *Ṛgveda* (No.16). Shashi Kumar Bansal has found out *utprekṣā* in the *Ṛgveda* (No.2). *Rasa*, as an aesthetic idea in the *Ṛgveda*, has been studied by J.B. Chethimattam (No.11).
7. Gonda has made a detailed study of the similes in Sanskrit literature (No.25). H.D. Velankar has studied *Ṛgvedic* similes (Nos. 78; 80) as well as *Atharva-vedic* similes (No.79). So also A. Ramanuja Tatacharya (No.70), and Venkatasubbaiah (Nos.85, 86) studied the simile. Kurt F. Leidecker has pointed out the philosophical significance of similes (No.37). A similar study has also been made by Shoun Hino (No.31). W.P. Schmid has studied the similes relating to cows (No.68). H.S. Ananthanarayana has studied similes in the *Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa* (No.1). S.Y. Dhonde has studied similes in the *Upaniṣads* (No.18). S.W. Jamison has pointed out some cases of disharmony in the *Ṛgvedic* similes (No.32).
8. The metaphor has also attracted the attention of some scholars. B. Schlerath has studied metaphors in the Vedic literature (No.67). Rajeshvari Pandharipande has pointed out that the metaphors were used as ritualistic symbols (No. 43). S.B. Velankar has made a comprehensive study of similes and metaphors (No. 77). M. Jêzic opines that Vedic poets employed

metaphoric homonymy on substitute synonymy (No.33).

9. The reference is to his ordeal in the water wherein he was thrown by his enemies, and was rescued by the Ásvins.
10. It may be noted that this *mantra* is recited when the *ekadhanā* water is being carried in the *Āponaptriya* rite.
11. S.K. Lal: *Female Divinities in Hindu Mythology and Ritual*, University of Poona, 1980, p. 192.
12. In another place is found *janitrī bhuvanasya* (RV. 10.30.10).
13. Sāyaṇa: *manuṣya-hitāḥ*, 'well-wishers of men'.
14. There is a grammatical irregularity in *aghnaui*; it should have been *aghne* (f. du.) as Sāyaṇa has also pointed out.
15. Sāyaṇa explains the term *aghnaui* as *hantum vināśayatam aśakyasya dṛḍhasya parvatasya...*. Geldner as "Haupte des stiers", though he adds that the sense is not clear (*Der Rig Veda*, Harvard University Press, 1951, s.v.).
16. Cf. also RV. 3.33.3: *samānam yonim anu samcaranti*.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Ananthanarayana, H.S.: "The similes in Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa", VIJ, 12 (1-2), 1974, 1-9.
2. Bansal, Shashikumar: "Utprekṣās in the R̥gveda Maṇḍala VII", ABORI, 55, 1974, 206-7.
3. Benveniste, Emile: "Phraseologie poetique de l'indo-iranien", *Renou Comm. Vol.*, 1968, 73-79.
4. Bhandarkar, D.R.: "The development of figures of speech in the R̥gveda Hymnology", *Kane Comm. Vol.*, Poona, 1941.
5. Bhattacharya, Bhabani Prasad: "A poetic study of R̥gveda-Maṇḍala V", SP, 33 AIOC, Cal. 1986, 46-47.
6. Bhattacharya, Bhabani Prasad: "A poetic study of R̥gveda Maṇḍala - VI", SP, 34 AIOC, Visakhapatnam, 1989, 15.
7. Bhawe, S.S.: "An ancient poem to the sacred drink", JMSUB, 10 (1), 1961, 1-12.
8. Bhawe, S.S.: "The conception of Muse of poetry in the R̥gveda". JBomU, 19 (2), 19-27.
9. Bose, A.C.: "Poetry of the Vedas", BUJ, 1 (3), 27-29.
10. Chakravorthy, G.N.: "Poetry and romanticism in the R̥gveda", PO, VII, April-July, 1942.

11. Chethimattam, J.B.: "Rasa, the soul of Indian art", *Intern. Philos. Quart.* 10(1), 1970, 44-62.
12. Chowdhury, Tarapad: "Aesthetic outlook in the Vedas", SP, 15, AIOC, Bombay, 1949, 3.
13. De, Sushil Kumar: *Ancient Indian erotics and erotic literature*, Cal., 1959.
14. De, Sushil Kumar: "Sanskrit devotional poetry and hymnology", NIA, 9, 130-61.
15. Devasthali, G.V.: "Poetic Art in the R̥gveda", URSHS, 1970-71, 1-14.
16. Devasthali, G.V.: "Ślesha as a means of economy in the Bhāradvāja Maṇḍala", JUPHS 23, 1965, 39-44.
17. Dhavan, Krishna Kumar: "Upaniṣadon me kāvyatattva" (Hindi), VVRI, Hoshiarpur, 1936.
18. Dhonde, S.Y.: "Simile in the Upaniṣad", *Sangameshvar College Journal*, 1(1), Sholapur, 21-26.
19. Dikshit, Hari Narayan: "Vaidikavāṇmaye alaṅkārah" (Hindi), JGJKSV 41, 1985 (1989), HS 77-82.
20. Drivedi, Ayodhya Prasad: *Vaidikaṁ kāvyabimbam*, Sag. 16 (4), 1978, 416-23.
21. Fatah Singh: *Kāmāyanī - saundarya* (Hindi), Bharati Bhandar, Allahabad, 1966, 317.
22. Gajendragadkar, S.N.: "Decorative style and alaṅkāras in the Aitereya Brāhmaṇa", JBBRAS, 27 (Suppl.), 314-19.
23. Gonda, J.: *Stylistische studie over Atharva-veda I-VII*, H. Veenmann and Zonen, Wageningen, 1938, 19.
24. Gonda, J.: "Some remarks on onomtopoeia, sound symbolism, and word-formation apropos of the theorises of C.N. Maxwell", *TITLV* (8092), 1940, 133-210.
25. Gonda, J.: "Remarks on Similes in Sanskrit Literature", E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1949 (2nd edn.).
26. Gonda, J.: "Syntax and verse structure in the Veda", *IL (Turner Jubilee Vol.)*, 1958, 35-43.
27. Gonda, J.: *Stylistic Repetitions in the Veda*, Amsterdam, 1959, 413.
28. Gonda, J.: "Ellipsis, brachylogy, and other forms of brevity in speech in the R̥gveda", VKNHAW - Letterkunde, n.r. 67 (4), Amsterdam, 1960, 91.

29. Gonda, J.: *The Vision of the Vedic Poets*, Mouton, The Hague, 1963, 372 (Ind. ed. Mun. Man. New Delhi, 1984).
30. Gunde Rao: "The poetic beauties of the R̥gveda", ER 53 (12), 295-98.
31. Hino, Shoun: "Simile in the philosophical writings", JOIB, 32 (3-4), 1983, 230-35.
32. Jamison, S.W.: "Case disharmony in R̥gveda simile," IJJ, 24, 1982, 251-71.
33. Jézic M.: "Some illustrations of the poetical techniques of the R̥gvedic poets", SP, 8 WSC, Wien, 1950.
34. Johnson, Willard, *Poetry and Speculation of the Rig Veda*, Calif. Univ. Press, 1981.
35. Krishnamoorthy, K.: "Poetic figures and sentiments in the Atharva-veda: a reappraisal", GJV, VSM, 1982, 140-47.
36. Kun, XU: "Poetry for precept's sake: an Indian tradition", (pt.I), *South Asian Studies* 4, Beijing, 1990, 64ff.
37. Leidecker, Kurt F.: "The philosophic significance of similes in ancient Indien", AP, 25 (5), 231-38.
38. Mainkar, T.G.: *Some Poetical Aspects of the R̥gvedic Repetitions*, University of Poona, 1966, 116.
39. Mainkar, T.G.: *R̥gvaidika-kavi-vimarśaḥ*, LB Sastri KSV, Delhi, 1971, 4-63.
40. Misra, Vidyanivas: "Foundations of Sanskrit poetics," A.N. Jha Fel. Vol., 1969, 375-393.
41. Narang Saroj: "Figures of speech in the Atharva-veda", (in) *Hist. Crit. Studies in AV*, Nag Publishers, Delhi, 1981, 11-27.
42. Oguibenine, Boris: '(On Homeric and Vedic poetry)' (French), *Annuaire, Res. Des Conf. XCII, EPHE*, 1983-84.
43. Pandharipande, Rajeshwari: "Metaphor as ritualistic symbols", *Anthropological Linguistics*, 29 (3), Bloomington, 1987, 297-318.
44. Prahlad Kumar: *R̥gvede 'lañkārah*, Pranav Pratisthan, Mun. Man. New Delhi, 1979, 259.
45. Raghavan, V: "Vedic Poetry", R.B. Trivedi Comm. Vol., Madras, 1958, 91-103.
46. Rahurkar V.G.: "A literary evaluation of the Gṛtsamada-sūktas", *Kaviraj Fel. Vol.*, 1967, 29-31.
47. Raja, C.K.: "Poetry in India", AP 17 (7), 262-67.

48. Ray, Pramod Ranjan: *Poetic vocables in the family maṇḍalas of the Ṛgveda*, Cal., 1988.
49. Sastri, P.S.: "The Ṛgvedic poetic spirit", ABORI, 38, 54-81.
50. Sastri, P.S.: *Ṛgvedic Aesthetics*, Delhi, 1988, 428.
51. Sastri, P.S.: "Origins of the songs of Ṛgveda", *Nagpur Univ. Journal*, (1944-45) 10, 30-44,; 11, 1-11.
52. Sastri, P.S.: "Figures of speech in Ṛgveda", ABORI, 28, 34-64.
53. Sastri, P.S.: "The Ṛgvedic Lyric", QJMS, 40 (2), 41-64.
54. Sastri, P.S.: "The religious lyric of Ṛgveda", Bh.Vid. 16, (3,4), 1-26.
55. Sastri, P.S.: "The religious lyric of the Ṛgveda", Bh. Vid., 18.
56. Sastri, P.S.: "Ṛgvedic lyrics of association and love", IHQ, 34.
57. Sastri, P.S.: "Soma lyricism of Ṛgveda", IHQ, 30, 301-10.
58. Sastri, P.S.: "Ṛgvedic ballads", IHQ, 32, 393-98.
59. Sastri, P.S.: "Ṛgvedic ballads of mythology", QJMS, 48, 290-301.
60. Sastri, P.S.: "Ṛgvedic ballads of association and love", IHQ, 33, 169-190.
61. Sastri, P.S.: "Imagery of Ṛgveda", ABORI, 29, 152-96.
62. Sastri, P.S.: "Ṛgvedic theory of inspiration", QJMS, 37, 72-91, 151-70.
63. Sastri, P.S.: "The Ṛgvedic principles of literary criticism", JGJRI, 14, 37-54.
64. Sastri, P.S.: "The Ṛgvedic principles of criticism", IHQ 34, 6-20.
65. Sastri, P.S.: "Ṛgvedic theory of poetry", 12, AIOC (summery), Benares, 1943-44.
66. Sastri, P.S.: "The Ṛgvedic theory of poetry", PAIOC (12th session), Part II, Benares, 1946, 232-39.
67. Schlerath, B.: "Bemerkungen zu dem vedischen Metaphoren und Identifikationen", (Proc.4 WSC), 1986, 478-482.
68. Schmid, W.P.: "Die Kuh auf der Weide", IF, 64, 1-13.
69. Schwab, Raymond: "Dialectique en Europe, rythmique en Asie", *France Asie*, 100, 115-18.
70. Tatacharya, A. Ramanuja: "Ṛgvedīyāḥ upamāḥ", PAIOC (21st session), 3, 1968; 25-31.
71. Tilakasiri, J.: "Technical and aesthetic theories of poetry in Sanskrit", UCR, 13 (4), 167-76.

72. Vagishvara Vidyānkar: *Vaidika-sāhitya-saudāminī*, Ramlal Kapoor Trust, Bahalgarh, 1985, 296.
73. Varma Mahendra Kumar: *Poetic Beauty of the Ṛgveda*, S.S. Rai Varma, Damoh, 1963, 244.
74. Varma Mahendra Kumar: "Poetry of the Gṛtsamadas", *CASS Studies* 1, 1972, 83-92.
75. Varma Mahendra Kumar: "Elements of poetry in the Ṛgveda", *ABORI*, 54, 1973, 199-205.
76. Varma Mahendra Kumar: "Poetry of Madhucchandas Viśvāmitra", *CASS Stud.* no. 2, 1974, 113-126 (also *VIJ*, 13, 1-2, 1975, 385-411).
77. Velankar S.B.: "Similes and metaphors in Ṛgveda", *JBomU*, 7 & 9, Sept. 1938 & Sept. 1940, (Eng. tr. of A. Hirzel, "Gleichnisse and metaphoren in RV", *Z Volkerps*, 19, (1889).
78. Velankar, H.D.: "Ṛgvedic similes", *JBBRAS*, 14 and 16, 1938 and 1940, (vol. 14, "Similes of Vāmadeva", vol.16, "Similes of Atris").
79. Velankar, H.D.: "Similes in the Atharva-veda", *JASBom*, 38, 1963, 19-43.
80. Velankar, H.D.: "Emotional similes in the Ṛgveda", *Bh.Vid.*, 25 (3-4), 1965, 1-43.
81. Velankar, H.D.: "Kavi and kāvya in Ṛgveda", *PAIOC* (23rd session), 1969, 253-58.
82. Velankar, H.D.: "World-economy and Ṛgvedic interpretation", *PAIOC* (23 session), 3.1, 1969, 139-145.
83. Venkatasubbaiah, A.: "Syntax of Vedic comparison", *ABORI*, 16, 1934-35 (Eng. tr. of A. Bergaigne, "La syntax des comparaisons vedique").
84. Venkatasubbaiah, A.: "Some observations on the figures of speech in the Ṛgveda", *ABORI*, 17, 1935-36 (Eng. tr. of A. Bergaigne, "Quelques observations sur les figures de rhetorique dans le RV").
85. Venkatasubbaiah, A.: "Five similes in the Ṛgveda", *Siddh. Varma Comm. Vol. I*, 1950, 178-88.
86. Venkatasubbaiah, A.: "Some similes in the Ṛgveda", *ALB*, 28 (3-4), Dec. 64, 161-207.
87. Vidyānidhi: *Vaidikālāṅkāra-nidarsanam*, *Siddheshwar Varma Comm. Vol.*, 1950, 193-200.

88. Watikns, Calvert: "The Indo-European background of Vedic poetics", SP, 8 WSC, Wien, 1990.

NOTE: For abbreviations, see *Vedic Bibliography* by R.N. Dandekar.

S. REVATHY

THE SADVIDYĀ SECTION OF THE CHĀNDOGYOPANIṢAD

(A Study from the Advaita and Dvaita stand-points)

In the systems of Vedānta there is a trinity - God, Man and Nature each having its own rights. The difficulty has been to show how these three entities are related to one another. This difficulty, the Advaitin has overcome by interpreting all these three as apparent diversifications of a transcendental principle; and, the Dvaitin, by admitting God as the Supreme Being with absolute independence and Man and Nature as essentially dependent upon Him. These two stand-points with marked difference and decided contrast between them - the one affirming that God, Man and Nature are only imaginary entities of a pure Being standing behind them and yet immanent in them, and the other maintaining that the three are distinct real entities - have emanated from the single source, namely, the Upaniṣads owing to the difference in the mode of interpretation of the latter.

In the present paper, we shall concern ourselves with the mode of interpretation of the sixth section (*adhyāya*) of the *Chandogyopaniṣad* entitled *Sadvidyā* by the Advaitin and the Dvaitin.

I

To begin with, the Advaitin considers the sixth section of the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* as *sadvidyā* on the ground that it serves the purpose of arriving at the knowledge of the true nature of Brahman which is termed *sat* and which is the true nature of the soul.¹

Herein the father Uddālaka instructs his son Śvetaketu that the world given in perception (*idaṃ sarvaṃ*) prior to creation remained as *sat* only.² From this there arises the cognition of *sat* as being identified with the world in its subtle form. Then he proceeds to state that *sat* is one only without a second: *ekam evādvitīyam*.³ From this text there arises the cognition that *sat* is free from any relation to any factor whatsoever. Thus from the passage as a whole there arises the cognition of the presence of the world and its absence in one and the same substratum at the same point of time. And this gives rise to the ascertainment of the illusory nature of the world.⁴

Having thus shown that the world of objects is non-real or illusory, the Upaniṣad proceeds to show that the soul is none other than Brahman by standing that in deep sleep state the soul remains in its true nature as Brahman.⁵

Śrī Śaṅkara explains this on the analogy of the reflected image of one's face in a mirror which becomes

one with the face that serves as the original when the limiting condition, namely, the mirror is removed. The so-called *jīva* or soul is only a reflected image of Brahman in mind; and, in the state of deep sleep when mind provisionally merges in *avidyā*, the soul leaves out the nature of being a soul and remains in its true nature as Brahman.⁶ And the Upaniṣad further proceeds to point out that just as a bird tied to a string flies in various directions, finds no resting place and hastens back to the very place whereto it is tied, in the same way, the soul having experienced pleasure or misery in the states of waking and dream hastens back to its source, namely, Brahman in the state of deep sleep.⁷

The entire world of insentient and sentient beings has Brahman as its self. And it is difficult to be comprehended by mind or sense-organs; it is real, that is, not subject to sublation in the three divisions of time - past, present and future.⁸ When it is said that the soul remains as Brahman in the state of deep sleep, a doubt arises as to why the soul in the state of sleep is not able to identify that it has become one with Brahman. This doubt is dispelled by the Upaniṣad in the passage:

*yathā somya madhu madhukṛto
nistiṣṭhanti nānāṭayānām vṛkṣāṇām rasān
samavahāram ekatām rasam gamayanti.
te yathā tatra na vivekaṁ labhante 'mu-
syāham vṛkṣasya raso' smy amusyāham
vṛkṣasya raso 'smīty eva khalu somyemāḥ
sarvāḥ prajāḥ sati sampadya na viduḥ sati
sampadyāmaha iti.*⁹

Just as the juices collected from the fruits of different trees are reduced into one essence, namely, honey, by the bees could not identify themselves as belonging to individual fruit, in the same way, the soul having become one with Brahman in the state of deep sleep could not identify itself to be so. But owing to the latent impressions and past merits and demerits, the soul being identified with mind in the state of waking, experiences itself as belonging to a particular class of being.

Further a doubt arises: the soul may not identify that it is one with Brahman in the state of deep sleep owing to the influence of sleep. But after waking up it could very well recognize that it has come from Brahman. This, however, is not the case. To dispel this doubt, the Upaniṣad states that just as the waters of the ocean which are drawn by the rays of sun are converted into the form of clouds poured down in the form of rain and attain the forms of different rivers leave out the notion of being an ocean and retain the notion of being rivers, in the same way, the soul having lost sight of its identity with Brahman owing to *avidyā*, could not recognize that it was one with Brahman in the state of deep sleep and it has come from Brahman from the state of deep sleep to that of waking.¹⁰ The Upaniṣad further emphasizes that the source - the identity with which has been lost sight of by the soul is Brahman.¹¹

An objection suggests itself at this stage: if the soul comes out of Brahman and becomes one with it, then it will be similar to a wave or a bubble of the ocean and as such non-eternal. To dispel this objection, the Upaniṣad states: just as a tree dries up when the life-principle is withdrawn, in the same way, the body falls off when the soul leaves it out. It is only the body that

is dead; and the soul remains as eternal. If the soul by becoming one with Brahman in the state of deep sleep is viewed as having lost its nature, then it could not come back to the waking state and adopt itself to the practical functioning then.¹² This doubt is dispelled by the Upaniṣad which states that just as the extremely subtle part of the seed of the banyan tree is the cause of the huge banyan tree, in the same way, Brahman which transcends sense-organs and hence viewed as subtle is the cause of this expansive world.¹³

Further to remove the doubt that if an object is existent then it must be perceived and an object which defies perception is not existent and so Brahman which does not come within the range of perception does not exist, the Upaniṣad states that just as salt dissolved in water is reduced to particles so fine and the particles form a homogeneous liquid and the salt cannot be distinguished from the liquid form of water, in the same way, Brahman which is immanent in the mind is self-luminous consciousness is not comprehended as distinct from mind, etc., by those whose sense-organs are directed towards external objects. This does not mean that Brahman could not be comprehended at all. Just as salt dissolved in water although not an object of visual perception, and yet comes within the range of gustatory sense, in the same way, Brahman although not coming within the range of sense-organs, yet could be realized by the teaching of the preceptor.¹⁴

The instruction of a preceptor alone is the means of attaining release from the trammels of transmigratory process. Just as a person carried off by thieves surreptitiously from the Gāndhāra region blind-folded and abandoned in a desolate place, is instructed by a

compassionate passer-by the route he has to take to reach the Gāndhāra region after removing the bandage over the eyes, in the same way, a compassionate preceptor by imparting the knowledge of the true nature of the soul enables him to reach his native shore that is Brahman.¹⁵

The knower of the truth has no rebirth while the ignorant one has. In the case of both at the time of falling off of the body, the sense-organs merge in mind, mind in vital airs, and vital airs in the Supreme Being. The ignorant one, in accordance with *karma* proceeds to the other world and comes back. The liberated one remains here as Brahman.¹⁶

The question as to why the knower of the truth is not bound by any *karma* while the ignorant one is bound remains to be answered. The Upaniṣadic text states that he who committed a theft and denies having done so makes himself false; and, when he grasps the heated axe, he is burnt. And he who is falsely implicated and who affirms that he has not committed the theft makes himself true and he is not burnt when he grasps the heated axe. In the same way, he who falsely thinks that he is only the body and not Brahman makes himself false and misery in the form of transmigration. And he who realizes himself to be Brahman makes himself true and he no longer experiences misery in the form of transmigration.¹⁷ Being instructed thus by his father, Śvetaketu realized his identity with Brahman.¹⁸

The Advaitin, by this analysis of the *sadvidyā* section of the *Chāndogya*, affirms that the material world is an illusion, and the soul is none other than Brahman.

II

Śrī Madhva considers that every illustrative example cited in the *Chāndogya* goes to show the difference between the soul and Brahman and not identity as held by the Advaitin. The examples of bird resorting to its resting place, of several juices or essences reduced into honey, of rivers flowing into ocean, of salt dissolved in pure water, of a thief and the object stolen and of a person carried off from Gāndhāra and abandoned in a desolate place - all these emphasize difference only; and, so in the analogue too we must maintain difference. This view of Śrī Madhva is substantiated by the *Paramaśruti* which is as follows:

*yathā pakṣi ca sūtram ca nānāvṛkṣarasā
yathā yathā nadyaḥ samudraś ca śuddho-
dalavaṇa yathā yathā stenapaharyau ca
yathā puṁviṣayāv api tathā jiveśvarau
bhinnau sarvadaiva vilakṣaṇau*¹⁹

On this basis Śrī Madhva reads the Upaniṣadic text as *atat tvam asi*, the logical significance of which is that the soul is not identical with the Brahman but is different from it.

Śrī Madhva, however, argues that the text may be read as *tat tvam asi* and the text may mean any one of the following:

- (1) You co-exist with Brahman;
- (2) You are dependent upon Brahman;
- (3) You originate from Brahman (*brahmaṇaḥ jātas tvam asi*);
- (4) You are controlled by Brahman;
- (5) You are similar to Brahman.

Śrī Vyāsātīrtha elucidates the above thus: *tatsāha-caryāt, tadāśritatvāt, tajjativāt, vadadhīnatvāt tatsā-drśyād vā tad iti vyapadeśaḥ*.²⁰

Śrī Vyāsātīrtha takes the expression *tattvam* as a compound word and interprets it as *tasya tvam*.²¹ Whatever may be the mode in which the structure of the expression *tat tvam asi* is taken, one thing stands out prominently; and it is that it conveys or implies the difference between soul and God.

III

We shall conclude this with merely juxtaposing two dissimilar doctrines. This should not be viewed as purposeless. It is because it is only after identifying the points of dissimilarity, we could discover the underlying basis of dissimilarity. The strict adherence to the concept of *māyā* and its corollary - illusoriness of the world of duality by the Advaitin and to the concept of dependent reality in the case of the world by the Dvaitin - these two serve as underlying bases of dissimilarity in the interpretation of the texts by the Advaitin and the Dvaitin.

REFERENCES

1. *sadākhyabrahmajñānasāadhanabhūtaḥ chāndogyopaniṣadgata-ṣaṣṭhaprapāṭhakaḥ sadvidyā ityanena vivakṣitaḥ*, *Sadvidyā-vilāsa*, p. 6, edited by V.S.V. Guruswami Sastrigal & V.R. Kalyanasundara Sastrigal, published by Adisankara Advaita Research Centre, Madras, 1982.
2. *sad eva saumya idam agra āsīt*, Chand.Up. 6.2.1.
3. *ibid*.
4. *ekakālāvacchinna-pratidyogabhāvaḥ ekādhikaraṇavṛttitva-dhīrūpaḥ mithyātvanīścayaḥ*, *Laghucandrikā*, p. 9.

5. *yatraitat puruṣaḥ svapiti nāma satā somya tadā sampanno bhavati*, Chand.Up. 6.8.1.
6. *ādarśāpanayane puruṣapratibimba ādarśagato yathā svam eva puruṣam apīto bhavati*, *evam mana ādy uparame caitanyapratibimbarūpeṇa jivenātmanā manasi praviṣṭhā nāmarūpavyākaraṇāya parā devatā sā svam evātmānaṁ pratipadyate jīvarūpatāṁ hitvā*, Bhāṣya on ibid.
7. *sa yathā śakuniḥ sūtreṇa prabaddho diśaṁ diśaṁ patitvānyatrāyatanam alabdhvā bandhanam evopaśrayate*, *evam eva khalu somya tanmano diśaṁ diśaṁ patitvānyatrāyatanam alabdhvā prāṇam evopaśrayate prāṇabandhanam hi somya mana iti*, Chand.Up. 6.8.2.
The word *prāṇa* stands for Brahman (*prāṇopalakṣitā devatā*).
8. *sa ya eṣo 'nimaitadātmyam idaṁ sarvaṁ tat satyaṁ sa ātmā tat tvam asi śvetaketo iti*, ibid. 6.8.7.
9. ibid. 6.9.2.
10. *imāḥ somya nadyaḥ purastāt prācyaḥ syandante*, *paścāt prati-cyas tāḥ samudrāt samudram evāpiyanti sa samudra eva bhavati*, *tā yathā tatra na vidur iyaṁ ahaṁ asmiyaṁ ahaṁ asmiti evam eva khalu saumyemāḥ sarvāḥ prajāḥ sata āgamyā na viduḥ sata āgacchāmaha iti*, ibid. 6.10.1.
11. *sa ya eṣo 'nimaitadātmyam idaṁ sarvaṁ tat satyaṁ sa ātmā tat tvam asi śvetaketo iti*, ibid.
12. *jīvāpetam vāva kiledaṁ mriyate*, *na jīvo mriyate*, ibid. 6.11.3.
13. *taṁ hovāca yaṁ vai somyaitam aṇimānaṁ na nibhālayasa etasya vai somyaiṣo 'nimna evaṁ mahān nyagrodhas tiṣṭhati..... ya eṣo 'nimaitadātmyam idaṁ sarvaṁ tat satyaṁ sa ātmā tat tvam asi śvetaketo iti*, ibid. 6.12.2.
14. *...atra vāva kila sat somya na nibhālayase 'traiva kileti*. *sa ya eṣo 'nimaitadātmyam idaṁ sarvaṁ tat satyaṁ sa ātmā tat tvam asi śvetaketo iti*, ibid. 6.13.2-3.
15. *yathā saumya puruṣaṁ gandhārebhyaḥ 'bhinaddhākṣam āñīya taṁ tato 'tijane viśrjet..... tasya yathābhinahanam pramucya prabrūyād etāṁ diśaṁ gandhārā etāṁ diśaṁ vrajeti sa grāmād grāmaṁ pṛcchan paṇḍito medhāvī gandhārān evopasampadyetaivam evehācāryavān puruṣo veda*, ibid. 6.14.1-2.
16. The Upaniṣadic passage - *atha yad asya vān manasi sampadyate manaḥ prāṇe prāṇas tejasi tejaḥ parasyaṁ devatāyām atha na jānāti*.

Śrī Śaṅkara states:

*avidvāṃs tu sata utthāya prāgbhāvitam vyāghrādibhāvaṃ
devamanuṣyādibhāvaṃ vā viśati. vidvāṃs tu śāstrācāryopa-
deśajanitajñānadīparakāśitam sad brahmātmānaṃ praviśya
nāvartata ity eṣa satsampattikramaḥ, Bhāṣya on ibid.*

17. *puruṣaṃ somyotā haṣṭagṛhītaṃ ānayaṃtī apahārṣīt steyam
akārṣīt paraśuṃ asmai tapateti, sa yadi tasya kartā bhavati,
tata evāṇṛtaṃ ātmānaṃ kurute so 'ṇṛtābhisandho 'ṇṛtenā-
tmānaṃ antardhāya paraśuṃ taptam pratigṛhṇāti, sa dahyate
'tha hanyate, ibid. 6.16.1-2.*
18. *taddhāsyā vijajñāu, ibid. 6.16.3.*
19. *Viṣṇutattvavinirṇaya*, p.120. Translated into English with de-
tailed notes by K.T. Pandurangi, published by Dvaita Vedanta
Studies and Research Foundation, Bangalore, 1991.
20. *Nyāyāmṛta*, pp. 1139-1144. Ptd along with the *Advaitasiddhi*
by Śaḍḍaraśanaprakāśanasamiti, Varanasi, 1977.
21. *ibid. p. 1146.*

C.R. SUBHADRA

CRITICISM OF THE STORY OF VATSARĀJA - A NOVEL APPROACH

It is undoubtedly accepted that the story of Vatsarāja is attractive and liked by all.¹ Vatsarāja or the king of Vatsa is Udayana who ruled kauśāmbi. His story was so famous that it is the theme for a number of works like *Tāpasavatsarāja*, *Vīṇāvāsavadatta*, *Pratijñā-yaugandharāyaṇa*, *Svapnavāsavadatta*, *Ratnāvalī* and *Priyadarśikā*. Udayana is seen as an important character in the *Bṛhatkathā*, the famous Prakrit work of Guṇāḍhya. Udayana is the father of king Naravāhanadatta, the hero of the *Bṛhatkathā*, as is understood from its later adaptations. Though the original epic is not available now, these adaptations, viz. *Kathāsaritsāgara* of Somadeva, *Bṛhatkāthamañjarī* of Kṣemendra and *Bṛhatkathāsamgraha* of Buddhasvāmin are accessible to us. Analysing these three versions, Warder remarks that the work of Buddhasvāmin is prominent in preserving the style of the original.² Actually all of them show an awareness of a general outline and important characteristics of the original work. But in certain

contexts there must have been some deviations. One such context is the description of the capture of Udayana by Mahāsenā with the help of a dummy elephant.

Bhāmaha, first among the Ālaṅkārikas, points out the impropriety seen in the context and vehemently criticises the same.³ The criticism reveals the keen observation and aesthetic sense of Bhāmaha who is a versatile scholar in various Śāstras as well as a critic of sharp common sense. His *Kāvyaṅkāra* is a work which focuses on instructions to poets by demonstrating some novel ideas on the concept of poetic blemishes. For example in the fourth *pariccheda* of the *Kāvyaṅkāra*, Bhāmaha defines a blemish called *nyāyavirodhi* thus:⁴

*nyāyaḥ śāstram trivargoktir daṇḍanītiṃ ca tāṃ viduḥ/
ato nyāyavirodhis tam apetaṃ yat tayā yathā//*

(Nyāya consists of the Śāstras, of those that treat of the three paths (*Dharma*, *Artha* and *Kāma*) and also of *Daṇḍanīti*. That which goes contrary to this is *nyāyavirodhi*.)

As an illustration to *nyāyavirodhi* Bhāmaha refers to the story of Udayana otherwise known as Vatsarāja. The work consists of this story which is the aim of Bhāmaha's criticism, is not yet clearly identified. A general view is that Bhāmaha aims at the *Pratijñāyau-gandharāyaṇa* of Bhāsa.⁵ But a close examination of both Bhāmaha's objection and Bhāsa's version reveals that Bhāmaha is referring to some other work dealing with the story of Udayana.

The criticism of Bhāmaha consists of the following points:⁶

(a) The king of Vatsa is described as one who desires conquest and victory as well as farsighted like an aged

and wise person. Later, such a king is described as having no spies. This is contradictory.

(b) The ignorance of king Vatsa about the arrival of an artificial elephant which consisted of hundred soldiers under the command of Sālankāyana at his own country is most improper.

(c) If the ministers who were being informed of the matter had deliberately abandoned him, they must be accused of being unintelligent or devoid of real devotion to their master.

(d) The arrows discharged from the bows of several angry soldiers did not hit the vital parts of Udayana. How could it be possible?

(e) Udayana would have been killed in such a fierce struggle by his enemies enraged after he had killed their close relatives like brother, son, father, uncle and nephew. How could those soldiers discharging so many weapons at him who is single, and that too in a forest, fail to kill him?

(f) Even a child would easily be able to distinguish between a living elephant and an artificial one. How could it happen that such an expert in the elephant-craft like Udayana failed to notice the difference?

Finally Bhāmaha salutes the intelligence of the learned men who explain the poet's intention like this which contradicts the accepted codes of Śāstra and *loka*.

A close examination of Bhāsa's *Pratijñāyugandharāyaṇa* gives answers to most of the above arguments.

Udayana is not described as a far-sighted one desiring conquest. He is neither said to be a king having no spies. His ministers Yaugandharāyaṇa and Rumaṇvān are not

at all selfish. They are faithful and devoted to their master whom they finally saved and brought to his own country risking their own lives.

Yaugandharāyaṇa who has just heard of the scheme of Pradyota's deceit to capture Udayana, decides to send a person, Sālaka by name, with a letter to warn the king. But before doing that, Haṃsaka, an upādhyāya who used to stand by Udayana, reaches with the news of the King's imprisonment by Mahāsenā. The discussion between Haṃsaka and Yaugandharāyaṇa clearly shows that the minister could not get time to inform the king about the deceit. Udayana is said to have forcefully discussed Rumaṇvān who accompanied him from following him, swearing an oath. Therefore the charge that the selfish ministers abandoned their King is unsound. Haṃsaka describes that Udayana rushed alone into the group of the enemies. Although his foot soldiers seem to have followed him instantly, they were killed. Only Haṃsaka could save himself to guard his master who was very tired and who fell unconscious. When he was conscious and began to fight again, the soldiers attacked him and one of them tried to kill him. Fortunately at the same moment, Sālankāyaṇa, the army leader rescued his life and took him to the palace of Mahāsenā. There his wounds were treated with medicine. Mahāsenā meets him only after this.⁷

The sixth impropriety that Udayana did not distinguish the artificial elephant is also answered in Bhāsa's work. In the play, Yaugandharāyaṇa explains that the artificial elephant was surrounded by some real elephants. It was well-covered with creepers of jasmine and thickets of Sāla trees and only the tusks and nails could be seen.

Therefore the improbability that Bhāmaha holds, has no base with regard to the *Pratijñāyaugandharāyaṇa*. Bhāsa seems to have foreseen almost all the defects of the traditional story as they are revealed in the questions of *Yaugandharāyaṇa*.⁸

Kṣemendra and Somadeva, both belonging to the eleventh century A.D., are the authors of the *Bṛhatkathā-mañjarī* and the *Kathāsaritsāgara*, two later versions of the *Bṛhatkathā*. Most probably they are also aware of the improprieties as pointed out by Bhāmaha. While describing Udayana as approaching the artificial elephant Kṣemendra raises a question thus -

‘How can an artificial elephant be caught by playing *Vīṇā*?’ He gives the answer that even to the great people, addiction to the seven vices (*vyasanāsakti*) causes infatuation (*moha*). Here the king is addicted to the vice, viz. hunting elephant. So he does not think about the consequences. And when he was absorbed in playing the *Ghoṣavatī*, soldiers rushed out of the elephant and attacked him. Udayana struck by such unexpected incident, killed many of them, but one of them caught the king from behind deceitfully. Hearing this Mahāsenā reached there and took away Udayana to the palace.⁹

The same portion of the story is narrated in the second *Lambaka*, fourth *Taraṅga* of the *Kathāsaritsāgara*. Here Somadeva describes that Udayana prevented all the army men from a very distant place and taking the *Ghoṣavatī* entered the great forest only with his spy -

cāramātrasahāyas tu
vīṇaṃ ghoṣavatīm dadhat/

nijavyasanavistīrṇām
 taṃ viveśa mahāṭavīm//¹⁰

The author explains why the king did not distinguish the elephant as artificial -

gāndharvadattacittatvāt
 sandhyādhvāntavaśāc ca saḥ/
 na taṃ vanagajaṃ rājā
 māyāgajam alakṣayat//

(As he was deeply indulged in playing the Vīṇā and due to the darkness of the night, the king did not notice that the elephant was artificial.)

In the midst of the forest when Udayana was fighting against the soldiers who appeared before him from the elephant, some other soldiers caught him from behind. And finally he was taken to the king Caṇḍamahāsena.

Thus in these versions the authors have ensured that, their works are not vulnerable to the criticism as that of Bhāmaha. So Bhāmaha must have been referring to some other work dealing with the story of Udayana. Or he must have seen the *Bṛhatkathā* of Guṇāḍhya where there is the original story of Udayana. Just after the discussion of the story of Udayana, Bhāmaha introduces a deed of Naravāhanadatta as an illustration of the blemish āgamavirodhi. As mentioned before, king Naravāhanadatta, son of Udayana is the hero of the *Bṛhatkathā*. Similarly a reference to Cāṇakya, as reaching the playhouse (*krīḍāgrha*) of Nanda seems to have been taken from the *Bṛhatkathā*. In both the *Kathāsaritsāgara* and *Bṛhatkathāmañjarī* also the story of Cāṇakya is described.¹¹ Even if there is a possibility of another work dealing with the story of Cāṇakya, the

above references show that Bhāmaha must be referring to the *Bṛhatkathā*.

In the context of *pratijñā*, etc. in *kāvya*, Bhāmaha illustrates a verse for the *Madanāśrayapratijñā* –

āhariṣyāmy amūm adya
mahāsenātmajām iti/
kṛtvā pratijñāṃ vatsena
sā hr̥teti madanāśrayā//

(*Madanāśraya-pratijñā* is that of Vatsa that he should take the daughter of Mahāsena and he did so).

Here, the vow is said to be by Udayana whereas in *Pratijñāyaugandharāyaṇa* Yaugandharāyaṇa takes the vow.¹³ So this reference also seems to have made from the original *Bṛhatkathā*.

To conclude, Bhāmaha seems to have known and referred to the Prakrit Epic of Guṇāḍhya who belongs to an earlier date of second century B.C. or at the latest in the first century B.C.¹⁴ The work was a repository of folk tales and Bhāmaha's objections are against the blind borrowers who copy the faults of the narrative also. It seems that in the period of Bhāmaha and after that *Bṛhatkathā* was prevalent among the people. For example Daṇḍin, the immediate successor of Bhāmaha refers to the *Bṛhatkathā* in his *Kāvyaḍarśa*.¹⁵ He accepts the stories from it as the theme of his other works, viz. *Daśakumāracarita* and *Avantisundarīkathā*. So it is probable that Bhāmaha who makes several references to the great epics *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Mahābhārata* was referring to the *Bṛhatkathā* along with the two epics, which he considered to be a work of an equal status.

REFERENCES

1. *loke hāri ca vatsarājacaritam, Ratnāvalī*, p. 5.
2. Warder, A.K., *Indian Kāvya Literature*, vol. II, p. 117.
3. For Bhāmaha's date and priority to other Ālaṅkārikas refer to K. Kunjunni Raja, *Rājasudhā*, pp. 37-46.
4. Bhāmaha, *Kāvyaālaṅkāra*, IV.39.
5. Refer to a) Krishnamacharyar, *History of Sanskrit Literature*, p. 562; b) A.K. Warder, op.cit., vol.II, p. 291 and vol.III, p. 20.
6. Bhāmaha, op.cit., IV.40-47.
7. See the first Act of *Pratijñāyugandharāyaṇa*.
8. ibid. pp. 58, 59.
9. *Bṛhatakathāmañjarī*, pp. 48, 59.
10. *Kathāsaritsāgara*, IV.16 (p. 35).
11. ibid. I.5, 109-124 and op.cit. p. 24.
12. Bhāmaha, op.cit. V.38.
13. Bhāsa, op.cit. I.16, p. 40.
14. Warder, op.cit. vol.II, p. 119.
15. *Kāvyaḍarśa*, 1.38.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bhāmaha, *Kāvyaālaṅkāra* with Sanskrit commentary, Sreenivasa Press, Tiruvadi, 1934.

Bhāsa, *Pratijñāyugandharāyaṇa*, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Varanasi.

Daṇḍin, *Kāvyaḍarśa*, Chowkhamba Vidyabhavan, Varanasi, 1972.
Krishnamacharyar, M. *History of Sanskrit Literature*, Motilal Banarsidass, Varanasi, 1970.

Kṣemendra, *Bṛhatakathāmañjarī*, Meharchand Lacchmandas, New Delhi, 1982.

Raja, K. Kunjunni, *Rājasudhā*, Department of Sanskrit, University of Madras, 1982.

Somadeva, *Kathāsaritsāgara*, Vihar Rashtrabhasa Parishad, Patna, 1961.

Śrīharṣa, *Ratnāvalī*, ed. M.R. Kale, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1984.

Warder, A.K., *Indian Kāvya Literature*, vol. I & II Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1972.

FORM IV**(See Rule 8)**

- | | | |
|----|--|---|
| 1. | Place of publication | Oriental Research Institute
Sri Venkateswara University
Tirupati-517 502
Andhra Pradesh, India |
| 2. | Periodicity of its
publication | Halfyearly |
| 3. | Printer' Name
Nationality
Address | M. Rajendran
Indian
The L.V. Graphics
268, Prakasam Road
Tirupati-517501 |
| 4. | Publisher's Name
Nationality
Address | Dr. M. Srimannarayana Murti
Indian
Professor & Director
Oriental Research Institute
Sri Venkateswara University
Tirupati-517 502 |
| 5. | Editor's Name
Nationality
Address | Dr. M. Srimannarayana Murti
Indian
Professor & Director
Oriental Research Institute
Sri Venkateswara University
Tirupati-517 502 |
| 6. | Name and Address of
individual who owns
the periodical | Sri Venkateswara University
Tirupati-517 502 |

I, M. Srimannarayana Murti, hereby declare that the particulars given above are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(Sd) **M. Srimannarayana Murti**
Publisher

V. RAMI REDDY

నేరము - నేరస్థుడు, మానవమితి: పరిశీలన

మానవజాతి, మానవుడు, మానవశాస్త్రం:

మానవ జాతి నాలుగు మిలియన్ల సంవత్సరాల చరిత్రలో దేశ, జాతి, కుల, వర్గ, వర్ణ మతాలతో సంబంధం లేకుండా మనమంతా *HOMO* అను ఒకే ప్రజాతి (*genus*) కి, *sapiens* అను ఒకే జాతి (*species*) కి చెందిన వారమనే సత్యం తెలిసిందే. మానవుడు జంతుప్రపంచంలో ప్రత్యేకస్థానం సంపాదించుకున్నాడనుటకు, అతడు తన రెండు కాళ్ళమీద నిటారుగా నడవటం, సునిపితమైన మెదడు, చూపు, స్పష్టమైన ప్రసంగం మొదలైన లక్షణాలు కలిగియుండడమేకాక, సమర్థవంతమైన సంస్కృతిని సృష్టించుకొనడం, దానిని నిలుపుకొనడం, వంశపారంపర్యంగా కొనసాగించడం కూడ అందుకు తోడ్పడుతున్నవి. జైవికంగా మనం జంతువులమైనప్పటికీ, ఈలక్షణాల వల్ల జంతువుల స్థానాన్ని అధిగమించి యున్నాం. ఈ ప్రత్యేకస్థానం కలిగి యుండటం వలననే మనల్ని సామాజిక జంతువులని కూడా సంభావిస్తారు. ఈ దృష్టి పరంగా సమాజంలో మనమంతా సమానంగానే కన్పడతాము. నేరస్థులు ఈ లక్షణాలకు అతీతులుకారు. ఎందుకంటే నేరస్థుల్లో కూడా మిగతా వారిలో మాదిరి జైవికలక్షణాలున్నాయి. వీటన్నిటినీ మానవులలో కాలస్థలాభాలతో సంపూర్ణంగా అధ్యయనం చేయడమే మానవ శాస్త్రద్వేయం.

ఈ విధంగా మానవుణ్ణి అధ్యయనం చేయటాన్ని సంపూర్ణ (holistic) పద్ధతి అంటారు. ఈ పద్ధతి ప్రకారం మానవుని జైవిక-సాంస్కృతిక సమాకలన సంబంధమైన అంశాలన్నీ క్షుణ్ణంగా పరిశీలించవచ్చు. మానవశాస్త్ర రెండు శతాబ్దాల చరిత్రలో మానవుణ్ణి వివిధ కోణాల నుంచి అధ్యయనం చేయటంలో వివిధరకాల

ప్రత్యేక శాఖలు వృద్ధిచెందాయి. వీటిలో మానవమితి (anthropometry) అనేది ఒక శాఖ. ఈ శాఖ 17వ శతాబ్ద మధ్య భాగంలో G.S. Elsholt మొట్టమొదటిసారిగా ప్రచురించిన పరిశోధన వ్యాసము ద్వారా ప్రారంభమైంది. తదు-
పరి J.F. Blumenbach, Paul Broca France లో, Ihering, R. Collignon లు, Germany లో, E.A. Hooton, R. Martin, K. Sallers, G. Sergi, Herdlicka లు USA లో, అతని సహచరులు ఇటలీలో ఇంకా అనేకమంది శాస్త్రజ్ఞులు ఈ శాఖలో పలుదేశాల్లో పరిశోధనలు జరిపి ప్రగతి సాధించారు. ఈ పరిశోధనలు, ఈ శాఖలోని పద్ధతులు సాంకేతిక అంశాలకు సంబంధిత పరికరాలు, యంత్రాలలో గణనీయమైన అభివృద్ధి, సున్నితత్వం సాధించుటకు దోహదం చేశాయి.

మానవమితి పరిధి:

మానవమితి అంటే మానవుని శారీరక కొలతలను శాస్త్రీయంగా తీసుకొనటం. మానవ శారీరక శాస్త్రంలో (Physical Anthropology) ఇది పరంపరగా వస్తున్న ఒక అంశం. శాస్త్రీయ పద్ధతులు, సంకేతాల సహకారంతో సజీవ మానవుని శరీరపు వివిధ అవయవాల కొలతలు, అస్థిపంజరం కొలతలు తీసుకొంటారు. వీటినే శారీరకమితి (Somatometry, Somatoscopy), అస్థిమితి (Osteometry), కపాలమితి (Cranimetry, Cranioscopy) అంటారు. ఈ కొలతలను శరీరం నిర్దిష్టమైన కేంద్రాల మధ్య తీసుకొంటారు. ఈ కేంద్రాలు (land marks) శరీర నిర్మితిలో స్థిరమైనవి. మానవమితి కొలతల ద్వారా యేర్పడిన సూచికలు వివిధ భౌగోళిక ప్రాంతాలలో నివసించే మానవ సమూహాలను పోల్చటానికి వీలవుతున్నవి. ఈ శాఖ మానవ శరీరంలో వివిధ భాగాల ఆకారం, వాటి మధ్య గల సంబంధాన్ని గురించి అర్థం చేసుకోవడానికి తోడ్పడడమే కాకుండా పరిశ్రమలలో రక్షణ సంబంధమైన (defence purposes) వివిధ రకాల పరికరాలు తయారు చేయటానికి సహకరిస్తూ ఉన్నది. మానవమితి ప్రమాణాల (anthropometric standards) ద్వారా ఇంకా ముఖ్యమైన ఓడసీనాక (space ship) డిజైన్లో, వైమానిక యూనిఫారములు (aircraft uniforms), రక్షిత దళాలకు అవసరమైన ఇతర ప్రత్యేక వస్తువులను తయారు చేయటానికి వీలవుతున్నది. ఒక నిర్ణీతకాలంలో మన జాతీయ జనాభాలను మానవమితి ప్రకారం సర్వేచేసిన తర్వాత అందులో మార్పుల గురించి సర్వేల ద్వారా అధ్యయనం చేయవచ్చు. ఇటువంటి డేటా కొన్ని physiological విధులు, లోని అంతర్గత మైన అంశాలు, basal metabolism, vital capacity, nutritional requirement లు మొదలైనవి అర్థం చేసుకోవడానికి తోడ్పడుతుంది. వీటి మూలంగా జాతీయ ప్రజారోగ్యకార్యక్రమాలను చేపట్టటానికి ఎప్పటికప్పుడు ఈ అధ్యయనాల సూచికలద్వారా కేంద్రీకరించడానికి వీలౌతుంది. మానవ శరీర

ఆకారపు పరిమాణాత్మక భావము (quantitative expression of the form of human body) నుంచి వివిధ రకాలైన దైనందిక అవసరాలను గుర్తించడానికి వీలౌతుందని చెప్పవచ్చు.

వివిధ రకాలైన నేరాల్లో, అగ్నిప్రమాదాలు, వాహనాలు, వినూనాల ప్రమాదాల్లో, ఇళ్ళు కూలిపోయినప్పుడు, పరిశ్రమల్లో ప్రమాదాలు కలిగినప్పుడు, నరదలు, భూకంపాలు, మొదలైన ప్రకృతి వైపరీత్యాలు సంభవించినప్పుడు దొరికే మానవ అవశేషాల ద్వారా వారి వయస్సు, లింగభేదం (sex), ఆకృతి (stature), జాతి మొదలైనవి గుర్తించటానికి మానవమితి ఒక ముఖ్యసాధనంగా ఉపయోగపడుతుంది. ఇట్టి medico-legal case లను అధ్యయనం చేయటాన్ని మానవ శరీరశాస్త్రంలో ఫోరెన్సిక్-మానవశాస్త్రమని అంటారు. ఈ శాస్త్రంలో అనేక ఇతర శాస్త్ర విజ్ఞానాలచే నేరం జరిగిన ప్రదేశాలలో దొరికిన వేలిముద్రలు, అరచేతి ముద్రలు, వీర్యం, లాలాజలం, రక్తం, మూత్రం, వెంట్రుకలు, కణాలు, కూరగాయలకు సంబంధించిన పదార్థాలు, పీచు, మొదలైన ఆధారాలను బట్టి నేరస్తులను పట్టుకోవడానికి వీలవుతున్నది. వివిధ రకాలైన నేరస్తులను పట్టుకోవడానికి అవకతవకలు, కొట్టివేతలు, అనుకరణలు మొదలైన వాటిని పరిశీలించడానికి కూడ పద్ధతులు ఉన్నవి. Forensic ballistics పద్ధతులను హత్యలు, హింసాకాండ, విధ్వంసక చర్యలు, దోమీలు, మొదలైన నేరాలలో వాడిన ప్రేలుడు పదార్థాలు, మొదలైన వాటిని తెలుసుకోవడానికి ఉపయోగిస్తారు.

భావన పమస్య:

మానవమితి అంటే ఏమి? దీని పరిధేమి? అన్న విషయాలు ఇంత వరకూ తెలుసుకొన్నప్పటికీ, సాహిత్యంలో phrenology, physiognomy ల లాంటి కొన్ని ఇతర పదాలను ముఖ్యంగా 18, 19వ శతాబ్దాలలో వాడారు. Chamber's 20th Century Dictionary ప్రకారం, phrenology అంటే మెదడు వివిధ భాగాలలో నిక్షిప్తమైన మేధను గురించి, తలమీది వివిధ కుంభాల (బుడిపెల)ను పరిశీలించి అధ్యయనం చేసే శాస్త్రం అని అర్థం. కాని, ఈ సిద్ధాంతాన్ని శాస్త్రీయంగా ఋజువు చేయడం కష్టం. కనుక, దీనిని సమర్థించటానికి వీలులేదు. పై నిఘంటువు ప్రకారం physiognomy ఒక వ్యక్తి ఆకారాన్ని - ముఖంగా ముఖాన్ని - బట్టి, ఆ వ్యక్తి గుణాలను కనిపెట్టే, లేక అంచనావేసే ఒక కళ అని అర్థం. మానవుని ముఖం అతని మేధను అర్థంలో చూపుతుందన్న ఈ సూత్రం కూడా శాస్త్రీయ జ్ఞానం వలన మద్దతు కోల్పోయింది.

బహుశా సైన్సు ఇంకా ప్రాథమిక దశలోనే వున్న రోజుల్లో మానవుని లక్షణాలను అధ్యయనం చేసే పద్ధతులుగా phrenology, physiognomy లను బాగా

నమ్మేవారు. ఎందుకంటే ఆ రోజుల్లో శాస్త్రజ్ఞులు సాధారణ మానవుల మత, మూఢనమ్మకాల ప్రభావం కల్గియుండేవారు. అట్టిపరిస్థితి పశ్చిమదేశాల్లో ఇంకా ఎక్కువగా ప్రబలి ఉండేది. అందువల్లనే 1859 లో డార్విన్ ప్రతిపాదించిన పరిణామ సిద్ధాంతాన్ని కూడా ఎవ్వరూ నమ్మలేదు. దీనికి తోడు బైబిల్ నిపుణుల ప్రభావంతో చాలమంది ఈ సిద్ధాంతాన్ని గురించి తీవ్రవాదోపవాదాలకు దిగారు. ఇలాగే 1865 లో మెండల్ ప్రతిపాదించిన ఆనువంశికత సూత్రాలు ఏదో ఒక మామూలు జర్నల్లో ప్రచురించగా ఎవ్వరూ గమనించలేదు. ఇదే సూత్రాలను క్రీ.శ. 1900 లో ముగ్గురు వేర్వేరు దేశాల శాస్త్రవేత్తలు వేర్వేరుగా కనుగొనే వరకూ ఎవ్వరూ గుర్తించలేదు. కాబట్టి ఏవో మూఢనమ్మకాల ప్రభావంతో నేరస్తుల కపాలాలను లేదా ముఖాకారాలను బట్టి వారి నేరాలను నిర్ణయించడం సరికాదు. అయితే కపాలాల, ముఖాల కొలతలను మానవమితిలో చేర్చడమే కాకుండా, వాటి ఫలితాల ననుసరించి వయస్సు, లింగభేదం, జాతి, మొదలైన అంశాల్లో మార్పులగురించి కూడా అంచనావేస్తున్నాం. నేరస్తులను మన సమాజసభ్యులుగా, నేరాన్ని మన సామాజిక జీవనంలో ఒక భాగంగా, ఇంకా మన సంస్కృతిలోనే ఒక భాగంగా, పరిగణించాలి. కాబట్టి phrenology, physiognomy లు మానవమితిలో భాగాలుగా కపాలాల, ముఖాల కొలతల మూలంగా వ్యక్తమయ్యే పరిణామాత్మక లక్షణాలని చెప్పవచ్చు.

నేరం, నేరస్థుడు - క్రిమినాలజీ లేక క్రిమినల్ ఆంథ్రోపాలజీ:

ఒక దేశంలో ఒక నిర్దిష్టమైన కాలంలో అమలులో వున్న చట్టాలనుసరించి ఏ మానవచర్యనైతే సమాజ సంక్షేమానికి ముప్పుని అధికార్లు భావిస్తారో దానిని నేరమని నిర్ణయించవచ్చు. అలాంటి చర్య, లేక చర్యలకు కారణమైన వ్యక్తిని నేరస్థుడని అంటారు. నేరాలను ప్రేరేపించే కారణాలు, వాటిని నివారించడం, అందుకు శిక్షలు, వాటిని అరికట్టే విధానాలు మొదలైన వాటిని మానవశాస్త్ర పరిధిలోనే అధ్యయనం చేయవచ్చు.

నేరం అనేది కాలానుగుణంగా సమాజాలకనుగుణంగా సైన్సు, సాంకేతిక రంగాల ప్రభావంతో మార్పు చెందుతూ వచ్చింది. సాంస్కృతికంగా వెనుకబడిన చిన్న సమాజాలలో నేరాలను అధికాభిప్రాయం, వారి ఐకమత్యం మొదలైన అంశాలద్వారా నిర్ణయిస్తారు. అట్టి సమాజాలు తమ సమస్యలన్నింటినీ కూడా తమ సంస్కృతిలో ఒక భాగంగానే పరిగణిస్తాయి. సంశ్లిష్టసమాజాలలో నేరాలనిలా భావించడానికి వీలేదు. సామాన్యగిరిజనసమాజాల చట్టాలు శక్తివంతంగా వున్నప్పటికీ కొన్ని వ్యక్తిగత నేరాల దర్శాపుల్లో అతిశక్తిహీనమై పోతాయి. దొంగతనం, మానభంగం, ధ్వంసం మొదలైన పెద్ద నేరాలను కూడ వారి వారి కుటుంబపెద్దలు, లేదా గోత్రపెద్దల ద్వారా విచారించాల్సిన వ్యక్తిగత నేరాలుగా పరిగణిస్తారే గాని సమాజపెద్దల జోక్యమేమాత్రముండదు. దైవాధిపత్యం ఆచరించే పశ్చిమ దేశాల్లో కూడా ప్రజలు చేసే తప్పులు

నేరాలనుకునేవారు. ఎందుకంటే ప్రజలు రాజును దేవుని అంశంగా భావించేవారు. కాబట్టి చేతబడి, మంత్రవిద్యలు, దైవదోహం, ద్రష్టమతం, మొదలైన వాటికన్నీంటికి మరణశిక్ష విధించేవారు. శాస్త్రీయవిజ్ఞానం పెంపొందినందువలననూ, మతాధిపతుల దోరణివలననూ, ఇంగ్లాండులో ఇట్టి పరిస్థితి 1736 వరకూ కొనసాగింది.

అయితే సాంస్కృతికవిప్లవం మానవుని ఆలోచనా విధానాన్నే మార్చింది. వివేకవంతమైన నేదాంత వ్యాప్తిలో మత సంబంధమైన నేరాలపై ఆలోచనలు ఉద్భవించాయి. ఒక పాశ్చాత్య దేశ శాస్త్రవేత్త, George Wilher నేరం ఒక కోవకు చెందిన, స్థిరమైన, నిలకడైన అంశం కాదనీ, కాల స్థలాలను బట్టి ఇది మారుతుందనీ భావించాడు. కాబట్టి నేర సంబంధమైన కారణాలు యావత్ప్రపంచంలో ఒకే రకంగా వుంటాయి అని అనుకొనటం సబబుకాదు. అందువలన నేరపరిశోధనలో వివిధ శాస్త్రజ్ఞుల పద్ధతులు, సహకారం ఎంతైనా అవసరమని తేటతెల్లమవుతున్నది. అట్టి స్వభావాల్లేవంటే భౌతిక వాతావరణం, అనువంశికత, శరీర నిర్మాణ పరిస్థితులు మొదలైనవి. ఈ రచనలన్నీ నేరస్థులు అరెస్టు చేయబడిన, శిక్షింపబడిన తరగతికి చెందిన వారనే నమ్మకాన్ని బలపరిచాయి.

భౌతిక వాతావరణం:

Aschaffenberg, Mills, Curry, Mehendale, Sutherland, Cressey అనే శాస్త్రజ్ఞులు నేరస్థుని ప్రవర్తన భౌతిక వాతావరణ పరిస్థితులపై ఆధారపడి ఉంటుందని నమ్మారు. అస్తులకు సంబంధించిన నేరాలు చలికాలంలో వీరివలన ఎక్కువగా జరుగుతాయని, భూమధ్యరేఖకు దూరమయ్యే కొద్దీ అవి పెరుగుతాయనీ పేర్కొన్నారు. అయితే వ్యక్తుల మీద జరిగే నేరాలు వేసవికాలంలో ఎక్కువగాను, భూమధ్యరేఖకు దగ్గరయ్యే కొద్దీ తగ్గుతాయనీ వారు చెప్పారు. బారోమెట్రిక్ వత్తిళ్ళలోని మార్పులు, గాలిదిశలను బట్టి కూడా నేరాల రేటు మారుతుందని అన్నారు. పర్వతప్రాంతాలు, మైదానాలు, సముద్రతీరప్రాంతాలు, లోపలిప్రాంతాలు కూడా నేరాల్ని ప్రభావితం చేస్తాయని భావించారు. ఈ రచనలను జాగ్రత్తగా పరిశీలిస్తే నేరాలరేటుకు భౌతిక స్థితిగతులకు మధ్య అతి తక్కువ సంబంధముందనీ, ఒక్కొక్కసారి అట్టి సంబంధం లేదనీ తెలుస్తున్నది. Laroche, Tilley, Bullock అనువారు చలికాలంలో శిశుహత్యలరేటు, వేసవిలో వ్యక్తులమీద జరిగే అనేక ఇతర నేరాలు ఎక్కువగా జరుగుతున్నాయని చూపించారు. ఆయా కాలాల్లో మానవుని నివాసానికి భౌతిక పరిస్థితులు లాభకరంగా లేక నష్టంవాటిల్లే విధంగా ఉండవచ్చు. ఈ కోణంలో వీటికి నేరస్థుని ప్రవర్తనకు సంబంధమున్నదని పేర్కొనవచ్చు.

ఆనువంశికం లేదా వారసత్వం:

ఈ శతాబ్దారంభంలో ఆనువంశికం - వారసత్వం నేరహేతువులనే సమస్యలపై వాదోపవాదాలు చెలరేగాయి. నేరప్రవృత్తి, ఆనువంశికతల మధ్య గల సంబంధాలను గురించిన అధ్యయనంలో అయిదు పద్ధతులు ఉపయోగించారు. మొదటి పద్ధతిని Cesare Lombroso, ఆయన అనుచరులు ప్రయోగిస్తూ, నేరస్థులను ఆటవికులలో పోల్చారు. ఈ ఆనువంశిక నేరప్రవృత్తి పద్ధతి నేరస్థుణ్ణి నేరస్థునిగా పరిగణించటమే కాక నేరస్థుడు ఆటవిక లక్షణాలు కలిగి వుంటాడనీ నమ్ముతుంది. కాని, ఈ సిద్ధాంతానికి సరైన ఆధారాలు లేవు.

తరువాత పద్ధతి నేరప్రవృత్తిని వంశవృక్షానికి ఆపాదించింది. అట్టి కొన్ని వంశవృక్ష-శాఖల కుటుంబాలలో నేరప్రవృత్తి, ఒక తరం నుంచి మరో తరానికి ఆనువంశికంగా వస్తుంది. Dugdale, Estabrook లు 1870 లో Juke ల వంశకుటుంబంలో 1200 మంది సభ్యులను అధ్యయనం చేస్తే వారిలో 140 మంది మాత్రమే నేరస్థులని తేలింది. ఈ ఫలితాలను Juke ల కుటుంబాలతో పోల్చారు. Juke లు ఒక గొప్ప మతబోధకుడైన Jonathan Edwards కు వారసులు. ఆయన పూర్వీకులు నేరస్థులైనా, అతని వారసులెవరూ నేరస్థులు కాలేదు. ఆ వంశం నుండి చాలా మంది USA అధ్యక్షులు, రాష్ట్ర గవర్నర్లు, సుప్రీంకోర్టు సభ్యులు, ప్రఖ్యాత రచయితలు, మతబోధకులు, ఉపాధ్యాయులయ్యారు. దీన్ని బట్టి చూస్తే Juke వంశంలోని ప్రతి శిశువూ ఆనువంశికతవారణ పరిస్థితుల ప్రభావం వలననే జన్మించినని స్పష్టమైంది.

మూడవ పద్ధతిని Carl Rath 1914 లో ప్రతిపాదించిన వంశవృక్షాలలో మెండిలియన్ నిష్పత్తుల పద్ధతి అంటారు. దీని ప్రకారం నేర మనస్తత్వం కొన్ని వూహించిన మెండలియన్ నిష్పత్తులలో వస్తుంది. Rath Seiburg (Germany) లో ఒక శిక్షాస్మృతి సంస్థలో వున్న 98 మంది కుటుంబ చరిత్రలను పరిశీలించి పై నిర్ణయానికి వచ్చారు.

నాల్గవ పద్ధతి నేరస్థుల తల్లిదండ్రుల పిల్లల గణాంక వివరాల సంబంధంపైన ఆధారపడింది. ఈ పద్ధతిని Charles Goring 1913 లో ప్రతిపాదించాడు. నేరస్వభావం వంశపారంపర్యంగా పస్తుందని, వారసత్వం పరిస్థితులు చాలా తక్కువ ప్రభావం చూపుతాయని ఈయన అభిప్రాయం. అందుకు ఆధారంగా ఆయన తండ్రికొడుకుల నేరస్వభావాలు, నేరస్థులు వారిసోదరుల correlation లలో $+0.60$, $+0.45$ coefficient లున్నాయన్నాడు. అయితే తగిన ఆధారాలు లేని మూలంగా ఈ పద్ధతిని కూడా నిరూపించుట కష్టం. నేరప్రవృత్తి ఆనువంశికతగా సంభవించు లక్షణమని Lange 1919 లో సమపోలికలుండు కవలలను పోల్చడం

ద్వారా నిర్ణయించవచ్చని అభిప్రాయపడ్డాడు. అందుకని ఆయన 13 సమరూపకవలలు, 17 భౌతిసంబంధమైన (మగ) కవలలను అధ్యయనంచేశాడు. Rasanoff, ఆయన అనుచరులు 1941 లో ఈ పద్ధతిని తప్పని ఋజువు చేశారు.

పై పరిశీలన ద్వారా నేరస్థులు కూడా మనుషులే ననియు, వారు సామాజిక సభ్యులుగా కొన్ని సందర్భాలలో చేసే చట్టవ్యతిరేకచర్యలు అనువంశికంగా సంభవించవని తెలుస్తున్నది. ప్రఖ్యాత జీవశాస్త్రజ్ఞులు Ashley Montagu 1941 లో, Penrose 1955 లో చేసిన పరిశోధనలు నేరప్రవృత్తి అనువంశికంగా వచ్చేది కాదనియు, నేరసంబంధచట్టం న్యాయశాస్త్రం విర్వచించేదాన్ని బట్టి వుంటుందనీ, చట్టాన్ని వ్యతిరేకించేవారికి అగుణం వారసత్వంగా వస్తుందనడానికి ఏ మాత్రం సంబంధం లేదనీ తేల్చినవి.

జీవశాస్త్రం:

జీవశాస్త్రంలో కొన్ని మానవ శారీరక లక్షణాల విభేదాలకు నేరప్రవృత్తిలో సంబంధం వుందని ఇటలీకి చెందిన క్రిమినాలజిస్ట్ Cesare Lombroso తన Biological theory, ఈ Positive school of crime ద్వారా తెలిపాడు. ఈ క్రిమినాలజీ పితామహుడి సిద్ధాంతము French తత్వవేత్త August Comte 'positivism' పై ఆధారపడి వున్నది. 1872 లో ఈ సిద్ధాంతంపై Lombroso వ్యాఖ్యానిస్తూ మనము నేరాన్ని అధ్యయనం చేసేముందు అసలు నేరస్థుడంటే ఏమిటో తెలుసుకొనవలెనని చెప్పాడు. తన సిద్ధాంతం ఋజువుకు Labroso మామూలు వ్యక్తులు, నేరస్థులు, పిచ్చివారు, మొదలైన వారి శరీర నిర్మాణ భేదాల పరిశోధన ఫలితాలను 1876 లో ప్రచురించిన తన ప్రఖ్యాత *Criminal Man* అనే పుస్తకంలో విశదీకరించాడు. ఇది 1775 లో చేసిన ఇటలీ న్యాయాధిపతి Cesare Beccaria సిద్ధాంతాన్ని వ్యతిరేకిస్తున్నది. Lombroso శిష్యుడు Enrico Ferri తన గురువు సిద్ధాంతాన్ని బాగా ప్రచారం చేశాడు. ఏదైనా ఈ సిద్ధాంతం ప్రకారం నేరస్థుని శరీర నిర్మాణం అతని వంశపారంపర్యంగా ప్రాప్తించే పాపాలకంటే నేరప్రవర్తనపై ఎక్కువ ప్రభావం చూపిస్తుంది. కాబట్టి, నేరస్థుడు పుట్టుకతోనే నేరస్థుడనియు, అనేరత్వం అతని శరీరనిర్మాణంలో మామూలు పరిస్థితిగా నెలకొన్నదనీ, అట్టివ్యక్తికి ఏ శిక్షలు విధించినా ప్రయోజనం లేదనీ పైగా అట్టి శిక్షలు అన్యాయంతో కూడినవనీ తెలుస్తున్నది. కనుక Lombroso దానికి మార్గము నేరస్థుణ్ణి చదవటం, వేరం చేయడానికి గల కారణాలు కనుగొనుటయే ధ్యేయమని భావించాడు.

Lombroso ప్రకారం నేరస్థుల్లో శరీరనిర్మితిలో అటవికలక్షణాలేవంటే, చిన్నకపాల సరిమాణం (low cranial capacity), వెనుకకు వంపుదేరిన నుదురు (retreating forehead), బాగా అభివృద్ధి చెందిన ఫ్రంట్ సైనసెస్ (highly developed frontal sinuses), త్వరగా మాసిపోవు కపాల సూదనాలు (early closing of cranial sutures), మామూలైన సూదనాలు, మందపైన కపాలఎముకలు, ప్రోగ్నాతిజం, చర్మంలో ఎక్కువ ఫీగ్మెంటేషన్, మొరటుగా వుండే రింగుల జుట్టు, పెద్ద చెవులు, దంతదయ్యైమాటా, తక్కువగా వున్న స్పర్శజ్ఞానం, దృశ్యాలను అతిత్వరగా చూచుశక్తి, దెబ్బలనుండి త్వరగా కోల్పోనేశక్తి, ఇంపల్సివ్ నెస్, శరీరధార్మిక, మానసిక excitability, గర్వము, జూదము, త్రాగుడుమీద మోహము, మూఢనమ్మకాలు, sensitiveness to personality, దేవుడు, నీతి, మొదలైన వాటిమీద ప్రత్యేక భావాలు, బాగా అభివృద్ధి చెందిన అనుమస్తుష్కము, కుద్య అనుకపాల క్యాల్యరైన్ విడరాల అరుదు కలయిక (calcarine fissures), ఎక్కువ పర్వుకలు (ribs), కశేరుకాలు (vertebrae), అట్లాస్ కశేరుక, తెల్లపదార్థంలో నాడికణాలు వుండటం, అట్లాస్ కశేరుక అనుకపాలాస్థితో కలవడం, పెద్దవిగా వుండే రదనికదంతాలు (canine teeth), చదరమైన అంగిలి (flat palate), lemur, rodent లలో లాగా మధ్యరకమైన అనుకపాలాస్థితాతం (occipital fossa), పరిగ్రాహక పాదం (prehensile foot), సాధారణంగా వుండే అరచేతిగీతలు ఎడమచేతివాటం మొదలైనవి.

Lombroso సిద్ధాంతం ఒక బయోటైపలాజికల్ స్కూల్ (Biotypological school) కు చెందింది. మిగతా స్కూళ్ళు, మొదడు పరీక్షలు, మానసికశాస్త్ర సంబంధమైనవి. 1913 లో Charles Goring వెయ్యిమంది నేరస్థులను, నేరస్థులు కాని వారితో సరిపోల్చగా వారిమధ్య ముఖ్యమైన తేడాలేవీ కనిపించలేదు. కాబట్టి Lombroso సిద్ధాంతం తృణీకరించబడింది. Lombroso కు గాని, అతని అనుచరులకుగాని ఆటవికుడు, అనాగరికుడు అంటే ఏమో తెలియదు. కాని అతని సిద్ధాంతం ప్రభావం 20వ శతాబ్దం వరకూ USA లో, యూరప్ లోని Neo-Lombrosian ల మీద వుంది.

ఈ శతాబ్దపు మూడవదశ చివరిలో ప్రఖ్యాత అమెరికా శారీరక మానవ శాస్త్రజ్ఞుడు Hooton తాను తీసుకొన్న వేల కొలది జైళ్ళలోని నేరస్థుల మానవమితి కొలతలను, కొంతమంది మామూలు మానవుల కొలతలతో సరిపోల్చి, Lombroso సిద్ధాంతాన్ని తిరిగి బలపరచడానికి ప్రయత్నించాడు. ఆయన ఈ రెండు sample ల మధ్య కొన్ని చిన్న తేడాలను గమనించినప్పటికీ నేరానికి ముఖ్యకారణం జైవికంగా తక్కువ రకానికి చెందడమేనని నిర్ధారించాడు. Hooton అధ్యయనాన్ని తరువాత Merton, Montagu, Tucker, 1940 లో; Wallerstein, Wyle లు 1947

లో; Timasheff 1944 లో తిరిగి పరీక్షించి అందులో ముఖ్యంగా sample size చాల తక్కువగా వుండటము, నేరస్తులకు నేరస్థులు కాని వారికి మధ్య చాలా తక్కువ తేడాలు వుండటం, ఏ ఆధారం లేకుండానే నేరస్థులను మిగతా వారి కంటే తక్కువ రకాలు (inferior) అని అనటం మొదలైన వాటి మూలంగా ఖండించారు.

నేరప్రవృత్తిని, భౌగోళిక, సామాజిక అసమానతలకు అన్వయింప జేసే ప్రయత్నాలు కూడా జరిగాయి. వీటిని cartographic, లేదా భౌగోళిక స్కూల్ అంటారు. ఈ స్కూల్ లో ముఖ్యంగా Marx, Engels ల రాతలపై ఆధారపడిన ఆర్థికస్థితి ప్రకారం వివరించే సామాజిక స్కూల్ కూడా వుంది. ఈ రెండు స్కూళ్ళకలయిక ద్వారా సామాజిక శాస్త్రీయస్కూల్ (sociological school) ఏర్పడింది. దీనిలో వివిధ సామాజిక కారణాలైన సామాజిక వ్యవస్థ (social organisation) సామాజిక పరిణామాల పాత్రను వివరిస్తారు. ఈ సిద్ధాంతాలన్నిటికీ వ్యతిరేకంగా అనేక కారణాల సిద్ధాంతము (Multiple factor theory) అనే సిద్ధాంతం ఏర్పడింది. దీని ప్రకారం నేరమనేది వివిధ రకాలైన అంశాల మూలంగా ప్రభావితమౌతుందని, వీటన్నిటినీ సాధారణంగా విభజించటం సాధ్యం కాదనీ భావిస్తారు. ఈ పద్ధతినే రేటు వైవిధ్య విశ్లేషణలో వాడుతారు.

మధ్య యుగాలన్నిటిలోనూ 19వ శతాబ్దారంభమయ్యే వరకు నేరం, నేరస్థుల అధ్యయనాన్ని లోపకరమైన పద్ధతులు, పరిశోధనల ద్వారా చేసేవారు. నేరస్థుణ్ణి చెడ్డవానిగా, అతని సంఘవిద్రోహత్వాన్ని పాపంతో పరిపోల్చేవారు. మానవుని లంబచరిత్ర, అనువంశికత ప్రాముఖ్యం, మానవుని biological constitution, అతని ప్రవర్తనపై వాటి ప్రభావం మొదలైన వాటిని గురించి 1859 లో చెప్పిన డార్విన్ పరిణామ సిద్ధాంతం కూడా నేరస్థుల అధ్యయనం మీద ప్రభావం చూపలేక పోయింది. ఆకాలంలోని సంఘసంస్కర్తలు, మానవుని పయనం దేవుని దగ్గరకే అని, మానవుని శీలం కేవలం అతని ధర్మం పైనే ఆధారపడి వుంటుందనే మూఢనమ్మకాన్ని ఖండించలేదు. కేవలం శీలంరూపాలు మాత్రమే చెడ్డదారిలో వెళ్ళి మానవధర్మాన్ని లేక దైవధర్మాన్ని విస్మరించి, శిక్షల పాలెతారని నమ్మేవారు.

మానవమితి, నేరస్థుడు:

నిర్దేశించబడిన సామాజిక కట్టుబాట్లకు, చట్టాలకు లోబడి వుండకుండా ఉల్లంఘించే వ్యక్తిని నేరస్థుడుగా పరిగణించడమనేది విస్మందేహంగా ఋజువైంది. అట్టి వ్యక్తి తన సామాజిక వ్యతిరేకచర్యం మూలంగా చట్టాలనుపరించే మానవులకు కష్టాలు, సమస్యలు కలుగ జేస్తాడు. కాకపోతే అతడు అన్ని విధాల సమాజసభ్యుడే. సభ్యుడుగా అతనికి అన్ని హక్కులను, సౌఖ్యాలను అనుభవించే అర్హత వుంది. కాబట్టి చట్టవ్యతిరేక

ప్రవర్తన నుండి బయటపడిన మరుక్షణం అతడు మామూలు జీవితం గడపటానికి మార్గమేర్పడుతుంది. నిజంగా ఇదే సమాజంలో, నేరస్థునికి గల స్థానం. శాస్త్రీయంగా చూస్తే, నేరస్థుడి బయోకల్చరల్ మేకప్ లో ఎటువంటి పెనువైదిగ్యం వుండదు. ముందే చెప్పినట్లు మానవమితి అనేది ఒక నేరం జరిగిన స్థలంలో ఆధారాలపరిమితిని బట్టి నేరపరిధిలో వ్యక్తి ఆచూకీ (ఆనవాలు) తెలిపే ఒక శాస్త్రీయ సాధనం. కాని, ఇలా దొరికిన ఆధారాలను బలపరుస్తూ అనేక రకాలైన జీవశాస్త్ర, జీవశాస్త్రీయ ఆధారాలు కూడ దొరకాలి. కాబట్టి మానవమితి పద్ధతి ఒక్కటే ఆధారం అనటానికి వీలేదు. పైనున్న అనేది ఇటువంటి పద్ధతుల ద్వారా సమాజంలో శాంతి భద్రతలు కాపాడటానికి ఉపయోగపడుతుంది. ప్రభుత్వ యంత్రాంగం న్యాయం చేకూర్చడంలో, ప్రజల మనస్సులలో వలెన నమ్మకం, సామరస్యం ఏర్పడేటట్లు చేయడమే కాక, తగిన విధంగా వారికి రక్షణ కల్పించటంలోను, అట్టి సమయాల్లో ప్రజలు తీసుకోవలసిన జాగ్రత్తలను గురించి, నేరాణ్విషయాలలో శాస్త్రమెంతో ఉపయోగపడుతుంది.

వ్యక్తిని గుర్తించడానికి సజీవుడైన మానవుని దేహం, అస్థిపంజర కొలతల ద్వారా మొట్టమొదటిసారి మానవమితి ఒక శాస్త్రీయ పద్ధతిగా France లో Alphonse Bertillon 1879 లో ప్రవేశ పెట్టాడు. సజీవ మానవులలో నిలబడి వున్నప్పుడు, కూర్చున్నప్పుడు, ఎత్తుకొలతలు, పై భాగము మీది కొలతలు, ముందు భాగంలో మొండెము పై లీనియర్ కొలతలు, మొండెము వెడల్పు, లోతు, శరీర బాహ్య ఎగువ దిగువ అవయవాలపై కొలతలు, చుట్టు కొలతలు, చర్మపుముడుతల కొలతలు, తల-కొలతలు, ఎత్తు, కోణాలు మొదలగునవి తీసుకొంటారు. Somatoscopic పద్ధతి ద్వారా శరీర భంగిమ, మెడ, వుదరం, పిరుదులు, వేళ్ళతోసహా బాహ్య అవయవాలు, గోళ్ళు, చర్మం రంగు, వెంట్రుకలు, తల, ముఖం, దవడలు, కళ్ళు, ముక్కు, పెదవులు, దంతాలు, క్రింది దొడ, చెవి, మొదలైన శారీరక భాగలక్షణాలను పరిశీలిస్తారు. అలాగే అస్థిపంజరపు కపాలం, పొడవు ఎముకల లక్షణాలను పరిశీలించడమే కాకుండా వాటి మీద వీలైనన్ని కొలతలు కూడా తీసుకొంటారు. వీటి నుండి లెక్కించిన అనేక సూచికలు జాతి వర్గీకరణకు తోడ్పడుతాయి. వివిధ రకాలైన ఆస్పత్రుల లాంటి సంస్థలలోనూ, కుటుంబాలవద్ద లభించే సంఖ్యా పూర్వక విషయాలు, వ్యక్తిగత పత్రాల ద్వారా లభించే ప్రమాణాలతో వీటిని పోల్చి ఒక నిర్ధారణకు రావచ్చు.

వ్యక్తిని గుర్తుపట్టుటలో నిమగ్నమైన విపుణునికి తగిన శిక్షణ, నేర్పు, సమర్థతలు, తులనాత్మక శరీరనిర్మాణశాస్త్రము, అస్థిశాస్త్రం, కపాలమితి, అస్థిమితి, జాతిస్వరూపాత్మకాలలో తగిన అనుభవముండాలి. అస్థిపంజర లింగభేదాన్ని కనుగొనడానికి వివిధ రకాలైన సూచికలున్నాయి.

కపాలంలో మామూలైన లింగభేద లక్షణాలు:

దాని సాధారణ పరిమాణము, నిర్మాణము (architecture), అధికోటరకటనలు (supraorbital ridges), గోస్తనకీలితాలు (mastoid processes), అనుకపాలాస్థిభాగము (occipital area), లలాటకుద్యాస్థికంభాలు (frontal, parietal eminences), నేత్రాలు (orbits), నుదురు (forehead), దౌడ ఎముకలు (cheek bones), కిందిదౌడ (అధోహనువు) (mandible), అంగిలి పరిమాణము - ఆకారము (palate size & shape), అనుకపాలాస్థికందాలు, (occipital condyles), దంతాలు బయటికి వచ్చుట - నిర్మితి (dental eruption & morphology) మొదలైనవి. కపాలపర అస్థిపంజరంలో మాత్రము శ్రోణ్యస్థిలో చాలా ముఖ్యమైన లక్షణాలు లింగభేదాన్ని సూచిస్తాయి. అట్టి లక్షణాల వ్యత్యాసాలు, శ్రోణ్యస్థి మొత్తము నుండి ప్రత్యేక లక్షణాల వరకు వున్నవి. అవి, సంధానము (symphysis), ఉపజఘనాస్థికాంశము (subpubic angle), శ్రోణిరంధ్రము (obturator foramen), ఉదూఖలము (acetabulum), greater sciatic notch, ఆసనాస్థి - జఘనాస్థిరేమై (ischiopubic rami), త్రిక-శ్రోణిసంధి (sacro-iliac articulation), preauricular sulcus, శ్రోణి (ilium), త్రికము (sacrum), శ్రోణి brim (pelvic brim), నిజమైన శ్రోణి (true pelvis), పొడవు ఎముకలు, కపాలేతర అస్థిపంజర అస్థిమితి కొలతలు నియమించిన వ్యత్యాసాలు, ప్రమాణాలలో లింగభేదాన్ని కనుగొనటానికి వర్తిస్తాయి. అట్టివాటిలో robustness నే కాక, గరిష్ఠమైన పొడవు, తలపై వుదరం వైపు అడ్డుకొలతలు, బరువు కూడ ఈ అధ్యయన పరిధిలోకి తీసుకోవాలి. సాధారణంగా పురుషుల ఎముకలు స్త్రీల ఎముకల కంటే పొడవుగా, లావుగా వుంటాయని తెలిసిందే.

మానవ వయస్సుపై యౌవనదశ వరకు పెరుగుదల, వికాససంబంధమైన లక్షణాలు, కౌమారవార్ధక్యదశల వరకు నశింపజేయు మార్పుల ప్రభావముంటుంది. బ్రతికిన వాళ్ళలో వయోనిర్ణయము పుట్టిన శిశువులలో పొడవు ఎముకల సగటు పొడవుల పరిమాణాల ద్వారానూ, చిన్నపిల్లలలో 15 సం.లు వయస్సు వరకు, పాలదంతాలు వచ్చుట, అస్థికేంద్రాలు కనిపించుట, వేర్వేరు కశేరుకాల భాగాల కలయిక చేతనూ, 18 సం.ల వయస్సు పిల్లల్లో మొట్టమొదటి శాశ్వత దంతము వచ్చుటయే కాక మిశ్రమదంత విన్యాసము కన్పించుటచేతనూ, 25 సం.ల వరకు ఎదిగిన యుక్త వయస్సులో ఎముకల epiphysialలు కాండముతో కలయుట చేతనూ, 45 సం.ల వరకున్న మానవులలో కపాలసూదనముల మాపు, ముఖ్యంగా ఉర్రోభాగపు సూదనము మాపు, జత్రుక మధ్య భాగపు కొనతో సహా పొడవు ఎముకల కొన్ని ముఖ్యమైన పెరిగే భాగాల epiphysial స్కోర్లు, శ్రోణిశిఖరం, త్రికపుకీలులో విభేదములచేతనూ, దంతాల

అరుగుదల, ఎముకల పలుచనైన భాగమై క్రోస్కోపిక్ పరిక్షలో కనబడు osteone ల సంఖ్య, పరిధి సంబంధమైన lamellar ఎముక శాతాలు, haversian కాలువల సంఖ్య చేతనూ చేస్తారు. అంసఫలకములు, చేతిఎముకలు, పాదాస్థికల లక్షణాలు కూడ వయస్సును నిర్ణయించటంలో తోడ్పడతాయి.

మానవ కోటిని Caucasoid, Mongoloid, Negroid జాతులుగా విభజించటంలో కపాలనిర్మితి వర్ణన, స్వాభావిక లక్షణాలపై ఆధారపడి వుంటుంది. అందుకు తోడ్పడు కొన్ని ముఖ్య లక్షణాలు, కపాలం పొడవు, వెడల్పు, ఎత్తు, ముఖం వెడల్పు, ఎత్తు, నేత్రనాసికా రంధ్రాలు, నాసిక క్రింద అంచు, సమాయత ఆకారము, ముఖాకృతి, అంగిలి ఆకారము, సాధరణంగా కపాలముండే మానవాకృతి నిర్ణయంలో పొడవు ఎముకల కొలతలు, గణితశాస్త్ర పద్ధతుల ద్వారా చేసే regression equation లు, multiplication factor లను ఉపయోగిస్తారు. అయితే ఇవి పరిమాణాలున్న జనసముదాయానికి మాత్రమే వర్తిస్తాయి. ముఖనిర్ణయంలో తలను కపాలం నుండి కనుగొనడమే కాక కపాలాన్ని చనిపోయిన స్వంతదారుని portrait లు, ఫోటోలతో పోల్చాలి. ఈ పద్ధతిని కొన్ని ఫోటోలమీద తీసిన మానవమితి కొలతలను కపాలముఖం మీది వాటితో పోల్చి చూడటం ద్వారా మెరుగు పరచవచ్చును. ఫోటోలు, కపాల నెగిటివ్ ప్లేట్లను, (negative plates), superimposition పద్ధతి నుపయోగించి పోల్చడం కూడ ఇటీవల చాలా ఉపయోగకరమైందిగా తేలింది.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aschaffenburg, G. 1913 *Crime and its Repression*.
 Bullock, Henry A. 1955 'Urban homicide in theory and fact', *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, 45 : 565-575.
 Curry, Manfred 1948 'The relationship of health condition, facial characteristics and crime', *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, 39 : 253-261.
 East, W. Norwood 1946 'Physical factors in criminal behaviour', *Journal of Clinical Psychopathy*, 8 : 7-36.
 Goring, Charles 1913 *The English Convict*.
 Hajnis, Karel 1979 'Some remarks in the development and use of anthropometric methods', in: *Methods of Functional Anthropology - Universities Carolina Pragenesis*, pp. 27-30
 Hooton, E.A. 1939a *Crime and the Man*. Cambridge : Harvard University Press.

- Hooton, E.A. 1939b *The American Criminal: An Anthropological Study*. Cambridge : Harvard University Press.
- Lange, Johannes 1919 *Crime and Destiny*.
- La Roche, E. and Louis Tilley 1956 'Weather and crime in Tallahassee', *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, 47 : 218-219.
- Mehendale 1955 'Physical environment and adolescent crime', *Indian Journal of Social Work*, 3(16) : 146-152.
- Mills, C.A. 1934 'Suicide and homicide in their relation to weather changes', *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 91 : 669-677.
- Merton, R.K. and M.F.A. Montagu 1940 'Crime and the anthropologist', *American Anthropologist*, 42 : 384-408.
- Montagu, M.F.A. 1941 'The biologist looks at crime', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 217 : 46-57.
- Nath, Surinder, Neeru Duggal and N. Satish Chandra 1987 'Stature estimation through percutaneous lengths of ulna and tibia among Lodhas of district Midnapore, West Bengal', *Indian Journal of Forensic Sciences*, 1(2) : 67-74.
- Penrose, L.S. 1955 'Genetics and the criminal', *British Journal of Delinquency*, 1(6) : 15-25.
- Rasch, P.J. 1947 'Red hair and outlawry', *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, 38 : 352-357.
- Rosanoff, A.J., Leva M. Handy and Isabel A. Rosanoff 1941 'Etiology behaviour difficulties, delinquency and adult criminality', *Psychiatric Monographs*, No. 1, California : Department of Institutions.
- Singh, I.P. and M.K. Bhasin 1989 *Anthropometry: A Laboratory Manual on Biological Anthropology*, Delhi : Kamla-raj Enterprises.
- Sutherland, E.H. and D.R. Cressey 1968 *Principles of Criminology*. Newyork : J.P. Lippincott Company.

- Timasheff, N.S. 1941 'The revival of criminal anthropology', *University of Kansas Law Review*, 9 : 91-100.
- Tucker, William H. 1940 'Is there evidence of a physical basis for criminal behaviour', *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, 31 : 427-437.
- Wallerstein, James S. and Clement J. Wyle 1947 'Biological inferiority as a cause of delinquency' *Nervous Child*, 6 : 476-472.

REVIEWS

ŚIVA TEMPLE AND TEMPLE RITUAL, ed. S.S. Janaki, The Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, Mylapore, Madras 1988. Pp. xxvi + 208. Price Rs.50=00.

The Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute (KSRI), Madras, organized a seminar on Śiva Temple and Temple Ritual in 1983 and invited scholars of Āgama literature, Śivācāryas (hereditary priests of Śiva temples) and *sthapatis* (traditional temple architects and sculptors) to participate in it, thus providing for a balanced synthesis between the theory as laid down in the Āgamas and its practice in temple construction and worship. The proceedings of this seminar are now brought out in this volume under review. Of the nine papers contained in this volume, seven are in English and two in Tamil, a welcome innovation being that each article in English is accompanied by a fairly long summary in Tamil and vice versa.

In his "Development of Temple Ritual in India" (pp 24-45), N.R. Bhatt, after making a broad survey of the Āgamic literature and its subdivisions, argues that temple worship was as old as the fifth century B.C. as it is mentioned in the great epics, Ṛgṣa-sūtras and Dharma-sūtras. Originally, however, the Vedic and the Āgamic traditions developed as two independent currents but the latter gradually began to attune itself to the former. Bhatt then discussed in great detail the various types of rites performed in the temple.

Wayne Surdam's cogently argued essay focuses attention on the "Vedicisation of Śaiva Ritual" (52-60). The core rites of the temple worship were non-Vedic in origin and were not accompanied by the recitation of Vedic hymns but today the most prestigious temple rituals are marked by elaborate recitations from the *Veda*. One wishes, however, that Surdam had tried to trace this development historically and examined when the trend of 'Vedicisation' started and under what social/religious compulsions. Surdam goes on to observe that in spite of this large degree of Vedicisation the chief goal of the Āgamic rites remains unchanged, a goal that does not find expression in Vedic literature or ritual. The Āgamic goal is two-fold: "in the personal worship, the transformation of the worshipper into Śiva, or as the texts describe it, the attainment of the quality of Śiva by the worshipper; in the worship performed in the temple for the sake of others, the showering of Śiva's grace onto the community at large, ultimately for the same transformational goal" (p.60).

Vedic tradition, as expounded by Manu, looks down upon the priests who officiate at temple worship for a consideration. This disdainful attitude is still shared by the orthodox. But in the Āgamic tradition, the performer of the rites at the temple has a central position; for it is he who invokes Śiva's grace on the community. This form of worship is known as *parārtha-pūjā*, as distinct from the *ātmārtha-pūjā*, i.e. worship conducted at home for one's own benefit. R. Subramaniam's "Parārtha Pūjā" (English Abstract, pp. 76-78) discusses the rites that constitute this mode of worship.

On special occasions like the installation of the icon, consecration of the temple and the like, elaborate rites are performed, not inside the temple proper but in the *yāgaśālā*, a temporary shed erected within the precincts of the temple. S.P. Sabarathinam's paper deals with "The Construction and the Concept of the Yāgaśālā" (pp. 79-88), while Sabharathnam Śivācārya's contribution "Temple Festivals" (English Abstract, pp 108-111) describes two types of festivals, viz. *Mahotsava* and *Pavitrotsava*, the latter being expiatory in nature.

V. Ganapathi Sthapati, Principal of the Government College for Traditional Temple Architecture and Sculpture at Mamallipuram, deals with the "Symbolism of the Vimāna and Gopura"

(pp. 112-118), i.e. the central shrine and the lofty entrance-gate of the temple. In Āgama literature, the temple is conceived as a human body. The vertical structural parts of the *vimāna* are likened to the limbs of an erect person, or the horizontal layout of the temple complex to a recumbent person; then the *gopura* with the *kalāśa* atop corresponds to the feet and toes, and the *garbhagrha* to the head. These correspondences are explained with the help of fine drawings. Beyond these relationships, the *sthapatis* postulate another kind of symbolism: the *gopura* represents the gross body and *vimāna* the subtle body.

Regional variation is the theme of D. Appukuttan's paper which shows how "Śiva Temple Worship in Kerala" (pp. 1-21) does not follow the Śaiva Āgamas or the Vedic Saṃhitās but a special amalgam of the two as laid down in texts like the *Tantrasamuccaya*, *Śeṣasamuccaya* and *Īśānagurudevapaddhati*.

In "Cinna Meḷam or Dāsi Āṭṭam" (pp 194-204), Saskia Kersenboom-Story studies the role of the Devadāsī in temple worship. The musical performances that form part of temple ritual are of two kinds: the major concert with Nāgasvaram and allied instruments and the minor concert (*cinna meḷam*) with the female dancer Devadāsī and her accompanists. Kersenboom-Story traces these two kinds of music to two types of poetry of the Saṅgam period; *puram*, the exterior and heroic poetry comparable to *tāṇḍava* in dance and *akam*, the erotic and emotional poetry which deals with the inner life of man and which has its parallel in the *lāsya* type of dance. The former, once again, is the central motif of the dance performed on special occasions like the *utsavas*, while *bhakti-śṛṅgāra* is the motif of the dance performed by the Devadāsī as part of the daily (*nitya*) rites. Here too, especially the *pūjā* at dusk is the one rite which is accompanied by the Devadāsī's song and dance. The article explains the details about the songs and dance meant for various occasions, notably the *Brahmotsava* - information painstakingly gathered by the author from practicing Devadāsīs.

Thus the volume addresses itself to a number of interesting issues of Śaiva temple ritual, but occasionally the contributions tend to become repetitive, just enumerating the names of diverse rites with little interpretation or analysis. Since *nyāsa*, infusion of the godhead into the icon, forms the central act of the Āgamic

worship, a detailed study of this aspect deserved inclusion. Likewise, occasional comparison with Vaiṣṇava Āgamas could have been rewarding.

Nevertheless, one must commend the efforts behind the seminar and the volume that resulted from it. It is indeed gratifying that the KSRI is providing a forum for the dialogue that is so essential between the indologists and the repositories of traditional knowledge.

Mention must, however, be made of two jarring notes, one minor and the other more substantial. The table of contents (p. xx) describes the articles presented in this volume as "research papers". It is, of course, expected that articles considered worthy of publication by an institute of eminence like the KSRI are based on solid research; even so "research paper" is a neologism coined by some juvenile mind and should best be avoided by mature academics.

The second concerns the questionable urge to seek legitimacy for matters spiritual from modern science or from its alleged homeland America. Otherwise, how does one explain the following sentences in this volume?

A hillock in America reveals a hill called Śiva. This is precious evidence of the ancient people of America being Śiva-worshippers. Many more evidences of Śiva temples, in places such as Columbia, Peru, Bolivia, Colorado, etc., have been found (p. xiv).

The concept of Naṭarāja and the symbolism which it incorporates are something transcendental, particularly when viewed in the light of modern atomic science (p. xxiv).

Nobody would think it necessary to explain, in terms of modern science, Kālidāsa's *Meghadūta* or the delicate scent of the Śirīṣa that wafts in summer evenings, each in its own way an emanation of the divine. Why then throw the light of atomic science - whatever that is - on Naṭarāja? This reviewer would submit that the proper

light to view Natarāja in is, if not the inner light, that which is provided by an oil lamp.

- S.R. Sarma

* * * * *

M. WINTERNITZ, KLEINE SCHRIFTEN. Ed. Horst Brinkhaus, 2 parts, (*Glasenapp Stiftung, Band 30*), Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 1991. Pt. I: pp xxvi+464; Pt. II: pp.xvii+465-968. Price DM 168.

After Max Müller, the most well known German Indologist in this country has been Moriz Winternitz whose *Geschichte der indischen Litterateur* remains even today quite unrivalled in its grand sweep of all important primary source together with an enormous corpus of secondary literature, and in the clarity with which the chronology of each significant text is settled, its contents narrated and a proper evaluation is made.

Born in 1863 at Horn in Lower Austria, Winternitz studied Indology at Vienna. After securing his Ph.D., he went to Oxford in 1888 as Max Müller's assistant and helped in preparation of the second revised edition of the *R̥gveda* with Sāyaṇa's commentary. For some time he was also the librarian of the India Institute at Oxford. In 1899 he was appointed Associate Professor of Indology and Ethnology at the University of Prague, where he became a full Professor in 1911. On the invitation of Rabindranath Tagore, he visited Santiniketan in 1922 and spent a year there as Visiting Professor. The English translation of his *History of Indian Literature* (vol. I, part 1) was dedicated to Rabindranath. He retired from the University of Prague in 1934 and passed away in 1937.

The book under review contains, in about a thousand pages, some of his minor writings, i.e. articles and book-reviews, and is published by the Helmuth von Glasenapp Foundation as No.30 of the series of *Kleine Schriften* of eminent German Indologists. There are some 67 articles and 12 book reviews collected in this volume. Some of these are in English, but the majority are in German. Though interested in almost all areas of Indology - the editor classifies these writings into 13 sections ranging from the *Veda* to modern India - Winternitz was specially attracted towards the

Mahābhārata and the *Pañcatantra*. Several articles and reviews in this collection are devoted to these two texts. In a lecture delivered at Santiniketan ("The *Mahābhārata*", part I, pp. 391-408), Winternitz states:

...no history of human thought, no history of religion, can ever be complete without the history of Indian religious and philosophical thought. And if the Veda gives us the most valuable information about the earliest stages of the development of Indian thought, the *Mahābhārata* is a very mine of information for almost all the later stages in this development.

Therefore, Winternitz made a proposal, as early as 1899, in the Indian section of the XII International Congress of Orientalists at Rome, for the formation of a Sanskrit Epic Text Society which would prepare a critical edition of the *Mahābhārata*. Again and again he pleaded for a critical edition, especially of the southern recension (I.409). But somehow the Sanskrit Epic Text Society never got started. Later on, when V.S. Sukthankar brought out the critical edition of the *Ādiparvan* from Poona, Winternitz greeted its publication in a lengthy review (I. 420-435) as: "the most important event in the history of Sanskrit philology since the publication of Max Müller's edition of *R̥gveda* with Sāyaṇa's commentary." Other articles in this volume discuss the southern recension (I. 286-328; 365-370), the connection between the *Mahābhārata* and the plays of Bhāsa (II.793-807) and so on.

Likewise, Winternitz's interest in the *kāvya* and *kathā* literature is reflected in a number of articles. Notable are his masterly reviews of the editions of the *Pañcatantra* by Johannes Hertel (II.700-710) and Franklin Edgerton (II. 823-830).

The volume also contains obituaries in which Winternitz pays scholarly homage to Georg Bühler, Friedrich Max Müller, Albrecht Weber and Alfred Ludwig (II. 833-918; 928-933). One does not, however, see the appropriateness of including here bibliographies of Max Müller (II.875-882) and Ludwig (II. 920-927). Though compiled by Winternitz, the proper place for these bibliographies would be the volumes devoted to the writings of the respective scholars.

As in the other volumes of this series, the editorial and production standards are excellent. There is an exhaustive bibliography of Winternitz's writings in the first part. The second part contains a general index, index of citations, index of words discussed (935-967).

— S.R. Sarma

* * * * *

A SURVEY OF THE ŚUKLAYAJURVEDA PARÍŚIṢṬAS. By C.G. Kashikar. Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona. 1994. *Pandit Shripadshastri Deodhar Memorial Lectures* (series fourth). Post-Graduate and Research Department Series No. 38. Pp. v+71.

Perhaps for perpetuation of the Vedic ritual tradition handed down through different recensions, amalgamation and accumulation of the Vedic ritual became inevitable by way of supplementation to match with the evolution of different philosophical schools. So besides the established Kalpasūtra texts, many appendixes sprang up with different names like *vedalakṣaṇa* and *pariśiṣṭa*. As the learned Vedic exponent C.G. Kashikar observes a *pariśiṣṭa* may mean a portion bearing the same character as that of the original, or a part of the original in the tradition or a portion of ritual which took place in course of time by reasons of changed cultural, social and economic circumstances. The *pariśiṣṭas* may deal with the language, *śrauta* rituals, *grhya* rituals and *dharma-śāstra*.

The book under review is a series of lectures delivered by C.G. Kashikar in the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute in 1993 on the *pariśiṣṭas* of the *Śuklayajurveda*. He has collected information from many unpublished manuscripts and given a comprehensive survey and current status of the *pariśiṣṭa* literature with special reference to the *Śuklayajurveda*.

Kashikar dealt with the *pariśiṣṭas* by dividing them into five groups according to their content as follows:

1. *Parīśiṣṭas* discussing the form and language: *Pratijñā I*, *Pratijñā II*, *Caraṇavyūha*, *Anuvākasamkhyā*, *Rgyājuṣa*, *Śuklayajurvedaprātiśākhya*, *Sarvānukrama*, *Yājñavalkyaśikṣā*.

2. *Parīṣiṣṭas* describing the Śrauta rituals: *Yūpalakṣaṇa*, *Chāgalakṣaṇa*, *Kūrmalakṣaṇa* *Sulbasūtra*, *Hautrika*, *Mūlyādhyāya*, *Iṣṭakāpūrṇa*, *Pravarādhyāya*, *Kratusaṃkhyā*.
3. *Parīṣiṣṭas* dealing with the Śrauta and Gṛhya rites: *Yajñapārśva*, *Nigama*, *Mantrabhrāntiharasūtra*.
4. *Parīṣiṣṭas* discussing the Gṛhya rituals: *Uñchaśāstra*, *Śrāddhasūtra*, *Śuklayajurvedhānasūtra*.
5. The *Parīṣiṣṭas* discussing a topic of *Dharmaśāstra*: *Prasavottthāna*.

These *parīṣiṣṭas* belong to a period from 4th century A.D. to 16th century A.D. The author has provided useful information regarding the status of each text, contents and utility in comparison with similar works in other Vedic recensions. He also observes that some of the works need to be edited, reedited and published like the *Pratijñā II*, *Kratusaṃkhyā* and *Nigama*.

* * * * *

GOPURASANDEŚAH (*anyakhaṇḍakṛtayaś ca*) [Sanskrit]. [By] Bommakaṇṭi Śrīnivāsācāryaḥ. Kalyani Prachuranalu, 1-9-34/5/1, Ramnagar, Hyderabad - 500 048. Pp. 58. Price: Rs. 30=00.

The *Gopurasandēśa* is a collection of fourteen tiny Sanskrit poems of sublime exquisiteness assorted from the writings of Bommakaṇṭi Śrīnivāsācārya, an ardent idealist, a versatile critic, an erudite scholar and a gifted poet in Telugu. The fourteen pieces of poetry with distinction in theme and identity in destination vouch the author's longing for a strifeless religious society. The book opens with the poem entitled *Gopurasandēśaḥ*, describing the initiation ceremony of the *Aṣṭākṣarī-mantra* to the masses gathered around Śrī Rāmānuja, the founder of the Philosophical school of Viśiṣṭādvaita, for their liberation from grief and cycle of birth and death at his own peril. Śrī Rāmānuja received the initiation of the *mantra* from Tirukkottiyūrnambi at Goṣṭhīpura (Tirukkottiyur) with a promise that it would not be revealed to any body, by betraying which the revealed would go to the heaven and the revealer to the hell. Rāmānuja preferred to go to the hell alone

than to keep the mantra a secret. So he climbed the *gopura* of the temple at Tirukkottiyur and divulged it in the public. There is another poem *Satyaśāyigītā*, a metrical rendering of the message of the contemporary saint Śrī Satya Śāyī of Puttaparti who is rendering yeomen service to the community besides prophesying a harmonious Hindu society. In the same strain he sung in glory of Kālidāsa, Jayadeva, Harṣa, Rabindranath Tagore, Rejendra Prasad, Śrīśrī and V. Raghavan. All these poems were either read in the All India Radio or published in periodicals.

Srinivasacharyulu deserves all admiration for his genius for poetry and progressive ideas. The Sanskrit rendering of the Telugu verses of the Progressive writer Śrīśrī is a glorious masterpiece in this collection, vouching the poet's idealism for modernity against the background of antiquity. The delectable poem *Vasantatilakam* describing the mystic charms of the spring season is a relief from monotony

* * * * *

NEW LIGHT ON THE DATE OF THE ṚGVEDA. By N.R. Waradpande. Sanskrit Bhasha Pracharini Sabha, 38, Hindustan Colony, Amravati Road, Nagpur - 440 010. 1994. Pp.8+42.

THE ṚGVEDIC SOMA. By N.R. Waradpande. Sanskrit Bhasha Pracharini Sabha, Nagpur, 1995. Pp. viii+48. Price: Rs.50=00.

N.R. Waradpande attempts in his monograph *New light on the date of the Ṛgveda*, to arrive at the date of the composition of the *Ṛgveda* as 4000 B.C. on the basis of the astronomical data gleaned from the *Ṛgveda*, mythology, and archaeological survivals. He opines that the Vedic Aryans were able to observe the moving zodiac and determine the division of time according to the precession of the equinoxes. Thus according to him the words *simha* (RV. 5.83.3; 9.89.3), *vṛṣabha* (RV. 3.39.3; 6.47.5), *kanyā* (RV. 6.49.7) refer to the constellations (*rāsis*) *Simha*, *Vṛṣabha* and *Kanyā* respectively, *arjuni* (RV. 5.84.1-2) and *śukra* (RV. 6.47.5) refer to the months *Phalgunī* and *Jyeṣṭhā*, and *saha* in *sahasya* (RV. 7.55.7) refers to the winter season. Śāyana did not interpret these words in the astronomical sense. So the author justifies the propriety of his opinion on the basis of the interpretation of the verses in

the given context. Thus today's astronomical calculations of the calendar can be equated with the contemporary calendar at the time of the composition of the *R̥gveda* by taking into account the rearward precession of the vernal equinox.

Thus the hymns RV. 5.83.3 and 5.89.3 were composed in the month of Bhādrapada of the rainy season (*Varsartu*) when the sun was in the Siṃharāsi at the sunrise. Similarly the Vaiśākha month in the Spring season occurred when the sun at sunrise was in the Meṣarāsi. Similarly "at the time of the *R̥gveda* the *Vṛṣabha rasi* appeared at sunrise in the season of spring in the month of *Jyeṣṭha* (p. 19)." Thus Vernal equinox fell some time in *Jyeṣṭha*. Thus all the data correlated leads for e.g. the verse RV. 8.93.1 was composed in the year 3984 B.C. Therefore the date of the *R̥gveda* can be fixed at 4000 B.C.

Incidentally he also holds that 3701 B.C. as the date of Rāma of the *Rāmāyaṇa* and 3101 B.C. as the date of the *Mahābhārata* war.

In the *R̥gvedic Soma*, Waradpande has highlighted with great ingenuity three interesting issues, namely, 1) repudiation of the mushroom and urine theory of Richard Wasson, 2) identification of Soma as hemp-plant, and its three products, hemp-juice (*vaṃśu*), marijuana and hashish (charas), and 3) interpretation of the *R̥gvedic mantras* referring to Soma.

Even though the *R̥gveda* is a fully protected document available not only in India but also in Europe, many of its words remain obscure regarding their derivation and denotation for want of adequate knowledge of the contemporary society. Patañjali, the grammarian of second century B.C. records that even during his time at least some of the Vedic words were considered to be obscure. Sāyaṇa's interpretations were also doubted by the Western as well as Indian scholars. These inquiries should continue as they are made with a view to obtain a best possible picture of the remote past by availing the contemporary scientific knowledge.

Richard Wasson has come forward, on the basis of RV. 9.97.33 and 8.4.10, with a theory in the light of non-Vedic Siberian practice that the Soma plant was a non-Āryan mushroom without roots, branches, leaves, flowers, seeds and that the urine of the sage who

had drunk Soma was consumed by the Vedic Ṛṣis. Waradpande ingeniously argues that the Soma plant was an indigenous Indian plant with roots, branches, leaves, resin on the leaves and flowers on the basis of the hymns RV. 10.85.3; 9.86.46; 9.5.1; 9.25.2; 9.38.2; 9.67.11; 9.61.13; 9.70.1 and so on. He demonstrates that all these verses can be interpreted as referring to both the Soma plant and the Moon, and the adjectives referring to them can be interpreted accordingly. The descriptive characteristics of the Soma plant and the physio-psychological effects caused on consumption of the Soma can be compared with the contemporary knowledge about the intoxicating drugs hemp, marijuana and hashish. The leaf (*patra* of the hemp plant is called *bhaṅgā* (Hindi *bhāṅg*), the flower (*puṣpamañjarī*) *gañjā* and the resin (*nīryāsa*) *caras*. Because of its medicinal qualities it is also called *vījayā*, *jayā* and *mātulāni* and because of intoxicating qualities it is called *bhaṅgā*, *mādinī* and *gañjā*. He concludes that Soma was nothing but *bhaṅgā* 'hemp' and it was consumed by the Vedic Āryans in three ways, as a hemp-juice (*soma-rasa*) by drinking, the flowers of hemp known as marijuana by smoking and the resin on leaves known as hashish by smoking.

The monographs under review shall certainly provoke interest among the Indologists to reexamine several issues regarding the home land and culture of the Vedic Āryans.

* * * * *

THE PRECESSION.[By] John J. Stanley. Vantage Press Inc., 516 West 34th Street, New York N.Y. 10001, USA, 1995. Pp. 6+69. Price: \$ 12.95.

Speculations on the history of human civilization on the basis of astronomical data obtained in mythology are very interesting even though the linguistic and other evidences betray. For example several Indologists tried to determine the date of the *Veda* on the basis of the astronomical references in the *Ṛgveda*. Here in the present monograph *The Precession*, John J. Stanley describes the activity of the man on this universe starting from 21,600 B.C. to 2042 A.D. on the basis of Greek mythology. He tries to interpret the mythology with the application of modern astronomical science.

Stanley presumes that the age of Capricorn started with 21,660 B.C. Taking into account the rearward precession of the equinox, the ages of Sagittarius (19,508 B.C.), Scorpio (17,350 B.C.), Libra (15,200 B.C.), Virgo (13,043 B.C.), Leo (10,888 B.C.), Cancer (8733 B.C.), Gemini (6578 B.C.), Taurus (4423 B.C.), Aries (2,268 B.C.), Pisces (113 B.C.) and Aquarius (2042 A.D.). On the basis of the significative characteristics of the rulers of each constellation, the age is named and the man's activity is described. For example the constellation Capricorn is presided over by Saturn and hence it is earthy age and 'the man may have begun to build his own shelter and channel or collect water'. Aquarius is the present constellation. The coming years will be governed by Uranus and Saturn. So it is predicted that science, electronics, automobiles, stock market, farming, houses, irrigation, bridges, occult arts like astrology and palmistry flourish.

The monograph calls forth for comparative study of the occult arts and fine arts besides mythologies of different countries to understand the cultural heritage in a wider perspective.

* * * * *

THE RĀMĀYAṆA IN TELUGU AND TAMIL - A COMPARATIVE STUDY. By C.R. Sarma. Author, 5/519. Thiruvalluvar Street, Sadasiva Nagar, Madurai-625020. 2nd edn. 1994 (1st 1973). Pp. 9+177. Price: Rs. 50=00.

The monograph under review is the second edition of the thesis of Challa Radhakrishna Sarma. The Rāmāyaṇa theme underwent several modifications and changes in the hands of known and unknown authors through adaptations, interpolations and translations, which are necessitated to bring the ancient to contemporaneity, for every author of social commitment tries to connect the past with the present and reinforce faith among the readers in the uninterrupted tradition. For a researcher the study of different versions provides a comprehensive vision of the social change both in isolation and in aggregation, thus suggesting the future course of action a cultured man could plan. Thus comparative study of literatures is as much significant as the comparative study of religions and philosophies.

In the present monograph Sarma has compared *Rāmāyaṇas* of *Raṅganātha* (13th or 14th cent.) and *Kamba* (9th or 10th cent.) in Telugu and Tamil respectively against the background of the *Vālmīki-Rāmāyaṇa* in Sanskrit. The identity and difference of the stories or details which are found in the translations and not found in the Sanskrit source show unity in diversity in South India. The author has shown that the *Kamba-Rāmāyaṇa* stresses more on universal brotherhood while the *Raṅganātha-Rāmāyaṇa* glorifies the value of receiving blessings of the god through devotion.

A comprehensive comparative study of translation of the *Vālmīki-Rāmāyaṇa* in all languages is a desideratum for the understanding of cultural epochs India passed through. Dr. Sarma deserves approbation for pioneering such a work in seventies of this century.

* * * * *

A TRANSCULTURAL APPROACH TO SANSKRIT POETICS.

By C. Rajendran. Author, Professor of Sanskrit, University of Calicut, Calicut University P.O., 673635. 1994. Pp. 6+110. Price: Rs. 60=00.

Rajendran has enthusiastically taken up to study the similarities and differences between Indian and Western aesthetics, falling in line with K.C. Pandey, Krishna Rayan and many others. In the present monograph he has successfully demonstrated how the *Dhvani* and *Rasa* theories are found expressed in the Western theories of Poetics like the instinct theory of psychologists and ambiguity theory of William Empson. Further the traces of structuralistic and post-structuralistic theories of the west are shown in the Indian poetics. Attempts to structuralize the meaning along with the word form can be found in the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali. But because of the exploitation of ambiguity - an inherent quality of the language - for poetic beauty, a new branch of linguistic interpretation called 'poetics' emerged out side grammar very early around the beginning of the Christian era. The comparative studies in literary and grammatical studies in different languages have proved the concurrence and divergence of ideas without any mutual contacts, for all theoreticians attempt at analysing the human behaviour manifested through linguistic expression.

Even though the present monograph is limited to find the theories of Indian poetics in the theories of the Western poetics and vice versa, it may lead one day to the evolution of hermeneutics of world poetics by amalgamation of different theories without losing sight of human values and phenomenological considerations. This monograph however does not fail to impress upon the readers the need for deeper introspection into the theory of language, besides acquainting with various theories current among theoreticians of the East and the West.

* * * *

1. MRGĀYURVEDA - INDIAN ANIMAL SCIENCE. [By] K. Vijayalakshmi and K.M. Shyam Sundar. Centre for Indian Knowledge Systems, No. 2, 25th East Street, Thiruvannamiyur, Madras-600041. Part I, pp. 7+68, December 1994, price: Rs. 60=00. Part II, pp. 7+72, January 1995, price: Rs. 60=00.
2. TREATMENT FOR POISONS IN TRADITIONAL MEDICINE. [By] K.M. Shyam Sundar, ed. by A.V. Balasubramanian and Ramesh M. Nanal. Centre for Indian Knowledge Systems, July 1996. Pp. 5+66. Price: Rs. 60=00.
3. RTUCARYĀ [Hindi]. Ed. Ramesh M. Nanal and A.V. Balasubramanian. Centre for Indian Knowledge Systems, July 1966. Pp. 7+87. Price: Rs. 50=00.
4. OPHTHALMOLOGY IN TRADITIONAL MEDICINE. [By] K.M. Shyam Sundar, ed. by A.V. Balasubramanian and Ramesh M. Nanal. Centre for Indian Knowledge Systems. November 1996. Pp. 5+58. Price: Rs. 50=00.
5. RTUCARYĀ - ADAPTATION TO THE SEASONS [English]. [By] Ramesh M. Nanal. Tr. from Hindi by A. Sobhana, ed. by A.V. Balasubramanian and Ramesh M. Nanal. Centre for Indian Knowledge Systems, March 1997. Pp. 5+69. Price: Rs. 60=00.
6. PRAKRUTHI - AN AYURVEDIC GUIDE TO HEALTH. [Ed. by] K.M. Shyam Sundar and A.V. Balasubramanian. Centre for Indian Knowledge Systems. July 1997. Pp. 5+65. Price: Rs. 75=00.

Revival of Hindu culture and civilization does not mean obtaining excellence in fine arts and literature but providing a trouble free happy life through the ways and means envisaged in the books of science and literature, and practised traditionally among people. The Āyurveda is one of such subjects which have profound value in keeping the balance of the man, as this medicinal science does not aim at curing a disease but treating the individual by taking into account of the body, mind and soul. The holistic view of the body, mind and soul is demonstrated by the treatment of such topics in Āyurveda like *dinacaryā*, *ṛtucaryā*, *sadvṛttam*, *āhāraavidhi*, *vegadhāraṇa*, *deśa*, *jala*, *vāyu*, *prakāśa*, *malanirharaṇavidhi*, *svāsthyanāśakavṛttis* and *śavasamśkāras*. Here the most important is that unless the mind is treated the man cannot ennoble himself to lofty way of life. This revival is possible by voluntary reformation. So the Centre for Indian Knowledge Systems, Madras has taken a right step to explore the current relevance and application of traditional Indian sciences relating to human health (Āyurveda), animal husbandry (*Mrgāyurveda*) and agriculture (*Vṛkṣāyurveda*), and popularise these ideas among common men and students through short monographs. The value of the monographs is enhanced by the fact that the statements are supported by traditional authorities like Caraka, Suśṛta and Vāgbhaṭa. Thus the efforts of the editors of the series K.M. Shyam Sundar and A.V. Balasubramanian deserve all appreciation.

The two parts of the *Mrgāyurveda* describe the characteristics of cattle, horses, elephants and fowls, their feed, procreation, exercises, diseases and their management. In Part I extensive information is given as to how the cows and buffaloes are to be maintained in good hygiene in the residential areas. The literature annotated in Appendix III of Part II and the manuscripts with miniatures on horses and elephants, as the *Aśvaśāstra* manuscript preserved in S.V.U. Oriental Research Institute Library (Stock No.6837) show the love for animals and their well-being on a par with human beings, besides taming them for useful services. The *Gajagrahaṇaprakāra* of Nārāyaṇa Dikṣita and *Gajaśikṣā* ascribed to Nāradaṃuni with the commentary *Vyaktitippaṇī* of Umāpatyācārya, edited by E.R. Sreekrishna Sarma and published by this Institute in its *S.V.U. Oriental Journal*, vols. 7 (1964) and 18 (1975) respectively are the metrical treatises dealing with

catching and training of elephants. Vijayalakshmi and Shyam Sundar deserve hearty approbation for their rewarding efforts.

The Treatment of Poisons in Traditional Medicine is the first of the series of five monographs entitled "Speciality Areas of Traditional Systems of Medicine". As the editors rightly opine, the practitioners of such medicine fall in the folk-tradition (*lokaparamparā*), as many of them are considered to be outside the Aryan path. But they are very powerful and their experiences are certainly to be exploited for the public cause. Types of *viṣa* 'poison', their substrata, their effects and management of poison are dealt with fairly in detail. Management of bites of snake, scorpion, rat, dog, spider, etc. is explained. Poisons produced by vegetables like *guñja*, *bhallātaka* and *jayapada* and their management are given with their effects. A biographical sketch of some folk practitioners is provided to stress the need for in depth study of the folk traditions.

The *Ṛtucaryā* (Nos. 3 & 5) is an yearly time-table of life-style to be adhered for good health. Along with the change of six seasons recognized by the Indian tradition, the effect of the Sun on the organic and inorganic matter changes demanding a corresponding change in the human behaviour in utilization of the earthly products for good living. Nonsynchronization of the human activity with the activity of the earth leads to disease in the body. So the *ṛtucaryā* is a prescription of dos and don'ts for the human beings to adjust his body and mind with the cosmic action. This monograph provides information as regards the types of foods and drinks which are recommended in each season matching to the manifestation of the *doṣas*. Besides big lists of dietary prescriptions, the evil effects of consuming the forbidden foods are also enumerated. It furnishes all the code of daily routine from awakening up to sleep including exercises and various postures one should practice or avoid as in sleep. This is the third in the series of "Speciality Areas of Traditional Systems of Medicine".

The Ophthalmology in Traditional Medicine is the second in the series of "Speciality Areas of Traditional Systems of Medicine". Anatomy and physiology of the eye, etiological factors of eye disorders, plants used in treating eye disorders, and preventive and promotive care of eye are the important topics discussed in the book. For example immersion in water immediately after exposure

to heat, persistent looking at distant objects, reversal of sleeping habits, excessive weeping, excessive anger, excessive grief, psychological stress, trauma, excessive indulgence in sexual activities, excessive intake of sour substances such as tamarind, vinegar, etc., suppression of the physiological calls of nature like tears, sneezing and yawning, excessive perspiration, excessive smoking, excessive vomiting, concentrating on minute objects, exposure to dust and fumes, travelling in high speed, seasonal aberrations, injury to the head and excessive intake of fluids are some of the etiological factors of eye disorders.

The *Prakṛuti* is aimed at to provide a general introduction to the concept of human constitution in Āyurveda. Every individual should identify his constitution and adapt his life style covering foods and seasonal regimen. The Sanskrit term *prakṛti* covers both the physical and mental levels. The human constitutions are divided into three *prakṛtis* called *kapha*, *pitta* and *vāta*. When the *prakṛtis* in the living beings are manifested diversely they are called *doṣas*. For example sleeping in the day time increases *kapha*; so one should not sleep in the day. This monograph provides a detailed description of the *prakṛtis*, foods for ideal health, diseases susceptible to different constitutions, the relation between *doṣas* and seasons, mentality of the people and the way to diagnose one's *prakṛti*.

*

*

*

*

STUDIES IN THE KATHASARITSAGARA. By Aparna Chattopadhyay. Author, New A/2/1 Principals' Colony, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi-221005. Pp. xxxii+320. Price: Rs. 350=00.

STUDIES IN THE CARAKA SAMHITA. By Aparna Chattopadhyay. Author. Pp.5+172. Price Rs. 200=00.

The *Studies in the Kathāsaritsāgara* is a socio-cultural study carried out by Aparna Chattopadhyay for her Ph.D. thesis. The *Kathāsaritsāgara* was composed in Sanskrit poetry by Somadeva during the eleventh century on the basis of Guṇāḍhya's *Bṛhatkathā* written in Paisācī dialect of Prakrit. Guṇāḍhya, for being associated with the Sātavāhana kings, should have lived around first century A.D. Even though the Paisācī text was lost, its stories became popular along with the name of its composer Guṇāḍhya. The

Kathāsaritsāgara, as Aparna Chattopadhyay holds, should certainly contain many interpolations, for the text as far as our present knowledge permits, is an adaptation of the *Bṛhatkathā*. Even though it is a fiction with stories, knitted around the hero Naravāhanadatta, of princes and princesses and their associates who range from beggars, ascetics, drunkards, prostitutes to kings and warriors. The fiction like farce is composed certainly with a single goal to impress upon its readers the need to cultivate good culture and right manners. So it becomes acceptable only when the narrations in the adaptation go very close to the local conditions, social, political and religious practices and philosophical speculations. As our cultural tradition is based on evolution the *Kathāsaritsāgara* paints not only the society as known to Guṇāḍhya, but also of Somanātha's times.

Aparna Chattopadhyay has skillfully separated the socio-religious practices which were newly introduced during early medieval period from those which were traditionally continued through centuries from Vedic times. She identifies the *raja-putras* mentioned in the *Kathāsaritsāgara* as a nomenclature of a community of Central Asiatic hordes known as Rājpuṭs who migrated into India since 6th century A.D. She made a reference to the regular military training taken by brāhmaṇas in ancient India and their frequent adaptation of the occupation of kṣatriyas. The classification of Āryans into brāhmaṇa, kṣatriya and vaiśya arose on the basis of profession and we do not know when they were crystallized into nonflexible rigid castes determined by birth.

Caste system, education, marriage, position of women, foods and drinks, pastimes and festivals, economic conditions, religious life and art are the main focal points in the study. The author has drawn attention to the social problems of women like child marriage, *purdā*, intercaste marriage, and devadāsīs. She has rightly described the place of courtesans in the kings' palaces, taking instances not only from the *Kathāsaritsāgara* but also from the *Rājatarāṅgiṇī*, Bāṇa's *Kādambarī*, smṛti literature, etc. She tries to establish the origin of the Devadāsī system to the influence of alien countries, particularly through the immigrating Rājpuṭs from Central Asia. It need not necessarily be so; for the temple culture, along with the change of political power to non-kṣatriyas changed

the relationship between the king and his subjects since fifth century A.D. not only in the North but also in the South. The Āgamic texts evidence that the king not only became the *yajamāna* of the temple, but also exhibited his pomp and political success through the temple festivals. A separate image called *Utsava-bera* was newly introduced to which all the services that are done to king are done; so the Āgamic prescription: *rājavād upacāram ... kārayet* (*Vimānācanākālpa*, Paṭala 53, p. 354, Madras, 1926). The temple became the replica of the palace and thus the courtesans enter into the temple for the service of amusement to the *Utsava-mūrti*.

The study acquired value and significance because the statements of the fairy-tale are corroborated with the evidences from the *gṛhya* and *dharma sūtras*, historical poem *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* and other sources. The monograph stands testimony to how fastidious a researcher she was when she was youthfully working for her thesis in sixties even though it is published in her post-retirement days.

The *Studies in the Carakasamhitā* evidences how the holistic view of Indian culture implies cultivation of aptitude in all faculties of learning like arts, science, technology, religion and philosophy. Thus the science like medicine, archery, dance and music are called *āyur-veda*, *dhanur-veda*, *nāṭya-veda* and *gandharva-veda*. Of course only a small group of elite may be successful in visualizing the totality of the wisdom. For example various prescriptions, medical procedures and rituals speak of the society of the period during which the texts were composed, redacted and modified. The *Caraka-samhitā*, as available today is no longer a book from the pen of one single author. There are others also who contributed to its bulk, of whom Dṛḍhabala deserves special mention. The historian Aparna Chattopadhyay has shown in her monograph how *Āyurveda* was not a trade in India and how it was viewed as created for the people to help them in gaining Brahman. She gleaned the cultural aspects by keeping away meticulously the technical details about drugs and curative affects. She arranged the matter in eight chapters, namely, 1) education, 2) women and family life, 3) food and drinks, 4) drinking and smoking, 5) dress, ornaments and daily physical care, 6) problems of poison, 7) sleep and obesity, and 8) the patient and his physician. On the basis of the cultural data, she has placed the composition of the *Caraka-samhitā* some

time by the end of the third century to the beginning of the fourth century A.D. The statements of the text, if proof be needed, can be corroborated from the historical records of the respective period.

— M. Srimannarayana Murti

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Dr. S.K.Lal	Centre of Advanced study in Sanskrit University of Poona Pune-411007
Dr.Narasingha Charan Panda	Research Officer Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts B 1/3, E-7, Lane 2, Ravindrapuri Extn. Varanasi-221005
Dr. G.C. Nayak	Formerly Vice-Chancellor, S.J.S.V. Puri, and Professor of Philosophy H.No. 4/215, IRC Village Nayapalli Bhubaneswar-751015
Dr. S. Rajeswara Sarma	Formerly Professor of Sanskrit Aligarh Muslim University 31, Zakir Bagh Aligarh-202002
Dr. V. Rami Reddy	Professor of Anthropology S.V. University College of Arts and Sciences Tirupati-517502
Dr. S. Revathy	Reader Department of Sanskrit University of Madras Madras-600005

Dr. Samiran Ch. Chakrabarti

Professor & Director
School of Vedic Studies
Rabindrabharati University
135, Indra Biswas Road
Calcutta-700037

Sri C.R. Subhadra

Special Grade Lecturer in Sanskrit
Government Sanskrit College
Pattambi
Kerala

Sri V. Swaminathan

Formerly Principal, Guruvayur
Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha
18-3-61, Santhi Nagar
K.T. Road
Tirupati-517507

EDITORIAL BOARD

Editor

Professor M.Srimannarayana Murti

Honorary Referee Members

Professor K. Satchidananda Murty	Sangam Jagarlamudi
Professor N.S. Ramanuja Tatacharya	Pondicherry
Professor G.V. Subrahmanyam	Hyderabad
Professor A.V. Narasimha Murthy	Mysore

STAFF MEMBERS

Dr.M. Srimannarayana Murti	Professor of Sanskrit & Director
Dr.V. Venkatarmana Reddy	Reader
Dr.M. Prabhakara Rao	Research Assistant in Telugu
Sri T. Ananthanarayana	Research Assistant in Sanskrit
Dr.E. Chandramouli	Research Assistant in Telugu
Dr.C.V.S. Subrahmanya Sarma	Research Assistant in Sanskrit
Sri M. Munirathnam	Research Assistant in Sanskrit
Dr. N. Narasimhulu	Research Assistant in Telugu (on lien)
Dr.T.S.R. Narayanan	Research Assistant in Sanskrit

SRI VENKATESWARA UNIVERSITY ORIENTAL JOURNAL

The Sri Venkateswara University Oriental Research Institute was established in 1939 by Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams and handed over to the Sri Venkateswara University in 1956. It publishes the half-yearly periodical entitled **Sri Venkateswara University Oriental Journal** with original research papers on language and literature of Sanskrit and Telugu, Linguistics, Indian Philosophy and Religion, Ancient Indian History, Fine Arts and Ancient Indian Science. Learned papers written mainly in English partly in Sanskrit and Telugu are received from eminent scholars for publication in the Journal. The papers sent for publication should not normally be more than 12 typed pages with double space and wide margins. Standard system of transliteration should be followed in reproducing original texts. Contributors are requested to retain one copy with them as the manuscript submitted cannot be returned. Twentyfive off-prints of the published article and one copy of the Journal will be sent to the authors free of cost.

The journal also contains reviews of books on Indology. Two copies of books are to be submitted for review in the Journal.

For further details please write to
The Professor and Director
Oriental Research Institute
Sri Venkateswara University
TIRUPATI-517 502 (A.P.)

